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Part I
Introduction

Chapter 1
Introduction
“ The world is becoming too fast, too complex and
too networked for any company to have all the answers
inside.”
YOCHAI BENKLER, 2006
1.1 Motivation
ONLINE collaboration and in particular crowdsourcing services are a new mechanismto share information and goods, participate in political debates, and even work on
small to complex tasks in a digital space. Information Technology (IT) enables people to
collaborate worldwide via internet access from their own computer, wherever they want.
Hence, it is now easier than ever to participate, collaborate, exchange, and work as entry
barriers are lowered given the easy and often anonymous access via the internet. Such
new services pave the pathway for our future interactions and a potential pathway of how
we are going to work in the future.
Many services and platforms, which were developed in the past century, proved how
disruptive online collaboration, particularly crowdsourcing, is. Nowadays we share in-
formation in private and professional social networks and blogs, communicate via online
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messengers, take part in political decisions via online polls or participatory budgeting pro-
grams, fund companies on crowdfunding platforms, develop new products in open innova-
tion contests, and even work online on crowdsourcing platforms. On such crowdsourcing
platforms, which are sometimes called online labor markets or crowd work platforms,
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)1, crowd workers from all over the world work
on small and mostly simple tasks for a small monetary compensation. Tasks are issued
from a set of requesters, usually companies, which most of the time break down tasks into
small subsets. Hence, one essential property of such tasks is that the overall goal can be
divided into subtasks. These so called micro-tasks can then be completed by one or several
crowd workers. Since each of these micro-tasks is usually executed quickly the monetary
compensation is comparatively low. After the completion of all micro-tasks, the requester
aggregates all finished instances of the overall task (see Chapter 2 for more details).
These recently developed online collaboration and crowdsourcing platforms offer a
huge potential for companies, practitioners, and researchers. With current internet tech-
nology it is now theoretically possible to reach a huge working force without high costs.
Crowdsourcing uses this available human capital – the crowd – and offers work for a small
price or sometimes even for free to this large pool of people willing to work (Ipeirotis,
2010a; Leimeister, 2010; Paolacci et al., 2010). Recently, an increasing number of com-
panies foster this potential by crowdsourcing work which was previously done in-house.
Based on the demand, a variety of platforms evolved not only ranging from simple tasks,
such as transcription of receipts, but to complex tasks, such as building logos on plat-
forms like 99designs2 (Hammon and Hippner, 2012; Kittur et al., 2012, 2013). Besides
using “standard” crowdsourcing platforms, which are organized by different online ven-
dors (e.g., MTurk1) and offer access to various crowds willing to work on these specific
tasks, companies sometimes design their own custom platform. These custom platforms
face the challenge of creating and incentivizing their own crowd (see Chapter 2 for more
details on crowdsourcing and its related concepts).
The design of such an online platform plays a pivotal role in how well these crowd-
sourcing applications perform. First, such platforms need to attract many participants to
build a crowd and foster the available human capital worldwide. The crowd is the most
important factor, as the whole concept of crowdsourcing is built around the cornerstone
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome last accessed: September 6, 2016.
2http://en.99designs.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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of having access to such a working force (see Ipeirotis, 2010a; Leimeister, 2010; Paolacci
et al., 2010). In some cases a crowd needs to consist of experts (e.g., designers), while in
other cases a wide range of user profiles is preferred. All of them need to be attracted by
adequate incentives.
Second, the platform must facilitate and attract fast execution to please the compa-
nies’ desire to receive results quickly. Finally, the platform must provide a certain quality
standard of the results, such that requestors’ expectations are met. All these challenges
target the crowd workers’ behavior: (i) crowd workers decide on whether to participate in
a crowd, (ii) execute the tasks quickly, and (iii) work carefully to secure the result quality.
A crowd worker’s behavior is known to be affected by the design of a platform or market
(Weinhardt et al., 2003; Weinhardt and Gimpel, 2007; Gimpel et al., 2008). Additionally,
most of the design challenges of crowdsourcing platforms are at least partially affected by
incentives, since incentives increase the likelihood that someone is motivated to work on a
task (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Rheinberg, 2008; Schattke, 2011). Hence, finding the correct
incentive for a crowdsourcing application is one of the biggest challenges in this field (Shaw
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013). Crowdsourcing platforms use a wide variety of incentive
and feedback schemes. Crowd workers work for free on platforms such as Wikipedia3 and
Google ReCAPTCHA4. On platforms such as MTurk1 and clickworker5 crowd workers are
paid for each finished (micro-) task. In contrast, platforms such as 99designs2 and thread-
less6 use tournament prizes with different implementations of giving feedback within the
tournament to attract crowd workers.
The work at hand stresses the importance of finding the correct incentives for a given
crowdsourcing scenario by developing a deeper understanding of crowd workers’ behavior
under different incentive and feedback schemes.
3https://www.wikipedia.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
4https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html last accessed: September 6, 2016.
5https://www.clickworker.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
6https://www.threadless.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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1.2 Research Outline
This thesis highlights the importance of incentive engineering for crowdsourcing from a
platform designer’s view. It focuses on the individual crowd worker’s behavior. More
precisely, it focuses on the effect of different incentives on a crowd worker’s motivation.
Incentivizing crowd workers is essential, since a crowdsourcing platform’s most important
asset is the crowd. A platform designer needs to incentivize participation or a certain be-
havior depending on the goals the crowd should achieve. In this thesis, therefore, different
incentive schemes are evaluated to shed light on the effect of incentives on crowd workers’
behavior.
Incentives are set by platform designers to motivate participants. Incentives can lead to
motivation if a person in his current situation is attracted by these incentives (Rheinberg,
2008; Schattke, 2011). A motivated person is then more likely to change his behavior, e.g.,
to work harder or with more precision (see Chapter 3 for more details). Motivation can be
either of intrinsic or extrinsic nature. Intrinsic motivation targets a participants’ inherent
satisfaction and not some separable outcome, as extrinsic motivation does, which is fur-
ther elaborated in Chapter 3 (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Straightforward incentives a platform
designer can adjust are of extrinsic nature, e.g., money and prizes (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
The two most common monetary incentive schemes used in crowdsourcing are “piece rates
(PR)” and “rank-order-tournaments (ROTs)” (see Chapter 2 for more details). PRs pay per
finished work and are mainly used in crowdsourcing small tasks, so-called micro-tasks,
on platforms like MTurk1, clickworker5, and CrowdFlower7. ROTs are mainly used for
tasks where it is not feasible to pay for every solution, e.g., creative tasks such as design-
ing logos, t-shirts, and innovative products, on platforms like 99designs2, threadless6, and
InnoCentive8. It is well known that different payment schemes affect a participant’s behav-
ior (Lazear and Sherwin, 1981; Bull et al., 1987; Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Becker
and Huselid, 1992; Prendergast, 1999; van Dijk et al., 2001). However, for online and
crowdsourcing settings in particular, it is unclear which incentive scheme motivates crowd
workers better. Hence, a field experiment on the most common micro-task crowdsourcing
platform – MTurk – comparing PR and ROT incentive schemes is implemented (see Chap-
ter 4). This approach delivers a comprehensive insight in crowd workers’ behavior on a
7http://www.crowdflower.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
8https://www.innocentive.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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crowdsourcing platform. The amount of effort a crowd worker puts into a task depending
on the incentive scheme, i.e., how often he finishes a task given a certain time frame, is
evaluated. In particular, the following research question is addressed:
Research Question 1: Which incentive scheme – piece rates or rank-order-
tournaments – incentivizes crowd workers’ effort best?
After comparing the two incentive schemes, the question arises if ROTs can be modified
in order that crowd workers exert more effort. Most ROTs standardly show a ranking to
give feedback about a crowd worker’s current position. However, this information may
encourage or discourage a crowd worker as it discloses chances to win. Crowd workers
who are far off of a winning position might be discouraged, while crowd workers close
to winning positions might be encouraged to give their best and close the gap to payout
positions (see Mazarakis et al., 2011). By customizing this feedback and only showing
certain competitors of different strengths, a crowd worker’s motivation might be positively
affected (see Mazarakis and Krämer, 2010; Mazarakis and Van Dinther, 2011) (see Chapter
4). Therefore, different feedback schemes in a ROT and their effect on crowd workers’
effort are evaluated on MTurk regarding the following research question:
Research Question 2: Does feedback in rank-order-tournaments affect crowd
workers’ effort in crowdsourcing settings?
After examining a crowd worker’s effort in ROTs with and without feedback, risk-taking
in ROTs is analyzed. Besides an adjustment of feedback, ROTs offer many more design op-
tions. It might be that in ROTs risk-taking is influenced by the tournament’s design and
the feedback mechanism (see van Dijk et al., 2001; Eriksson et al., 2009b). Participants on
lower ranks might take higher risks to close the gap to payout ranks or risk attitudes of par-
ticipants competing in teams might differ from participants competing individually. How-
ever, studies for crowd tournaments are missing, although risk-taking might be beneficial
for certain crowdsourcing applications. Especially for creative crowdsourcing tasks, who
seek extraordinary solutions, designs exerting risk-taking behavior might result in a vari-
ety of more diverse and non-standard solutions. High risk propensity might affect crowd
workers to avoid conformist solutions. For other tasks, where non-creative, but standard
solutions are seeked, risk aversion might stimulate higher quality. Thereby it is important
for platform designers to shed light on how their ROT setup influences crowd workers’
7
Chapter 1 Introduction
risk-taking. Hence, different ROT setups and their influence on risk-taking in a longitu-
dinal crowdsourcing setup are analyzed. In particular an individual ranking, where each
crowd worker competes on his own, and a team ranking, where teams compete against
other teams, are studied (see Chapter 5). Hence, the following research question with its
three sub-questions are analyzed:
Research Question 3: How is risk-taking behavior affected in long lasting rank-
order-tournaments?
Research Question 3.1: Does the tournament mode (teams or individuals)
affect risk-taking behavior?
Research Question 3.2: Does the tournament progress affect risk-taking be-
havior?
Research Question 3.3: Does the ranking position affect risk-taking behav-
ior?
Besides monetary incentives and different setups within these payment schemes, crowd-
sourcing often is not based on offering a monetary compensation as incentive for crowd
workers (Hammon and Hippner, 2012). Many prominent crowdsourcing examples like
Wikipedia3, Google ReCAPTCHA4, Stack Overflow9, and OpenIDEO10 show that a crowd
can be motivated to participate without a payment. For a platform designer it is there-
fore beneficial to understand the motives behind such non-monetary incentives. It is well
known from classical motivational theory that besides extrinsic motivation, intrinsic mo-
tivation is a strong driver for participation and effort (Ryan and Deci, 2000). From a plat-
form designer’s perspective it is hard to target intrinsic motivation with incentives, since it
is driven by the personal interest of the crowd worker. However, it might be beneficial to
remind a crowd worker about his initial intrinsic motivation or to give insights about the
altruistic goals of the platform by a (customized) framing. Hence, the influence of framing
on crowd workers’ behavior is analyzed in the context of a German government financed
project – the “Planspiel Flächenhandel11” (see Chapter 6). Moreover, it is of interest for
9http://stackoverflow.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
10http://www.openideo.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
11The “Planspiel Flächenhandel” evaluates a cap and trade system for tradeable development rights. For
more details see Subsection 6.2.2 of Chapter 6, and the project’s homepage http://www.flaechenhandel
.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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platform designers how such a framing in non-monetary settings performs compared to
standardly incentivized settings. It might be that a (customized) framing in non-monetary
settings induces similar behavior as in monetarily incentivized settings. This would pro-
vide a strong tool for platform designers. In particular the following research questions
are analyzed:
Research Question 4: Is framing capable of influencing behavior in non-monetary
settings towards a certain goal?
Research Question 5: Can a customized framing for a non-monetary setting
lead to similar behavior as in monetarily incentivized settings?
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The work at hand is structured in four parts as shown in Figure 1.1. Part I motivates this
thesis (Section 1.1 of Chapter 1), presents the research outline and the research ques-
tions (Section 1.2 of Chapter 1), gives an overview of this thesis’ structure (Section 1.3 of
Chapter 1), and presents the research development process (Section 1.4 of Chapter 1).
Part II introduces and defines collaborative online work and in particular crowdsourcing
as a use case scenario of this work (Chapter 2). Furthermore it presents foundations of
motivational theory (Chapter 3).
Part III consists of the three main chapters of this thesis and presents insights about
collaborative online work, most importantly crowdsourcing platforms. Chapter 4 evalu-
ates how different payment schemes and giving feedback about the competitor’s strength
affects a crowd worker’s behavior (thereby addressing Research Questions 1 and 2). Fur-
ther evaluating a crowd worker’s behavior, Chapter 5 analyzes how risk-taking behavior is
influenced by different tournament designs (thereby addressing Research Question 3 and
its sub-questions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). Chapter 6 evaluates if crowds in collaborative online
work scenarios without monetary incentives can still be incentivized with a framing, even
when they work for free (thereby addressing Research Questions 4 and 5)
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Part IV concludes this thesis by summarizing the key contributions made in the context
of collaborative online work and crowdsourcing (Section 7.1 of Chapter 7). Furthermore,
it outlines promising pathways for future research (Section 7.2 of Chapter 7).
Part V contains the appendices.
1.4 Research Development
Parts of the work at hand have been accepted for publication and have been presented
at European and international conferences. In addition, parts have been published as
articles in double-blind reviewed journals. This section serves to give an overview of this
development.
Chapter 4 evaluates the effect of different payment schemes and feedback on a crowd
worker’s motivation. It was developed in the process of three publications. The basic
setup consisted of two extreme feedback schemes as proof of an effect of feedback on a
crowd worker’s motivation. It was published in the proceedings of the international confer-
ence Collective Intelligence 2014 as joint work with Henner Gimpel and Florian Teschner
(Straub, Gimpel, and Teschner, 2014). It was ranked six among the top ten recent papers
on labor markets as listed on the Social Science Research Network after publication in April
9th 2014. After establishing the initial proof, extensions with more sophisticated feedback
mechanisms and theory development were made, which allow a more detailed evaluation
of the effects. Hence, an additional extended experiment was conducted targeting the
extreme feedbacks and a new mediocre feedback. This revised and extended version of
the paper was published at the 22nd European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS
2014) in Tel Aviv, Israel as joint work with Henner Gimpel, Florian Teschner, and Christof
Weinhardt (Straub, Gimpel, Teschner, and Weinhardt, 2014). To further strengthen the
findings and to integrate the feedback from the two conferences, two new experiments
were conducted. Thereby, another feedback mechanism was evaluated and a compar-
ison between the two payment schemes without feedback was evaluated. These three
experiments were then published as extensive picture about Research Questions 1 and 2
published in the special issue Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social Comput-
ing of the journal Business & Information Systems Engineering as joint work with Henner
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Gimpel, Florian Teschner, and Christof Weinhardt (Straub et al., 2015).
Chapter 5 discusses the effects of different ROT setups on a crowd worker’s risk-taking
behavior. It complements Chapter 4 by looking at a different aspect – risk-taking – of
the user’s behavior in crowd tournaments and targets Research Question 3 and its sub-
questions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. The evaluation was implemented as an online experiment
accompanying the FIFA World Cup of 2014. It was presented at the 49th Hawaii Interna-
tional Conference on System Sciences (HICSS 49) as joint work with Timm Teubner and
Christof Weinhardt (Straub, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016) and was nominated for the
best paper award.
Chapter 6 was developed between 2014 and 2016, during the course of the project
“Planspiel Flächenhandel” funded by the German Federal Environment Agency. In this
project the overall goal of testbedding a cap and trade system for land consumption was
implemented and experimentally evaluated with local authorities. Results of these exper-
iments were contributed to the project, including a publication in the book “IÖR Schriften
Nr. 69: Flächennutzungsmonitoring VIII” and several result reports, which are accessible
on the project’s homepage12. The book publication was created as joint work with Ralph
Henger, Kilian Bizer, Lutke Blecken, Katrin Fahrenkrug, Uwe Ferber, Jens-Martin Gutsche,
Tobias Kranz, Michael Melzer, Lukas Meub, Till Proeger, Stefan Siedentop, Tom Schmidt,
Achim Tack, and Christof Weinhardt (Henger et al., 2017). Parts of the design and con-
ceptualization of the project context are described in Subsection 6.2.2 and Section 6.3.
They were developed as joint work with Tobias Kranz, Timm Teubner, Christof Weinhardt,
Ralph Henger, and Michael Schier. In the work at hand, a different angle is taken, accom-
panying the project’s context. Light is shed on the motivational factor of non-monetary
incentives, targeting Research Questions 4 and 5. Hence, findings further strengthen the
overall picture of incentive engineering in crowdsourcing.
In addition, complementary research in progress in Chapter 7 (Towards a Guideline
for Conducting Crowd Experiments) was presented at and published in the proceedings
of the Second Karlsruhe Service Summit Research Workshop as joint work with Florian
Hawlitschek and Christof Weinhardt (Straub, Hawlitschek, and Weinhardt, 2016). It sum-
marizes lessons learned for experimental economics from the three chapters in Part III.
12http://www.flaechenhandel.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Particularly conducting online experiments with crowds sometimes needs different ap-
proaches as classical experimental economics suggests. Hence, it proposes a way for re-
searchers to collaboratively overcome typical challenges one faces when conducting such
online experiments with crowds. However, it is not a main part of this work but ongo-
ing complementary research presented in Section 7.2. Thereby it gives an outlook and a
possible direction for future work.
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Part II
Foundations and Related Work

Chapter 2
Aspects of Collaborative Online Work
“ [...T]his is not an information age. It’s an age of
networked intelligence, it’s an age of vast promise, an
age of collaboration,[...].”
DON TAPSCOTT, 2012
COLLABORATIVE online work is more present than ever. Starting with the Web 2.0development in the early 2000’s, the World Wide Web (WWW) has changed (Knorr,
2003; O’Reilly, 2006). Before, a set of web developers produced content while internet
users consumed. With the Web 2.0 development the user changed from a consumer to a
prosumer, who develops and uses content at the same time.
Since then many concepts originated how people collaborate and share information,
knowledge, creativity, money, and even work (see Malone et al., 2010; Leimeister, 2010;
Hammon and Hippner, 2012; Prpic´, 2016). Blogging is the concept of web-users cre-
ating their own articles in the web (e.g., blogger1, WordPress2, etc.) (see Nardi et al.,
2004). Tagging refers, for example, to labeling images to index them for search engines
(e.g., Flickr3, YouTube4, etc.) (see Golder and Huberman, 2006; Malone et al., 2010; Lee
1https://www.blogger.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
2https://wordpress.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
3https://www.flickr.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
4https://www.youtube.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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et al., 2012). Wikis are a tool for collaboratively sharing and managing content (e.g.,
Wikipedia5, SharePoint6, etc.) (see Oreg and Nov, 2008; Malone et al., 2010; Mazarakis
and Van Dinther, 2011; Lee et al., 2012). With social media sites, people can build their
own networks, share content publicly or privately, and keep in touch with friends and
share personal thoughts (e.g., Facebook7, twitter8, etc.) (see Röll, 2010; Wilson et al.,
2012; Boecking et al., 2015). Through crowdfunding, internet users can invest money
in ideas and products (e.g., Kickstarter9, Indiegogo10, etc.) (see Hammon and Hippner,
2012; Feldmann and Gimpel, 2016). Open innovation contests outsource new product
developments to users (e.g., Tchibo ideas11, OpenIDEO12, etc.) (see Chesbrough, 2006;
Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). Using prediction markets, a combination of informed and un-
informed traders predict future events by trading stocks and therefore shed light on the
likelihood of future events (e.g., Economic Indicator eXchange13, Iowa Electronic Mar-
kets14, etc.) (see Spann and Skiera, 2003; Teschner et al., 2011; Kranz et al., 2014; Kloker
et al., 2016). Last, (crowd) online labor markets refers to outsourcing work to internet
users (e.g., MTurk15, clickworker16, etc.) (see Ipeirotis, 2010a; Mason and Suri, 2012).
Different research domains take certain angles to tackle this ever-changing develop-
ment. For example, the service research domain focuses on different conceptual roles
customers can take when they are integrated in the processes of companies and the ben-
efits for the company (see Straub et al., 2013; Kunze von Bischhoffshausen et al., 2015).
The Information Systems (IS) domain focuses on the impact on electronic markets, how to
create crowds, how to incentivize crowds (see for example Chapters 4, 5, and 6), how to
secure quality, and how this potential workforce can be used in different setups (Ipeirotis,
2010a; Ipeirotis et al., 2010; Leimeister, 2010; Paolacci et al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2011;
Hammon and Hippner, 2012; Wang et al., 2013).
5https://www.wikipedia.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
6https://products.office.com/en-us/sharepoint/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
7https://www.facebook.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
8https://twitter.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
9https://www.kickstarter.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
10https://www.indiegogo.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
11https://www.tchibo-ideas.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
12https://openideo.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
13http://www.eix-market.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
14http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
15https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome last accessed: September 6, 2016.
16https://www.clickworker.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Recently the term crowdsourcing became prominent and is used for many of these Web
2.0 approaches (Howe, 2006a,b). Specifically it is used for concepts who try to harness
the human capital available worldwide as working force, i.e. the crowd. The work at hand
evaluates how different incentives affect a user’s motivation on crowdsourcing platforms.
The most important factor of online collaboration and online work in particular is human
capital (i.e., the crowd). All of the mentioned concepts only work if a platform can mo-
tivate people to participate. Crowdsourcing is used as it targets this factor most clearly.
In crowdsourcing there are no users who just consume, like it is the case with blogs or
tagging, where users might passively read or profit from better search engines (i.e., con-
sumers), which are enhanced with tagged pictures by other active users (i.e., prosumers)
– crowd workers are creating value (Hammon and Hippner, 2012). All crowd workers are
users who produce and without them such concepts would not work. Hence, motivation
of users is the most important asset in crowdsourcing.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 introduces and de-
fines the term and concept “crowdsourcing”. Subsection 2.1.1 classifies different crowd-
sourcing applications along different incentive schemes. Subsection 2.1.2 explains several
crowdsourcing applications which are later in focus of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Subsection
2.1.3 delineates the concept from different related collaboration concepts. Section 2.2
then embeds the work at hand in existing works and research streams of collaborative
online work, crowdsourcing, and incentives.
2.1 Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing and online labor markets (e.g., MTurk15) have emerged as new pools of
human labor that allow organizations to flexibly scale their workforce and hire experts,
typically for a comparatively low price or no price at all (Leimeister, 2010; Paolacci et al.,
2010; Hammon and Hippner, 2012). The neologism was created by Howe (2006a,b) as
“[...t]he act of a company or institution taking a function once performed by employees
and outsourcing it to an undefined network of people in the form of an open call.” This
definition specifies the key aspects of crowdsourcing in a clear manner and is in line with
other definitions of the term crowdsourcing (cf. Estellés and González, 2012; Hammon
and Hippner, 2012).
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Crowdsourcing is the combination of the two terms “crowd” and “outsourcing” (Rouse,
2010). The concept is similar to classical “outsourcing” with several key differences. First,
in classical outsourcing one company outsources tasks once performed in-house to an-
other company (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993). Therefore it is clear to whom the company
outsources its tasks (Rouse, 2010). In crowdsourcing a company or any other individ-
ual outsources the task to “[...a]n undefined network of people[...]” – the crowd (Howe,
2006a,b; Rouse, 2010). Therefore they do not know to whom they are outsourcing to.
Second, crowdsourcing is an “open call”. Hence, it is not clear when the task will be fin-
ished or at which level of quality. Normally in outsourcing you have information about the
company to whom you are outsourcing your tasks (Rouse, 2010). Hence, you can gather
some details about this company (e.g., reputation), which sheds light on these uncertain-
ties. In crowdsourcing this is normally not the case. Third, while in standard outsourcing
contracts between the two respective firms exist, they are missing in crowdsourcing (Mar-
janovic et al., 2012). This makes it almost impossible to embed expectations about the
result.
However, besides these key differences to classical outsourcing, crowdsourcing offers
great potential for companies, practitioners, and researchers. First, crowdsourcing offers a
large potential pool of workers – the crowd (Paolacci et al., 2010; Mason and Suri, 2012).
In theory these are all people with internet access. However, they need to be motivated
to work (see Chapter 3 on more details about motivation). Some emerged markets are
collecting large pools of online workers which are willing to work for a small monetary
compensation, like for example MTurk15, clickworker16, or 99designs17, which have up
to 850,000 workers18(Ipeirotis, 2010a). Second, the crowd is almost 24/7 available for
work, since they are working from around the globe. Hence, tasks have the potential to
be finished fast, when they are attractive for crowd workers, since a subset of the crowd
can always work on tasks (Ipeirotis, 2010a). Third, paid online labor is cheap (Leimeister,
2010; Paolacci et al., 2010). The hourly reservation wage is as low as United States dollar
(USD) 1.38 while the effective wage is as low as USD 4.80 (Horton and Chilton, 2010;
Ipeirotis, 2010a).
17http://en.99designs.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
18Note that numbers are mainly based on information from the companies’ websites. Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) 500,000 (https://requester.mturk.com/tour last accessed: September 6, 2016), click-
worker 700,000 (https://www.clickworker.com/en/about-us/ last accessed: September 6, 2016), and
99designs 850,000 (http://99designs.de/about/press-releases)
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Crowdsourcing offers opportunities for crowd workers as well. First, crowd workers
can work from wherever and whenever they want, as long as they have a computer with
an internet connection (Terranova, 2004; Howe, 2006a,b; Brabham, 2008). This offers a
flexible work life. Second, crowd workers can make some extra cash or base their living
on crowd work. Crowd workers can earn more than USD 1,000 a week working on MTurk
(Ipeirotis, 2010b). 12 % percent of U.S. workers and 27 % of Indian workers even use
MTurk as their primary source of income (Ipeirotis, 2010b). Third, crowdsourcing offers
the potential to use arbitrage effects. Since crowd workers are working from all over
the world and requesters (i.e., companies) offer tasks from all over the world as well,
the offered wages are often attractive. For example, an effective wage of USD 4.80 per
hour might be higher than the average wages in some regions (Horton and Chilton, 2010;
Ipeirotis, 2010a). This effect can be seen on MTurk where 34 % of workers are from India.
The average yearly wage of an Indian person is roughly at USD 1,50019. Fourth, crowd
workers can choose which tasks they want to work on (Mason and Suri, 2012). Hence,
they only have to work on tasks which they prefer, which is a clear distinction to standard
work contracts.
In the past few years, companies have initiated many crowdsourcing activities in or-
der to benefit from the knowledge and potential of the crowd (e.g., 99designs17, thread-
less20, MTurk15, clickworker16, CrowdFlower21, InnoCentive22, Wikipedia5, Google Re-
CAPTCHA23). These platforms show the great potential of rightly tuned crowdsourcing
applications, which incentives, goals, and collaboration structures attract large crowds.
Moreover, researchers started to harness the potential of the crowd as well. Experimental
researchers increasingly started using MTurk as low cost participant pool (Chilton et al.,
2010; Hall and Caton, 2014). Furthermore, previous work has examined crowdsourcing
regarding its requirements for research (Schlagwein and Farhad, 2014), validity and costs
(Chilton et al., 2010), and crowd worker demographics (Paolacci et al., 2010; Berinsky
et al., 2012). See Mason and Suri (2012), Horton et al. (2011), Kaufmann et al. (2011),
Pilz and Gewald (2013), and Teschner and Gimpel (2013) for recent examples.
19Note that this number is based on statistics from the world bank in 2013 (http://data.worldbank.o
rg/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD last accessed: September 6, 2016).
20https://www.threadless.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
21http://www.crowdflower.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
22https://www.innocentive.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
23https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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2.1.1 Classification of Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing can be classified by means of several dimensions (Geiger et al., 2012).
Crowdsourcing could be classified at hand of the type of task (Corney et al., 2009; Rouse,
2010; Doan et al., 2011; Brabham, 2012; Geiger et al., 2012; Prpic´ et al., 2015; Prpic´,
2016), who is working on the tasks (Corney et al., 2009; Malone et al., 2010; Rouse,
2010; Zwass, 2010; Doan et al., 2011; Geiger et al., 2012), which control system or quality
mechanism is used (Allahbakhsh et al., 2013; Saxton et al., 2013), or which incentive
structure is used (Leimeister et al., 2009; Horton and Chilton, 2010; Malone et al., 2010;
Rogstadius et al., 2011; Hammon and Hippner, 2012; Chandler and Kapelner, 2013; Kittur
et al., 2013). The focus of this thesis is on incentives for crowdsourcing. Hence, we
concentrate on classifying crowdsourcing along this dimension.
A prominent classification by Prpic´ et al. (2015) identifies four main crowdsourcing al-
ternatives along two dimensions as depicted in Figure 2.1. The first dimension separates
crowdsourcing alternatives along its content. Crowdsourcing content can either be subjec-
tive or objective. Subjective content has no right or wrong answer but rather is based on
an individuals opinion, while objective content leads to an unbiased result, so to speak a
fact (Prpic´ et al., 2015; Prpic´, 2016). The second dimension differentiates crowdsourcing
based on how the contributions are processed by the requester once crowd workers fin-
ished the task(s). Aggregated contributions collectively generate the desired value, while
other contributions must be filtered based on their quality to secure their value for the
requester (Prpic´ et al., 2015; Prpic´, 2016). Based on these two dimensions, four main
crowdsourcing alternatives can be identified. First, in crowd-voting crowd workers collec-
tively decide between alternatives by each voting for their subjective best option. Second,
micro-task crowdsourcing divides a big task into small subsets of repeatable micro-tasks
which can then be worked on individually (see Subsection 2.1.2 of this chapter for an ex-
ample of such a platform). Afterwards the individual contributions must be aggregated
from the requester, in order that the overall task is solved. Third, in idea crowdsourcing
the creativity of the crowd is desired. Since the requester desires a unique and diverse so-
lution the contributions must be filtered afterwards, in order that the contributions meet
subjective expectations. Fourth, in contrast to idea crowdsourcing, solution crowdsourc-
ing has a well described problem which can be objectively solved. The contribution either
solves the problem, then the content is correct, or not (Prpic´ et al., 2015; Prpic´, 2016).
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An organization requests choices 
between alternatives and then 
aggregates the votes. 
 
 
e.g., American Idol, 
Facebook Like-Button 
 
Idea Crowdsourcing 
 
An organizaiton invites opinions  
for small or big questions and then 
evaluates the proposed ideas. 
 
 
e.g., threadless,  
       99designs 
Micro-Task Crowdsourcing 
 
An organization breaks a problem 
into smaller jobs and then  
re-assembles the completed tasks. 
 
 
e.g., Google ReCAPTCHA, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Solution Crowdsourcing 
 
An organization invites and tests 
contributions for very specific 
problems and then adopts the best 
non-falsifiable solutions. 
 
e.g., Netflix Prize,  
       Tchibo Ideas 
FIGURE 2.1: Classification of crowdsourcing into four main alternatives by Prpi´c et al. (2015),
extended with further examples.
This classification gives an exhaustive overview of different crowdsourcing alternatives.
However, there is no clear distinction of different applicable and used incentives for crowd-
sourcing. For example, two prominent examples for micro-task crowdsourcing are Google
ReCAPTCHA23 and MTurk15. Google ReCAPTCHA23 does not offer a monetary compen-
sation but rather enforces participation in order to get access to a certain website, while
MTurk15 offers a monetary compensation to its crowd workers. Hence, we need to clas-
sify crowdsourcing along the dimension of incentives in order to have a fuller picture of
crowdsourcing.
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Following Hammon and Hippner (2012) crowdsourcing platforms can be divided in
paid- and non-paid crowdsourcing applications. Paid crowdsourcing is mostly initiated
by profit oriented companies submitting their tasks on crowdsourcing markets where a
large pool of potential workers are registered to work for money (e.g MTurk15, Crowd-
Flower21, clickworker16, 99designs17, threadless20). Non-paid crowdsourcing mostly con-
sists of tasks following different goals than earning money. It is mostly initiated from
non-profit organizations or from non-profit projects within companies (e.g., Wikipedia5,
Google ReCAPTCHA23) (see Subsection 2.1.2 for an exemplary platform description and
Chapter 6 for details on how such non-monetary incentives influence user behavior).
Paid-crowdsourcing applications can be further divided by their payment scheme (Mal-
one et al., 2010; Kittur et al., 2013). On the one hand, there are crowdsourcing tourna-
ments that are applied for tasks which are mostly complex and often of creative nature
(e.g., 99designs17, threadless20) (see Subsection 2.1.2 for an exemplary platform descrip-
tion and Chapters 4 and 5 for details on how this incentive structure influences user be-
havior). In such cases it is mostly not suitable to pay every worker, but only one who’s
submission is accepted and used by the company. Hence, the payment scheme follows a
ROT where only one or several contestants get paid in the end. The principle of such ROTs
can be briefly summarized as follows: Typically, a task and a set of rewards are announced
to attract potential crowd workers who then compete against each other in completing the
task. Over the course of the tournament, an optional ranking may inform the crowd work-
ers about their current performance evaluation and (or just) their payoff-relevant position
in the ranking. The most successful contributors in the eyes of the issuer or an external
jury win a (graduated) set of rewards (Araujo, 2013). On the other hand, there are PR
payment schemes. PRs are mostly used for tasks which can be divided into small, simple,
and repetitive chunks, so called micro-tasks (e.g., MTurk15, clickworker16) (see Subsec-
tion 2.1.2 for an exemplary platform description and Chapter 4 for details on how this
incentive structure influences user behavior). In the case of a PR payment scheme a crowd
worker usually works on one ore several of these micro-tasks and gets paid per finished
task. Payment is usually lower than in ROTs, since each task is normally small and can be
executed fast (Hammon and Hippner, 2012; Mason and Suri, 2012). This type of work
can, for example, be data entry, image tagging, or verification of addresses. Following this
we can classify crowdsourcing based on the incentive scheme as depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Crowdsourcing 
Incentives 
Non-Monetary Monetary 
Piece Rate Rank-Order-Tournament 
FIGURE 2.2: Classification of crowdsourcing based on the incentive scheme. Own presentation
based on Malone et al. (2010), Hammon and Hippner (2012), and Kittur et al.
(2013).
2.1.2 Exemplary Crowdsourcing Platforms
To better understand crowdsourcing and to get a feeling about its scope this section briefly
discusses several crowdsourcing platforms. These platforms represent the three mainly
used incentive types as depicted in Figure 2.2 (see Subsection 2.1.1) and are each promi-
nent and successful examples of these incentive types. Moreover, the following platforms
and their crowdsourcing application type are in focus of the Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
Amazon Mechanical Turk
MTurk15 presents itself as “marketplace for work”. It is one of the biggest, most noticed,
and examined crowdsourcing platforms (Ipeirotis, 2010a; Paolacci et al., 2010). Mainly it
is a micro-task platform, where requesters (mostly profit oriented companies) ask crowd
workers to execute simple and mostly repetitive tasks which suit to fulfill an overarching
goal – so called Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) (Mason and Suri, 2012; Chandler et al.,
2014). The crowd workers are paid per finished task (PR) and payment is rather low due to
the simplicity of tasks (Paolacci et al., 2010). Hence, MTurk is an example of a platform us-
ing a monetary PR incentive type as depicted in Figure 2.2 (see Subsection 2.1.1). Based on
these dimensions MTurk is comparable to platforms like clickworker16 or CrowdFlower21.
Such platforms are sometimes called “online labor markets” or “crowd work” platforms
to differentiate them from non-paid crowdsourcing applications (see Horton, 2010; Kittur
et al., 2013). The process of such crowdsourcing platforms is rather straightforward, as
depicted in Figure 2.3. A requester publishes his task on the platform. The requester then
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Task 
Publication 
Worker 
Preselection 
Task 
Execution 
Validation & 
Reward 
Requester Requester or Platform Crowd Worker(s) Requester or Platform 
Crowd Task 
Task Description 
Crowd Workers Task Instances 
Workers to be Rewarded 
(black) 
FIGURE 2.3: The high-level steps of crowdsourcing and the respective actors of Tranquillini
et al. (2015).
may set requirements for workers, so called qualifications (Mason and Suri, 2012). Doing
so, only workers who fulfill these requirements are allowed to work on such a task. On
MTurk such crowd worker requirements include (i) a rate of how many of the previous
tasks were processed correctly, (ii) how many tasks he already finished, and (iii) in which
country a worker resides (Mason and Suri, 2012). Workers who fulfill these requirements
then start working on the tasks. Once they are finished, the requester checks the results
and if they are valid, pays the crowd workers, if not, rejects the task (Tranquillini et al.,
2015). MTurk is the focus of the implemented analyses of Chapter 4.
99designs
99designs17 is a crowdsourcing application where requesters (mostly profit oriented com-
panies) can outsource the design of logos to crowd workers, i.e., a logo for a company or a
website (Schlagwein and Farhad, 2014). The platform uses a tournament setup to decide
who gets paid (Tranquillini et al., 2015). Hence, 99designs is an example of a platform
using a monetary ROT incentive type as depicted in Figure 2.2 (see Subsection 2.1.1). A
requester only pays for one design, the design picked in the end (Huang et al., 2012).
Therefore he creates a crowdsourcing tournament and gives the crowd workers (design-
ers) some specifications about the desired design (Cavallo and Jain, 2012). Several crowd
workers then start designing logos and compete for the prize. During the tournament
the requester can rank the designs and give personalized feedback to the crowd workers.
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After several iterations, where the crowd workers can submit revised versions of their de-
signs, the requester picks a winning submission (Cavallo and Jain, 2012; Huang et al.,
2012; Tranquillini et al., 2015). Such contests are especially suitable for tasks where the
requester does not have a clear idea about the outcome, as it is the case for creative work
(Cavallo and Jain, 2012; Tranquillini et al., 2015). The crowd worker whose design is
picked by the requester gets the prize, usually up to a couple hundred USD. The overall
process is similar to the process depicted in Figure 2.3. However the key difference is, that
the task is not divided into small micro-tasks, but is left as it is (Tranquillini et al., 2015).
99designs represents a platform with a ROT payment scheme for creative tasks. By this it
is similar to crowdsourcing platforms like threadless20 or InnoCentive22. Crowdsourcing
platforms using a ROT payment scheme are the main focus of Chapter 5.
Wikipedia
Wikipedia5 was created in 2001 with the goal to create the biggest encyclopedia of the
world. The platform uses crowd workers to collaboratively write, proofread, and update
the published articles (Rafaeli and Ariel, 2008; Leimeister, 2010). The platform does not
use money to incentivize participation (Subramani and Peddibhotla, 2003; Rafaeli and
Ariel, 2008). Hence, Wikipedia is an example of a platform using a non-monetary incentive
type as depicted in Figure 2.2 (see Subsection 2.1.1). Access to the articles is free of
charge as well. Overall more than 70,000 active crowd workers follow the idea of sharing
their knowledge for free and created approximately 38,000,000 articles in 290 different
languages24. Thereby, Wikipedia follows an altruistic goal with an epic meaning, which
suits as incentive for participation (Subramani and Peddibhotla, 2003; Rafaeli and Ariel,
2008). Such non-monetary incentives are the focus of Chapter 6.
2.1.3 Related Concepts
Crowdsourcing is an umbrella term used for a multitude of different concepts (e.g., online
labor, co-creation, crowdfunding, blogging, social networking, knowledge management,
etc.). To clearly understand the scope and generalizability of this thesis we briefly discuss
the differences from related concepts to crowdsourcing.
24Numbers are based on the project’s homepage accessible at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki
pedia last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Open Innovation
Open innovation is a similar concept to crowdsourcing regarding the fact that some tasks
once performed in-house are outsourced to a certain set of people. However, open innova-
tion targets the innovation process of a company (Chesbrough, 2006; Leimeister, 2010).
In many ways this concept focuses more on integrating customers or a special subset of
them, such as lead users (cf. Straub et al., 2013; Kunze von Bischhoffshausen et al., 2015).
Hence, it is often not an “open call” to the crowd, but rather a selective sample of (well)
known customers.
Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is the concept of using the crowd as seed capital investors for new startups
and product ideas (Hammon and Hippner, 2012; Niemeyer et al., 2016). Compared to
standard fundraising, where a small set of angel investors invest a large sum of money,
the funds are spread within the crowd. Following this, many crowd workers only invest
a small amount each, but the collective investments sum up to a large amount. While
using the crowd for its purposes, here the financial assets, it does not focus on the work or
labor of the crowd. Hence, incentives and motivation have a different nature. Therefore,
crowdfunding is not in focus of this work.
Social Networks
Social networks are sometimes framed as crowdsourcing (Doan et al., 2011). However,
social network are a tool to keep connected to your peers (Boecking et al., 2015). While
still the crowd produces content for a subset of the crowd – a person’s network – the
focus of such platforms is to keep in touch with each other. Based on Doan et al. (2011)
this is called exploiting the network. Keeping in touch with one’s own network is not a
crowdsourcing process. Based on the definition presented in Section 2.1 no “outsourcing”
from processes within the company is applied (Howe, 2006a,b). Hence, social networks
are not in focus of this work.
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2.2 Existing Work on Collaborative Online Work and
Incentives
Incentives for collaborative online work and in particular incentives for crowdsourcing ap-
plications have recently been subject to research (e.g., Horton and Chilton, 2010; Mason
and Watts, 2010; Brabham, 2008, 2010; Chandler and Kapelner, 2013). As introduced in
Figure 2.2, incentives for crowdsourcing can be categorized as non-monetary and mone-
tary incentives. Monetary incentives can be further divided into PRs and ROTs (see Sub-
section 2.1.1 for more details).
To this end, most researchers concentrate on understanding monetary and non-monetary
incentives in a crowdsourcing scenario independently of each other. For example, early
works on PR payment schemes focus on the link between the amount of paid compensation
and performance (e.g., Horton and Chilton, 2010; Mason and Watts, 2010) (see Chapters
4 and 5 for a detailed overview of related work on monetary incentives). Most studies on
non-monetary incentives in crowdsourcing focus on incentives and motives for participa-
tion (see Chapter 6 for a detailed overview of related work on non-monetary incentives).
Hence, implications on their effect on outcome variables such as performance (i.e., effort;
see Chapter 4 for a detailed overview on related work on effort) and risk-taking (see Chap-
ter 5 for a detailed overview on related work on risk-taking) can not be deduced as they
are mainly questionnaire based (e.g., Brabham, 2008, 2010).
Comparisons between monetary incentives, in particular PRs and ROTs, has been an-
alyzed in the context of classical labor (e.g., van Dijk et al., 2001; Eriksson et al., 2009a,
2009b) (see Chapter 4 for a detailed overview of related work on the different effects of
PRs and ROTs). However, classical labor is different from collaborative online work and
crowdsourcing (see Section 2.1 for more details). Motives for participation and hence the
effect of incentives might differ vastly in a crowdsourcing scenario (see Chapter 3).
Following this, the work at hand thereby addresses and unifies several research streams
and links them to several outcome variables, as depicted in Table 2.1. All of them are im-
portant to fully understand the research domain of collaborative online work and crowd-
sourcing. A detailed overview of related work will be presented in the respective Chapters
4, 5, and 6.
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Chapter 3
The Theory of Motivation and Incentives
“ There is no medicine like hope, no incentive so
great, and no tonic so powerful as expectation of some-
thing better tomorrow.”
ORISON SWETT MARDEN, 1908
DESIGNERS of online collaboration platforms and in particular crowdsourcing plat-forms face several challenges when they create platforms, because they need to
generate specific outcomes. Two of the main challenges of crowdsourcing platforms are to
secure qualitative online work and to incentivize participation (Shaw et al., 2011; Wang
et al., 2013). This work focuses on the latter – incentives for crowdsourcing applications.
It is key to understand the related concepts around incentives and the interaction be-
tween these concepts for designing platforms where the crowd – an undefined set of peo-
ple in the web (Howe, 2006a,b) – needs to participate and behave in a specific manner to
achieve a desired outcome. People work, share their knowledge, or participate when they
are motivated to do so. Incentives have the potential to spur motivation, as they depict a
certain goal (e.g., winning a prize, earning money, etc.) (Rheinberg, 2008; Schattke, 2011;
Ryan and Deci, 2000). If the person desires this goal, then his willingness to take action
is addressed. Hence, this person is motivated by this incentive (Ryan and Deci, 2000). We
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therefore have to understand the link between incentives and motivation in more detail
to design the best incentives for crowdsourcing platforms. Crowdsourcing applications,
for example, use different monetary and non monetary incentive schemes (see Chapter
2) such as PRs (e.g., MTurk1, clickworker2), ROTs (e.g., 99designs3, threadless4), and no
monetary incentives (e.g., Wikipedia5, Google ReCAPTCHA6) as discussed in Subsection
2.1.1. Clearly these incentives effect a crowd workers’ motivation differently. This chapter
outlines the motivation theories behind these incentives to position this work’s studies in
the motivation theory literature (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 defines the terms
motive, incentives, motivation, and behavior to clearly distinct between the four concepts.
Section 3.2 then summarizes motivation theory, by introducing content theories, process
theories, and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
3.1 Definitions
To better understand and differentiate between the related concepts motive, incentives,
motivation, and behavior, they will be briefly defined and delineated based on the clas-
sical approach to motivation from Rheinberg (2008) and Schattke (2011) as depicted in
Figure 3.1:
Motive
A motive is a personal attribute (Rheinberg, 2008, 2011). Motives depict a person’s overar-
ching objectives and hopes. A motive then is the desire to achieve this outcome. However,
motives vary across different persons, as they are individual attributes (Rheinberg, 2008;
Schultheiss et al., 2009; Schattke, 2011). Hence, motives are, in contrast to motivation,
time-stable and character-dependent variables (Rheinberg, 2011; Mazarakis, 2013).
Incentive
Incentives and motives are linked (Rheinberg, 2008). Incentives depict the achievement of
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome last accessed: September 6, 2016.
2https://www.clickworker.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
3http://en.99designs.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
4https://www.threadless.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
5https://www.wikipedia.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
6https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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certain goals. If this goal is in line with a person’s motives, the interaction of the incentive
and his motives increases the chances that the person will take action (Schattke, 2011).
However, persons differ in how attractive they find those incentives, as they might have
different motives. Even the reaction within a person to an incentive might differ based
on the current situation (Rheinberg, 2008; Schattke, 2011). For example, a person who
currently needs money to pay his bills finds working for a moderately loan attractive, while
several years later the same person might not find it attractive, since he currently does not
urgently need money. In the latter situation the person might base his decision to work on
different factors, such as if the work is enjoyable or interesting.
Motivation
Motivation results out of the interaction of motives and incentives (Rheinberg, 2008, 2011;
Schattke, 2011; Mazarakis, 2013). Individuals are motivated, when they are driven to do
something (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Motivation therefore is the result of different factors
(i.e., motives and incentives) which stimulate a person to a certain action (see Section
3.2). Hence, motivation results out of any motive(s) which drive an individual towards
a certain action and those incentive(s), e.g., money and the person’s current situation,
which trigger these motive(s). The interaction of motives and incentives lead to moti-
vation, which increases the willingness to act (Rheinberg, 2008; Schattke, 2011). Hence,
motivation is, in contrast to motives, a time- and character-dependent variable (Rheinberg,
2011; Mazarakis, 2013).
Behavior
A person who is motivated for a task, may change his behavior, e.g., work harder. However,
it is important to understand that motivation does not necessarily lead to a certain behavior
or participation. Motivation only increases the likelihood to act (Schattke, 2011). Hence,
a platform designer can profit from having insights on how different incentives address
different motives and, hence, motivation, which will result in higher chances to behave in
a certain way (Rheinberg, 2008; Schultheiss et al., 2009; Schattke, 2011).
33
Chapter 3 The Theory of Motivation and Incentives
Incentive 
Motivation Behavior 
Motive 
FIGURE 3.1: The classical approach to motivation adapted from Rheinberg (2008).
3.2 Motivation Theory
Understanding motivation is crucial for designing the right incentives for a specific plat-
form. However, a clear definition of motivation is still under scientific debate, as many
different and refined theories exist (cf. Maslow, 1943; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Csikszent-
mihalyi, 1990; Amabile et al., 1994; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Rheinberg, 2008; Vallerand
et al., 2008; Vansteenkiste et al., 2010; Schattke, 2011). These theories can be divided
into content- and process theories (Kanfer, 1990). Content theories describe a person’s
motives and which variables influence a person’s motivation. Hence, content theory fo-
cuses on the question “what gets a person motivated” (see Maslow, 1943; Herzberg, 1968;
Hackman and Oldham, 1976; Herzberg et al., 2011). Process theories, on the other hand,
focus on how motivation originates. Hence, process theory focuses on the question “how
to get or keep a person motivated” (see Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1971; Locke, 2001; Locke
and Latham, 2002; Rheinberg, 2011). Both theories will be briefly introduced in the fol-
lowing Subsections (3.2.1, 3.2.2) to highlight the motivation theory streams which are
currently under scientific debate. Afterwards a third research stream, which differentiates
motivation into intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, will be introduced in more detail as this
categorization serves as main theoretical framework of motivation in the context of this
work (Subsection 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Content Theories
One of the first content theories is Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943). Maslow
(1943) divides a person’s needs in a hierarchical system where more basic needs are at
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FIGURE 3.2: Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Own presentation based on Maslow (1943).
the bottom: (i) physiological needs, (ii) safety needs, (iii) love and belonging needs, (iv)
(self-) esteem needs, and (v) self-actualization needs, as depicted in Figure 3.2. This hier-
archical view clarifies that a person’s needs are not independent from each other. A person
only seeks to fulfill higher needs once basic needs are satisfied (Maslow, 1943) (see Figure
3.2).
The two-factor-theory from Herzberg (1968) follows a similar idea. Herzberg (1968)
divides motivation into two distinct factors: (i) hygiene factors and (ii) motivators. Hy-
giene factors are neutral to a person’s motivation for a certain work task. However, if they
are missing a person gets dissatisfied with his job. In a work environment, such factors
can be salary or the relationship with peers (Herzberg, 1968). Motivators, on the other
hand, get a person motivated for doing a task. However, they do not necessarily lead to
dissatisfaction with the job if they are missing. Such motivators can be the work itself,
growth, and recognition (Herzberg, 1968).
Hackman and Oldham (1976) describe in their job-characteristics-model five variables
as main reasons for an internal motivation towards a task or job: skill variety, task identity,
task significance, autonomy, and feedback. An employee becomes intrinsically motivated
(see Subsection 3.2.3 for further details on intrinsic motivation), if a task fulfills these
psychological states (Hackman and Oldham, 1976).
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Content theories, in summary, help to identify motives behind motivated actions. The
process of getting a person motivated to perform a certain task is focus of process theory,
which will be focus of the next Subsection (3.2.2).
3.2.2 Process Theories
The expectancy theory by Vroom (1964) relies on the three factors: (i) valence, (ii) in-
strumentality, and (iii) expectancy. Motivation is defined as a process of a person, which
decides between several alternatives of tasks. Each task eventually leads to a certain out-
come. A person decides whether to do a task based on valence, instrumentality, and ex-
pectancy. Valence describes if a person desires an outcome (positive valence) or wants to
avoid the outcome (negative valence). Instrumentality describes if a person’s actions lead
to a certain (desired) outcome, if the goals of the task are met. Expectancy describes a
person’s subjective expectation that one’s effort will lead to a performance good enough to
meet the goals of the task (Vroom, 1964). Motivation is then the product of the person’s
valence towards the task outcome (e.g., positive valence of potential promotion), the in-
strumentality if the task will lead to the outcome (e.g., acquisition of a big industry project
with a potential project manager position), and how much effort the person expects to
fulfill the task (e.g., several project acquisition meetings) (Vroom, 1964).
Locke and Latham (2002) describe in their goal-setting theory motivation as pursuit to
achieve goals. Goals serve as a directive function. Hence, if a person wants to achieve
a goal the person focuses his effort and attention towards goal relevant activities. Goal
irrelevant tasks are seen as a distraction (Locke and Latham, 2002). Furthermore, the
harder it is to achieve a desired goal, the more effort a person puts into the tasks to fulfill
the goal. Hence, a person is more motivated to do the task (Locke and Latham, 2002).
In addition, Locke and Bryan (1969) found that giving feedback about a person’s current
performance directs more effort into tasks in line with their goals.
Process theories, in summary, help to understand the process of how people get mo-
tivated. However, there exists another prominent research stream besides these process-
and content theories, which differentiates between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In
the following Subsection (3.2.3) this distinction will be further explained.
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3.2.3 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
One of the most prominent theories and categorizations of motivation differentiates be-
tween the drivers that lead to a certain reaction (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci,
2000). The so called self-determination theory categorizes two different types of motives
as main drivers for motivation – intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. This categorization is
used in many other publications (cf. Hars and Ou, 2001; Tedjamulia et al., 2005; Reiss,
2012; Mazarakis, 2013; Kosonen et al., 2014; Xu and Li, 2015) and will be used in the
context of the work at hand as well, as main theoretical framework for motivation.
Intrinsic Motivation
When a person is intrinsically motivated the person takes action because the task is en-
joyable or the person is interested in the task. Intrinsic motivation mostly lacks of an ob-
servable and separable outcome. Hence, purely intrinsic motivated tasks are executed by
a person for the task itself and not some separable incentive or outcome (Deci and Ryan,
1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000). For example, a person who starts to solve a logic puzzle,
such as the rubik’s cube, out of interest, curiosity, and fun. Intrinsic motivation is seen as
the more beneficial motivational factor than extrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
However, intrinsic motivation is highly dependent on the individual (see Section 3.1).
One person might be intrinsically motivated for a task, while, regarding the same task,
this is not true for a different person (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Moreover, social demands
and responsibilities in work-life for non-intrinsic tasks undermine intrinsic motivation af-
ter childhood (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Harter (1981) observed that intrinsic motivation
of school children is decreasing with every school year. Furthermore, tasks can lack the
potential of motivating individuals intrinsically, such as boring and repetitive tasks (Ryan
and Deci, 2000; Gill and Prowse, 2012; Mazarakis, 2013). Intrinsic motivation is a main
part of the study conducted in Chapter 3.
Extrinsic Motivation
Extrinsic motivation refers to taking an action because of a separable outcome, for ex-
ample a monetary reward (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000). Purely extrinsic
motivated tasks are executed by a person solely for this separable outcome and not for the
task itself (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000). Hence, extrinsic motivation con-
trasts intrinsic motivation. For example, working for a salary or filling out a questionnaire
37
Chapter 3 The Theory of Motivation and Incentives
for the chance to win a prize. Extrinsic motivation can vary in its autonomy (Ryan and
Deci, 2000; Mazarakis, 2013). Persons can execute tasks with disinterest and resistance
or with willingness, because they have accepted the task. In both cases the task can still
be extrinsically motivated, since the person is performing the task for a separable outcome
(Ryan and Deci, 2000). For example, a person can work on a project only because he fears
sanctions from his boss, while a different person might perform the same work to increase
chances of a promotion. Both persons would still be extrinsically motivated, while the
former case is an example for external control and the latter involves a feeling of choice
(Ryan and Deci, 2000). Extrinsic motivation is a main part of the studies conducted in
Chapters 4 and 5.
Most of the times people are motivated due to several reasons. For example, a person
might work since the work is enjoyable to some extent (intrinsic motivation) and since
earning money to pay bills is a necessity (extrinsic motivation). Hence, a person’s moti-
vated state results out of the interplay of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Moreover, mo-
tivation varies along different dimensions. First, it can vary in strength, with the antipodes
being not or highly motivated. Second, motivation can vary in the underlying reasons for
the motivation – intrinsic, extrinsic, or the interaction of both. Following this, a person, for
example, can be highly motivated to work on 99designs3, since the person enjoys creating
logos and wants to earn money (intrinsic and extrinsic motivation), while being moder-
ately motivated to work on MTurk1 for a monetary reward (extrinsic motivation) even if
the person finds the tasks not enjoyable or interesting (no intrinsic motivation). How-
ever, it is important to notice that the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is
not linear, and is strongly context dependent (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole,
2003; Frey, 2012). For example, extrinsic incentives (e.g., monetary rewards) can under-
mine intrinsic motivations – the so called crowding-out effect. It has been observed that
adding an extrinsic incentive does not necessarily increase or in some cases even reduces
effort and participation when participants were highly intrinsically motivated before the
extrinsic factor was added (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Frey, 2012).
This non-linear relation means platform designers, by just adding incentives, do not nec-
essarily improve the outcome. This and the fact that the reaction to incentives is context-
(i.e., the crowdsourcing platform) and person- (i.e., the crowd) specific, makes clear that
insights from work-life or related concepts, such as social networks, open innovation, and
crowdfunding (see Subsection 2.1.3 of Chapter 2), can not be transferred one to one to
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crowdsourcing. This stresses the importance of evaluating different incentives (see Sub-
section 2.1.1 of Chapter 2) in the field of crowdsourcing and its different platforms (see
Subsection 2.1.2 of Chapter 2) as implemented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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Part III
Insights from Collaborative Online Work

Chapter 4
Incentives for Crowdsourcing: Payment
Schemes and Feedback
“ Call it what you will, incentives are what get people
to work harder.”
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
THIS chapter evaluates the effect of different payment schemes (PR and ROT, see Sub-section 2.1.1 of Chapter 2) and feedback on one of the outcomes of crowdsourcing
platforms – effort of crowd workers. Moreover, it introduces a research model of the coher-
ences of feedback and crowd workers’ effort in crowdsourcing and evaluates the effects.
Therefore, this chapter focuses on Research Questions 1 and 2 (see Section 1.2 of Chapter
1).
Research Question 1: Which incentive scheme – piece rates or rank-order-
tournaments – incentivizes crowd workers’ effort best?
Research Question 2: Does feedback in rank-order-tournaments affect crowd
workers’ effort in crowdsourcing settings?
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This chapter builds on and extends the collective works: Straub, Gimpel, and Teschner
(2014), Straub, Gimpel, Teschner, and Weinhardt (2014), and Straub, Gimpel, Teschner,
and Weinhardt (2015). It starts with an introduction and motivates the context and impor-
tance of this evaluation (Section 4.1). Section 4.2 summarizes specific related literature
for this chapter. Section 4.3 develops and outlines the research model. Section 4.4 ex-
plains the overall study design. Sections 4.5 through 4.7 (studies 1–3) explain the specific
study design (4.5.1, 4.6.1, 4.7.1) and show the results (4.5.2, 4.6.2, 4.7.2) of the respec-
tive study. Section 4.8 summarizes the findings of all three studies and shows pathways
for future directions.
4.1 Introduction
Recently, crowdsourcing has gained attention by both practitioners and researchers as
model to outsource human work on demand to a broad, diverse, and distributed work-
force. Monetarily incentivized (paid-) crowds are provided by many commercial vendors,
e.g., MTurk1, upwork2, clickworker3, 99designs4, and InnoCentive5. These platforms pro-
vide access to a range of different crowd workers who work on a wide range of tasks –
from simple repetitive e-mail tagging to creative and more complex tasks such as building
logos (Kittur et al., 2012, 2013; Hammon and Hippner, 2012).
In these online labor markets one challenge for organizations is to properly incentivize
crowd workers’ effort and quality of work (Huang et al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2011; Wang
et al., 2013). Work relations are short-lived and commonly one-shot labor relations, i.e.,
the relation between the requester and worker only exists once for the given task and is
finished after its completion. This is in contrast to standard employment contracts in of-
fline labor situation, where contracts between the employer and employee usually last over
at least several month. Quality control is mostly done by repetition of work by different
crowd workers (Ipeirotis et al., 2010; Kokkodis and Ipeirotis, 2013; Wang et al., 2013).
In paid crowdsourcing settings, crowd workers are usually incentivized by a PR (pay per
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome last accessed: September 6, 2016.
2https://www.upwork.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
3https://www.clickworker.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
4http://en.99designs.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
5https://www.innocentive.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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finished task) or by a ROT (see Subsection 2.1.1 of Chapter 2). PR payments are most
commonly observed for the collection of crowd input on activities that can be divided into
small pieces that can be done (mostly) independently of each other (Malone et al., 2010).
Paying a price to the best performing crowd worker or a small set of top performers is
most commonly seen for tournaments when only one or a few good solutions are needed.
Examples include the design of a good algorithm or logo. On crowdsourcing platforms
hosting such tournaments, like 99designs, the employer (i.e., the person or organization
that creates a crowdsourcing task and posts it on the crowd labor market) typically has
to decide whether to provide feedback on a crowd worker’s current competitive position.
Standardly these platforms give the option to display leaderboards and signal who is the
provisional winner or to hide this information from crowd workers (Araujo, 2013). In
addition the requester can directly contact the workers by commenting their submissions
(Araujo, 2013). ROTs are also commonly used in traditional work places (Microsoft, GE,
Yahoo! etc.) and sports (poker, soccer leagues etc.). Given their wide usage and appeal of
using competitive elements to incentivize workers, some organizations using crowdsourc-
ing even employ ROTs on platforms like MTurk1, where PR payments are seen as the stan-
dard. Setting up and controlling a ROT is clearly more cumbersome than straightforward
PR payments. Handling this complexity might, however, pay off when the crowd workers’
performance is higher; given that both incentive schemes provide the same average wage
for crowd workers.
Overall, this raises two main questions: (i) Do rank-order-tournaments lead to better
performance by crowd workers than piece rate payments? (ii) When conducting a crowd
labor tournament, should one provide feedback on a crowd worker’s competitive position?
Those questions are implemented as Research Question 1 and 2 presented in Section 1.2
of Chapter 1:
Research Question 1: Which incentive scheme – piece rates or rank-order-
tournaments – incentivizes crowd workers’ effort best?
Research Question 2: Does feedback in rank-order-tournaments affect crowd
workers’ effort in crowdsourcing settings?
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In this chapter both these research questions are investigated in an exploratory way
using a series of three real effort studies on MTurk1 with overall 874 crowd workers par-
ticipating.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Payments in Online Labor
Crowdsourcing and online labor markets usually need smaller payments than traditional
work relations. Paolacci et al. (2010) report that to get comparable results to traditional
offline labor settings, crowdsourcing needs rather small monetary incentives. The hourly
reservation wage of crowd workers on MTurk is USD 1.80, while the effective hourly wage
is USD 4.80 (Horton and Chilton, 2010; Ipeirotis, 2010a).
Several studies analyzed how changes in the payment structure influence the behavior
of crowd workers in online labor markets (Mason and Watts, 2010; Shaw et al., 2011).
Shaw et al. (2011) show that linking monetary incentives to the responses of other crowd
workers (e.g., penalty for disagreeing to the majority) influences the performance. In
their experiment they decreased the payment (i.e., 10 %) for a task if the crowd worker’s
response disagreed with the majority of other crowd workers’ responses. In contrast to just
paying a PR, crowd workers’ show a higher performance under this penalty condition.
Mason and Watts (2010) show that more money leads to more effort by crowd work-
ers. The experimental setup varied the payment and difficulty of the task. Participants
who were exposed to a setup where more money was paid, finished more tasks than par-
ticipants in lower payment treatments. However, quality is not affected by an increased
payment. Participants made the same amount of mistakes in the different difficulty se-
tups, independent of the payment. Moreover, compared to a PR, an overall lower quota
pay scheme, which only pays for a set of completed tasks, leads to a greater output.
To sum up, it is an open debate which incentive and information structures are best
suited to stimulate crowd workers’ performance.
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4.2.2 Incentives: Piece Rates and Rank-Order-Tournaments
In ROTs two or more people compete against each other and are ranked according to their
performance. Top performer(s) win the tournament. Such settings are used in sports
(poker, soccer, etc.), traditional labor relations and work places (Microsoft, GE, Yahoo!,
etc.), and crowdsourcing platforms (99designs4, threadless6, InnoCentive5, by some re-
questers on MTurk1, etc.).
In settings, other than crowdsourcing, economics suggest that ROTs incentivize workers
better than piece rates (PRs) (Bracha and Fershtman, 2013; Lazear and Sherwin, 1981;
Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Bull et al., 1987; van Dijk et al., 2001). Ehrenberg and
Bognanno (1990) find that professional golf players are positively incentivized by tourna-
ments. Lazear and Sherwin (1981) give evidence that ROTs, used in work places, incen-
tivize risk-averse workers equally well as a PR. Bracha and Fershtman (2013) distinct effort
into labor effort and cognitive effort. Participants who work under a ROT exert more labor
effort but at the same time less cognitive effort than when working under a PR. Reasons
are that competition incentivizes workers but they are less able to do cognitive tasks under
pressure. In addition, van Dijk et al. (2001) find that effort levels and variance in ROTs
are higher compared to PRs. In addition, low ability workers work harder. Similarly, Bull
et al. (1987) find a higher variance of effort in ROTs compared to PRs.
These results suggest the strength of the competitors as explanation for effort variance:
Some participants might lose interest when falling behind (Mazarakis and Krämer, 2010;
Mazarakis and Van Dinther, 2011; Mazarakis et al., 2011; Mazarakis, 2013). Others who
are in front might relax. Some who are close to each other might actually be competing
harder. Eriksson et al., (2009a) present experimental evidence that if participants can
choose between ROTs and PRs, variance decreases and effort levels increase in ROTs. They
further find that risk-averse participants tend to choose a PR.
Eriksson et al., (2009b) experimentally study the influence on participants’ effort by
giving feedback on their current position with PR payments and ROTs. Three different
feedback rules on relative performance are observed – (i) no feedback, (ii) feedback given
half way through the experiment, and a (iii) continuously updated feedback. On average
feedback does not change effort, but participants who are behind make more mistakes
6https://www.threadless.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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under continuous feedback and almost never drop out of the ROT. The reason could be a
social norm to never give up (Eriksson et al., 2009b). Arguably this relation might, how-
ever, be stronger in a laboratory setting, which is used in these studies, than an anonymous
digital crowdsourcing settings. Hence, drop outs might be more pronounced in online la-
bor markets.
Evidence for this is presented by Fershtman and Gneezy (2011): Quitting is often
avoided by participants because it is socially stigmatized. Still, higher rewards lead partic-
ipants to exert more effort and quit more often at the same time. Finally, Pull et al. (2013)
show that in dyadic tournaments where the ability of participants is heterogeneous, effort
levels should decrease, because both know that one will win anyway. When participants’
abilities are homogeneous, effort levels should be high. In consequence it is expected that
continuous feedback will lead to the same effect. In detail, if participants get feedback and
performed better than expected, they decrease their effort but expect to be better in the
future (Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012). While workers who performed worse than their expec-
tations will increase their effort but reduce their expectations. This implies that showing
feedback has the potential to improve and lower performance of participants depending
on the current position in the tournament.
4.2.3 Motivation in Paid Micro-Task Crowdsourcing
Intrinsic motivation refers to doing something because one wants to do it out of pure in-
terest or fun, while extrinsic motivation refers to the motivation of doing something out of
external reasons like getting a reward (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Eccles and Wigfield, 2002)
(see Subsection 3.2.3 of Chapter 3). Both affect the performance of crowd workers in
crowdsourcing settings (Brabham, 2008, 2010; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Pilz and Gewald,
2013). Paid crowdsourcing settings (e.g., MTurk, 99designs4, threadless6, InnoCentive5,
clickworker3, CrowdFlower7, etc.) mainly targets extrinsic factors, by paying crowd work-
ers – an extrinsic motivation. Thus, this study focuses on extrinsic motivation by using
monetary compensation as incentive for performing well. It is not possible to completely
exclude intrinsic motivation. However, on MTurk the main motivation of crowd workers
7http://www.crowdflower.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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is to earn money (Kaufmann et al., 2011). Hence, crowd workers are initially mainly ex-
ternally motivated. Furthermore, by using a real effort task, which from design has no
overall meaning for society or the person itself, is boring, and does not improve major
skills of a person, it is as much as possible excluded that altruism, entertainment, and per-
sonal development, which are often referred to as intrinsic motivation, play a role (Gill and
Prowse, 2012). Additionally, Deci et al. (1981) argue that competition decreases intrinsic
motivation. More accurately, competitive situations where participants feel a pressure to
win undermine intrinsic motivation (Reeve and Deci, 1996).
4.3 Research Model
The first aim is comparing performance of crowd workers, i.e., crowd workers’ effort, in
rank-order-tournaments (ROTs) and piece rate payments (PR). Following van Dijk et al.
(2001), Bracha and Fershtman (2013), and Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990), it is hy-
pothesized that when both mechanisms yield the same expected payout ROTs should be
associated with higher performance. PR payments offer little room for designing the in-
centive scheme; the key parameter is the PR itself which is set to be equal to the average
ROT payout. A ROT, on the contrary, opens up more design options. Hence, the second
aim is to evaluate these and aim for the best ROT design. Therefore the related work
reviewed above is summarized in the research model depicted in Figure 4.1.
Following the sequential distinction of service quality in (i) structure, (ii) process, and
(iii) outcome (Donabedian, 1980, 2003), a crowd worker’s performance is considered as
outcome and is hypothesized to be related to the work process and structures. Structural
constructs are classified as (i) individual, (ii) crowd, or (iii) system level (Figure 4.1).
Potentially, this structure will prove useful for more extensive conceptualization on the
interrelation of crowdsourcing incentives and quality. Evaluating this belief is future work;
here the generic structure is used as frame for a specific moderated mediation model.
The model shows the hypothesized correlates of crowd workers’ performance in ROTs,
which are the following: Performance is the achievement of a worker on a given task in a
given time frame, in this case a crowd worker’s effort. It is operationalized as number of
successfully completed instances of a task in a certain time frame. Performance is directly
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FIGURE 4.1: Hypothesized research model on the correlates of crowd workers’ performance in
rank-order-tournaments.
related to the crowd worker’s capability, i.e., his ability to perform the specific task. Hence,
capability is measured as the number of finished tasks in a pre-round. Capable crowd
workers are expected to perform better. Strength of competitors is the performance of the
respective competitors. Feedback indicates whether participants are informed about their
current position in the tournament. In this case whether a leaderboard is shown. Based
on the work by Eriksson et al., (2009b), performance might be related to the competitors’
strength in cases when feedback on the performance and current standing in a ROT is
provided. Therefore the correlation might be moderated by feedback. Given evidence
from studies on ROTs, the direction of the moderated effect of the competitors’ strength
on performance is, however, not ex-ante clear (Eriksson et al., 2009b; Fershtman and
Gneezy, 2011; Pull et al., 2013). Whether a crowd worker finishes the task or not is
indicated by task completion. Following Fershtman and Gneezy (2011) and Eriksson et al.,
(2009b) it is assumed that a strong association with performance exists. Task completion
is hypothesized to mediate the correlation of capability and strength of competitors on
performance. Crowd workers able to do a task will finish it more often. Therefore a positive
correlation between capability and task completion is assumed. Strength of competitors is
assumed to be correlated with task completion: Similar to Fershtman and Gneezy (2011),
it is believed that falling behind leads to quitting, hence, the stronger the competitor, the
more likely crowd workers quit the task. Feedback moderates the association of strength of
competitors with both task completion and performance. Only when feedback is given, the
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competitors’ strength can be seen and hence show a relation. Facing strong competitors is
expected to lead to a stronger relation between competitors’ strength and task completion
than facing weaker competitors (Pull et al., 2013). For strong competitors, the hypotheses
is that the relation to performance is positive while it is expected to be negative for weak
competitors. In other words: When a crowd worker sees that he is falling behind but
does not quit the task, the feedback is expected to increase performance. When the crowd
worker is ahead, he might relax and therefore performance decreases. When the crowd
worker is facing an equally good competitor and always has to excel to win, a performance
increase and almost no dropout rates are expected, since there is always a fair chance to
win. Finally, a crowd worker’s age, gender, and education is expected to be correlated with
capability, task completion, and performance – at least these demographics might serve as
surrogate measurement for less observable individual characteristics. Directions of this
correlation are not hypothesized, since this is not in focus of the work at hand.
4.4 General Study Design and Procedures
In this chapter the relations between performance (i.e., crowd workers’ effort), strength
of competitors, and feedback as implemented in the research model (Figure 4.1) are ex-
plored. Hence, results of three studies are presented: Study 1 compares PR payments
with the simplest dyadic ROT providing no performance feedback. Study 2 investigates
the performance in dyadic ROTs depending on the strength of the competitor and whether
feedback is provided or not. Study 3 further tweaks the design of the dyadic ROT by fea-
turing a group matching where individual crowd workers are matched with supposedly
equally well performing competitors to spur their performance.
All three studies in this chapter have similar designs and can be referred to as “ex-
ploratory studies using experimental techniques” (see Section 7.1 of Chapter 7 for further
details). They implement a real effort task to measure performance (i.e., crowd workers’
effort), similar to the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012). A real effort task is designed
to measure effort while excluding accompanying motivational factors (Gill and Prowse,
2011, 2012). In the case of the studies of this chapter, crowd workers have a fixed time
adjusting as many sliders as possible ranging from 0 to 100 to a value of 50. Correct
positioned sliders reset, with a changed shape (width and horizontal orientation), until
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either the time for the task elapses or the crowd worker quits. The number of sliders a
crowd worker correctly sets prior to the end of the task is the measure of performance
(i.e., effort). The rather simple, needless work is on purpose and typical for real effort ex-
periments. The intention is to measure crowd workers’ reaction with a task that depends
as little as possible on pre-existing knowledge, learning by doing effects, randomness, or
guessing (Gill and Prowse, 2012). In addition it partially excludes intrinsic motivational
factors like entertainment, learning, or contribution to an epic meaning (see Chapter 3).
All tournaments are dyadic ROTs – a crowd worker competes with only one other crowd
worker, the winner gets a bonus of USD 1.00; the loser does not receive a bonus. The choice
of the smallest possible number of competitors aims at making the competitor salient and
allowing crowd workers to most clearly judge their competitive position. In this, this chap-
ter follows the study design by Eriksson et al., (2009a), Eriksson et al., (2009b), Fershtman
and Gneezy (2011), and van Dijk et al. (2001) and posits that this design feature (i.e., a
dyadic ROT design) carves out the relation between tournament competition and perfor-
mance most clearly. To increase experimental control, participants do not compete live but
against historic data collected from a previous participant. This is made clear in the in-
structions of the crowd experiment. Using historical data is a design choice to compensate
for unknown arrival times of crowd workers which are given due to the open call nature
of crowdsourcing and MTurk, where it is not given that two or more people arrive at the
same time to participate in an experiment (Suri and Watts, 2011; Mason and Suri, 2012;
Mao et al., 2012; Amir et al., 2012) (see Section 7.2 of Chapter 7 for more details on this
design challenge).
All participants are recruited from the general pool of MTurk crowd workers restricted
that they can only take part once and in one of the three studies; reside in the US; finished
at least 1,000 MTurk tasks (so called HITs) prior to our studies; and 95 % of their prior
work was approved by the respective employer (requester) (see Subsection 2.1.2 of Chap-
ter 2 to see more details on crowd worker requirements and the rejection of crowd work).
Using MTurk as platform for experimental research is gaining prominence in various disci-
plines, including economics (Horton et al., 2011), psychology (Buhrmeister et al., 2011),
computer science (Chilton et al., 2010), and information systems (Teschner and Gimpel,
2013). For the purpose of this study, MTurk is not merely a platform to recruit and reim-
burse participants but the natural environment of many crowd workers. In fact it is the
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FIGURE 4.2: Overall experimental process of Chapter’s 4 Studies 1, 2, and 3.
crowdsourcing market with most crowd workers and most tasks. All three studies start out
with the instructions and a short quiz to test understanding of these, followed by a train-
ing round, the experimental task, a questionnaire on some demographics, and payment of
participants according to their respective performance. This overall experimental process
is depicted in Figure 4.2.
The studies are conducted with a custom-made web application, using the Grails8 frame-
work and a model view controller approach. From a technical perspective I follow the
guidelines of Mao et al. (2012) and Mason and Suri (2012). The slider task was originally
developed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A similar version is implemented with Java and
integrated in the custom-made web application to be accessible online through MTurk. An
‘out’ button was added, to allow the crowd workers to quit the task whenever they wanted.
Potentially quitting a task is common in crowdsourcing markets: Considering the experi-
ence a crowd worker gains during a task and the opportunity costs of time, it might well
be rational for the crowd worker to quit by simply abandoning the task. In the MTurk con-
text this is referred to as not returning a HIT. The explicit option to quit aims at reducing
experimenter demand effects and the relevance of a potential social norm to never give
up.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the task and the feedback for all three studies: Figure 4.3a shows
an example for a ROT with feedback. At any time during the ROT a crowd worker sees
his own performance so far (here 7 completed sliders), his competitor’s performance so
far (here 11 completed sliders), and the next slider to be set to 50. In addition, the screen
has a timer at the top and a quit button at the bottom. Figure 4.3b exemplifies the no
feedback treatments; it is identical except that feedback on the competitor’s performance
is missing – this information is only disclosed after the ROT when the result is shown. The
8see https://grails.org/ for more details; last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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FIGURE 4.3: User interface: feedback (left image), no feedback (right image).
user interface for PR treatments is identical to the one for ROTs without feedback (Figure
4.3b); the subsequent payment scheme differs.
In statistical tests, I employ a 0.1 level to decide on the rejection of null hypotheses.
More detailed information on p-values is provided in the result Subsections (4.5.2, 4.6.2,
and 4.7.2) of this chapter. Design features that differ between the three studies are de-
scribed below.
4.5 Study 1: Piece Rates versus Rank-Order-Tournaments
4.5.1 Study Design
Study 1 is a comparison of PR payments with ROT payments providing no feedback on the
competitor’s performance during the study. Presumably, performance depends on various
individual characteristics like the individual capability to perform the task and other fac-
tors that might partially be captured by observing age, gender, and education (see Section
4.3). To account for this partially unobservable heterogeneity, a within-subject compar-
ison for the two treatments (PR and ROT) is employed: Each participant participates in
both payment schemes. Each participant plays a training round of the slider task for 30
seconds to get familiar with the task and the interface followed by two study rounds of
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FIGURE 4.4: Experimental process of Study 1.
two minutes each, as depicted in Figure 4.4. One of the study rounds is under PR condi-
tions, getting USD 0.02 per finished slider, while the other round is under ROT conditions,
winning USD 1.00 if the participant finished more sliders than his competitor. If there is a
tie after the experiment (i.e., both finished the same amount of sliders), the winner is de-
cided randomly by the throw of a dice, a so called random tie breaking. Based on pre-tests,
payments are calibrated such as participants achieve the same average payment in both
mechanisms9. Hence, the differences in performance cannot be attributed to different ex-
pected or realized payoffs. In both treatments the participants get the same information
– their own performance (Figure 4.3a). For the ROT, they are informed after the round
if they won. To control for order effects, wealth effects, learning, and fatigue, the order
of the two payment schemes is balanced. The number of finished sliders in PR and ROT
is used as measure for the participants’ performance (i.e., crowd workers’ effort) to be
compared between payment schemes.
4.5.2 Evaluation
149 participants took part in the first study. General statistics of participants are depicted
in Table 4.1. 73 first worked under the PR scheme, then under ROT; 76 first worked under
the ROT, then under PR scheme. Participants’ age ranges from 19 to 66 years with a mean
of 31 years. 41.6 % are female. The task took on average 11 minutes, and the average total
payment was USD 1.63. Payment consists of a fix USD 0.50 show-up fee and payments for
both incentive schemes. For PR, mean payment was USD 0.55 (standard deviation (SD)
9Based on a pre-test with 30 participants payments per finished task in the PR treatment were calibrated
to match the expected outcome of the ROT, assuming that 50 % would win. For the PR payment, the as-
sumption was made that participants would finish on average the same amount of tasks as the participants
finished on average during the pre-test.
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= .17), for ROT it was USD 0.58 (SD = .50). Payments in both incentive schemes are
statistically indistinguishable (two-sided t-test, t = -.571, p-value = .569).
The relation of the two payment schemes with the participants’ performance is evalu-
ated in three ways: First, we count how many participants performed better in PR than
in ROT and the other way round. Of 149 participants, 17 finished the exact same num-
ber of sliders under both incentive schemes, 63 performed better in the ROT than with
PR and 69 performed better with PR than ROT. This data suggests that both incentive
schemes are about equal: Given that one performs differently under PR and ROT, the
likelihood of performing better under ROT is 48 % which is statistically indistinguishable
from a random 50 % (two-sided binomial test, p-value = .664). Second, we compare the
mean number of sliders finished in either treatment: 27.64 for PR (SD = 8.26) and 27.65
for ROT (SD = 8.39), as depicted in Figure 4.5. Again, not statistically significant differ-
ent (two-sided matched pairs t-test, t = -.028, p-value = .978). Third, an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression is employed with performance as dependent variable (DV) while
controlling for age, gender, education and the order effects. The binary variable round10
equals zero for the first incentive scheme and equals one for the second. Age is measured in
years, education in the following categories: some high school completed = 0, high school
diploma = 1, some college completed = 2, associate’s degree = 3, bachelor’s degree = 4,
master’s degree = 5, doctorate = 6. The binary variable tournament is one for ROT and
zero for PR. This is the focal variable in this study. The results are depicted in Table 4.2.
Most importantly – but not surprisingly given the other tests described in this paragraph
– a significant correlation between the treatment and performance is not observed.
Overall PR First ROT First
#Participants 149 73 76
Female 186 90 96
Average Age 30.85 32.18 29.57
Average payment (USD) 1.63 1.70 1.57
TABLE 4.1: General statistics of participants for Study 1.
10The value of round depends on the order a participant worked on the treatments. If he worked first on
PR then on ROT, PR is coded 0 and ROT 1 (73 participants). If he worked first on ROT and then on PR, ROT
is coded 0 and PR 1 (76 participants).
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FIGURE 4.5: Mean finished sliders (performance) by treatment, standard error bars for 95 %
confidence interval.
The absence of significance does not directly imply the absence of a relationship. Thus it
is interesting to evaluate the marginal effect size of the tournament in explaining variance
in performance. For doing so, a second regression analysis was implemented to obtain
the residual R2, i.e., without tournament as independent variable and compare it to the
variance explained by tournament to calculate the effect size f 2 (Cohen, 1988, p. 407ff.).
By convention, f 2 = .02 is termed a small, .15 a medium, and .35 a large effect. Here, the
effect size f 2 turns out to be merely .00003, i.e., three orders of magnitude less than a small
effect. The relation is not only statistically insignificant, it is economically meaningless:
The estimated effect of running a tournament equals the estimated effect of increasing the
participants’ age by about three month which is not substantial given an average age of 31
years. Given the confluence of this evidence, the following result is formulated.
Result 1: Given equal expected payments, both piece rate and dyadic rank-order-
tournament payment schemes without feedback on the crowd worker’s competitive
position result in equal performance of crowd workers.
Further relevant results from Study 1 are that performance has a strong relation to age
(older crowd workers perform worse than younger crowd workers)11 and gender (males
11Note that participants’ age ranged from 19 to 66 years. In our data this results in a linear relation.
However, this gives no insight about an overall shape of the relation, since this observation does not span
over all ages. It is assumed that younger and older ages, which were not observed, show a different relation.
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DV (method) Performance (OLS)
Intercept 33.886***
Age (in years) -.319***
Gender (male) 2.905**
Education .065
Round (second) 3.317***
Tournament (ROT) .080
N 149
R2 .242
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .1
TABLE 4.2: Regression results for Study 1.
perform better than females), but performance is not related to the education of partic-
ipants (Table 4.2). This might be since the real effort task does not need a certain skill
or knowledge to master. In the following studies, I consequently continue to elicit demo-
graphic information and use it as control variables in the analysis. In addition, participants’
performance is strongly associated to the order of tasks (participants perform better in the
second round). To avoid any confounding effects from the order of treatments, for the fol-
lowing studies a between-subject design is used and the sample size is increased to control
for individual heterogeneity.
A ROT requires more effort and complexity in implementing, communicating, and con-
trolling than PR payment. As this effort does not translate to higher performance, I con-
clude that the short and simple dyadic ROT studied in Study 1 is – for practical reasons –
less suited than PR payments. This might, however, strongly depend on the ROT’s design,
most prominently the lack of feedback on a crowd worker’s current competitive position.
Whether such feedback is positively correlated to performance and renders a ROT worth-
while is the focus of Study 2.
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4.6 Study 2: Feedback in Rank-Order-Tournaments –
Different Strengths of Competitors
4.6.1 Study Design
Study 2 evaluates the relation of competitors’ strength and feedback to performance. It
is a between-subjects comparison of four treatments. In each treatment crowd workers
first work on the slider task for 90 seconds with a PR payment of USD 0.01 per finished
slider. The number of finished sliders is the proxy for capability. In addition, it allows
crowd workers to get familiar with the task and interface. This data is not used to judge
whether PR or ROT lead to higher performance. Second, crowd workers participate in
a three minute dyadic ROT. For the ROT, each crowd worker is randomized to either of
four treatments: no feedback on the performance of the competitor (NF), feedback on the
performance of the competitor in a ROT with a strong competitor (FS), feedback on the
performance of the competitor in a ROT with a mediocre competitor (FM), and feedback
on the performance of the competitor in a ROT with a weak competitor (FW). The structure
of this study is depicted in Figure 4.6.
Data for competitors is retrieved from historic data based on a pre-test; it is constant for
each treatment in order to not induce unnecessary variance. The weak competitor finishes
27 sliders in three minutes time; the mediocre competitor 47 sliders; the strong competitor
66 sliders. The number of sliders a crowd worker finishes in the ROT is the measure for
his performance. A crowd worker that finishes more sliders than his competitor wins
USD 1.00.
Instructions 
& Quiz 
Piece Rate 
(PR) 
Questionnaire Payment 
ROT 
No Feedback (NF) 
ROT 
Weak Feedback (FW) 
ROT 
Mediocre Feedback (FM) 
Treatments 
ROT 
Strong Feedback (FS) 
FIGURE 4.6: Experimental process of Study 2.
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4.6.2 Evaluation
331 crowd workers participated. General statistics are depicted in Table 4.3. 97 partici-
pated in NF, 80 in FW, 74 in FM, and 80 in the FS treatment. Participants’ age ranges from
18 to 66 years with a mean of 32 years. 39.9 % are female. The task took on average 8
minutes, and the average payment was USD 0.89. Note that differences between average
payments were observed (ANOVA, p-value < .001). However, this is given by experiment
design: In FW, the competitor was weak, in FM he was mediocre, and in FS the competi-
tor was strong. Thus, the rate of participants winning was affected by the strength of the
competitor. In the NF treatment the competitor strength was randomized, hence, aver-
age payment lies in between the other payments. However, given randomization of the
treatments, each participant had equal chances to be in the respective treatments.
The moderated mediation model sketched in Figure 4.1 is evaluated with a set of eight
regressions, following the general steps from Hayes’ (2009) contemporary interpretation
of the mediation and moderation analysis of Baron and Kenny (1986) and a bootstrap test
of indirect effects, following Preacher and Hayes (2004). For the causal step mediation
analysis, the correlation of the causal variables on the mediator (regression models 1 to
4 in Table 4.4) are established first and then the correlation of causal variables and the
mediator on the outcome variable (regression models 5 to 8 in Table 4.4) are estimated.
Task Completion is binary (completed = 1, not completed = 0). Strength of competitors
is coded in three levels (weak, mediocre, or strong). In this setting, the statistical consid-
eration of moderation differs from the conventional approach: Conventionally, feedback
moderating the correlation of strength of competitors would be modeled by two direct ef-
fects (one from feedback, one from strength of competitors) and the interaction of these.
In this model and experiment, strength of competitors is, however, not meaningfully de-
fined in the absence of feedback. Without feedback, strength of competitors cannot be
Overall NF FW FM FS
#Participants 331 97 80 74 80
Female 132 39 32 28 33
Average Age 31.87 31.08 31.02 35.80 30.05
Average payment (USD) .89 .95 1.34 .77 .49
TABLE 4.3: General statistics of participants for Study 2.
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correlated with either task completion or performance. Thus, moderation here results in
four combinations: (i) no feedback (irrespective of the strength of competitors), (ii) feed-
back and a weak competitor, (iii) feedback and a mediocre competitor, and (iv) feedback
and a strong competitor. Results of the analyses are provided in Table 4.4.
As expected, capability is substantially associated with task completion (regression model
1 in Table 4.4; support for H1 in the research model). Feedback is a dummy equal to 0 for
NF treatment and 1 for FW, FM, and FS. The interaction of strength of competitors and
feedback assesses the moderation. When facing a weak competitor and feedback is given,
there is no significant relation to task completion compared to no feedback. On the con-
trary, when playing against a mediocre or strong competitor, there is a significant relation
to task completion. Feedback makes crowd workers quit the task when facing a mediocre
or strong competitor. Furthermore, a mediocre or strong competitor makes crowd workers
quit more often compared to a weak competitor (regression model 3 in Table 4.4, signifi-
cant effect of a mediocre or strong competitor interacted with feedback on performance).
In total, feedback moderates the relation of strength of competitors and task completion
(support for H6). The stronger the competitor the more likely a crowd worker quits the
task resulting in a negative correlation (support for H4).
Result 2: Capability is correlated to task completion in a rank-order-tournament.
Capable crowd workers finish the task more often.
Result 3: Task completion is correlated to mediocre and strong competitors when
feedback is given in a rank-order-tournament; it is not related to task completion
when strength of competitors is weak. Crowd workers quit the task more often
when facing stronger competitors.
After establishing the correlations on the mediator task completion, we now turn to
the correlations with the outcome. The results of ordinary least squares regressions (OLS)
are depicted in columns (5) to (8) of Table 4.4. As expected (H3), task completion has
a strong relation to performance. Crowd workers who complete a task also finish more
sliders correctly. Capability has a direct relation with performance (support for H2). Ca-
pable crowd workers perform better than those who are not. The correlation of capability
on performance is mediated by task completion. The more capable a crowd worker is
the more likely he will complete the task, which will result in better performance. Giving
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feedback about a weak competitor is correlated with performance compared to no feed-
back (regression model 6 in Table 4.4). Crowd workers who are informed about facing a
weak competitor perform worse than without this information. We conclude that indeed
frontrunners lay back when they know that they are frontrunners. On the contrary, giving
feedback about facing a mediocre or strong competitor leads to no different performance
than no feedback (regression model 6 in Table 4.4). The difference between a weak and
a strong competitor is significant (regression model 7 in Table 4.4). The difference be-
tween a weak and a mediocre competitor (regression model 7 in Table 4.4) and between
a mediocre and strong competitor is not significant (regression model 8 in Table 4.4). As
hypothesized, a moderating relation of feedback on the relation of strength of competi-
tors on performance is found. H5 is, however, only partially supported: As expected, with
given feedback, playing against a weak competitor decreases performance; contrary to the
expectation, when playing against a mediocre or strong competitor feedback does not in-
crease performance. These associations are not associated with fatigue of crowd workers
who play longer than those who quit the task, since it is controlled for task completion in
the regressions.
Result 4: Capability is related to performance in a rank-order-tournament. Ca-
pable crowd workers perform better than those who are not. The relation is par-
tially mediated by task completion.
Result 5: Strength of competitors is related to performance in a rank-order-
tournament. When feedback is given, there is a direct, unmediated negative cor-
relation of weak competitors with performance. With mediocre or strong competi-
tors, the negative correlation with performance is mediated by task completion.
After the causal mediation analysis steps we now turn to the indirect effect and the
effect sizes using Preacher and Hayes’ (2004) bootstrap test. To do so, the dataset with
four treatments is modified in seven sets of pairwise treatment comparisons to assess the
analysis (Pedersen et al., 2011). All results are based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations
with a sample size of 331. Feedback implements treatments FW, FM, and FS. The results
are depicted in Table 4.5.
First, the NF treatment that resembles the tournament used in Study 1 is compared with
all three feedback treatments (FW, FM, FS; model 1 in Table 4.5). When feedback is given,
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the significant total negative effect on performance is mediated by task completion. In
comparison to giving no feedback, feedback on a weak competitor leads to no significant
mediation but significant negative direct and total effects on performance (model 2 in
Table 4.5). For a mediocre competitor, the significant negative total effect is mediated by
task completion (model 3 in Table 4.5). For a strong competitor, interestingly, there is a
significant negative mediation effect on performance via task completion; the total effect
is, however, not significant as the mediation effect is partially offset by an (insignificant)
positive direct effect (model 4 in Table 4.5).
Looking at the differences between the different strengths of the competitors (models 5
to 7 in Table 4.5) only the comparison of the two extremes – FW and FS – shows significant
relations. Compared to facing a weak competitor, a strong competitor makes some crowd
workers quit the task (mediation effect) while incentivizing others to perform better (di-
rect effect). Both effects cancel each other about out, thus leading to an insignificant total
effect. These results further underpin and detail our findings so far: The stronger the com-
petitor, the more likely a crowd worker quits the task. Task completion thereby partially
mediates the negative correlation of feedback and performance. When a crowd worker
decides to complete the task, the weaker the competitor, the lower the crowd worker’s
performance.
In summary, Study 2 suggests that feedback is related to one’s performance. No matter
how strong or weak the competitor in a dyadic ROT performs, on average over all crowd
workers it decreases performance. The mechanism of this negative correlation is either
the mediation by task completion or a direct negative effect on performance. This result
seems disillusioning for short dyadic ROTs showing leaderboards. It might, however, be
driven by averaging over crowd workers facing competitors of different strength.
It still might be the case that a clever matching of crowd workers yields higher per-
formance. Specifically, it is hypothesized that a competitor not substantially stronger or
weaker but about on par with the crowd worker itself should result in the fiercest compe-
tition that does neither discourage continuation not allow to relax. This issue is addressed
by Study 3.
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4.7 Study 3: Feedback in Rank-Order-Tournaments –
Equal Strength of Competitors
4.7.1 Study Design
Study 3 – evaluating the relations of an equally well performing competitor – consists again
of a PR round measuring capability and a dyadic ROT measuring performance. Three treat-
ments for the ROT phase are compared – no feedback about the competitor’s performance
(NF3; with a suffix 3 to denote Study 3), feedback about a mediocre competitor (FM3),
and feedback about an equally good competitor (FE), as depicted in Figure 4.7. The first
two exactly replicate the respective treatments from Study 2 (see Subsections 4.6.1 and
4.6.2). The new aspect of Study 3 is FE: Knowing a crowd worker’s capability from the PR
phase, a competitor for the ROT who – in the available historic data12 – is closest to him
in terms of capability is picked.
4.7.2 Evaluation
Overall, 394 crowd workers participated. General statistics are depicted in Table 4.6. 131
participated in NF3, 128 in FM3, and 135 in FE. Participants’ age ranges from 18 to 66
years (mean 34 years, 47.7 % female). The task took on average 11 minutes, and the
average payment was USD 1.69.
To assess the moderation mediation model, similar to Subsection 4.6.2, we first evaluate
the results of a set of six regressions, following the general steps from Hayes (2009) con-
Instructions 
& Quiz 
Piece Rate 
(PR) 
Questionnaire Payment 
ROT 
No Feedback (NF) 
ROT 
Mediocre Feedback (FM) 
ROT 
Equal Feedback (FE) 
Treatments 
FIGURE 4.7: Experimental process of Study 3.
12The used historic data consists of the pre-test data and the data from Study 2 (see Subsections 4.6.1
and 4.6.2).
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temporary interpretation of Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation and moderation analysis.
Again, the correlation of the causal variables on the mediator (regression models 1 to 3 in
Table 4.7) are established first and then the correlation of the causal variables and the me-
diator on the outcome (regression models 4 to 6 in Table 4.7) are implemented. Strength
of competitors is coded in two levels (mediocre and equal). Second, we use Preacher and
Hayes (2004) bootstrap test method, resulting in four dichotomous comparisons (NF3 –
Feedback, NF3 – FM3, NF3 – FE, FM3 – FE) with each 10,000 bootstrap simulations. Re-
sults from the six regressions are summarized in Table 4.7 and results from the bootstrap
analysis are summarized in Table 4.8.
First, reinforcing the results of Study 2 (see Subsection 4.6.2), feedback affects the me-
diator (task completion) negatively (regression model 1 in Table 4.7). The interaction of
strength of competitor and feedback assesses the moderation. Again, facing a mediocre com-
petitor negatively affects task completion. This confirms the findings of Study 2. Turning
to the new aspect of Study 3 – a matched, equally well performing competitor – however,
contrary to the expectations, negatively affects task completion (regression model 2 in Ta-
ble 4.7). Moreover, differences between a mediocre and an equal competitor regarding
their effect on task completion are not observed (regression model 3 in Table 4.7).
Result 6: The existence of an equally good competitor is negatively correlated
with task completion in rank-order-tournaments. When feedback is given, crowd
workers facing an equally good competitor quit the task more often than without
feedback.
Second, confirming the results of Study 2 as well (see Subsection 4.6.2), feedback af-
fects the outcome variable (performance) negatively as well (regression model 4 in Table
4.7). The mediator (task completion) again effects performance (regression model 4 in
Table 4.7). Hence, the effect of feedback is partially mediated by task completion. When
Overall NF3 FM3 FE
#Participants 394 131 128 135
Female 188 71 59 58
Average Age 33.79 33.72 33.30 34.32
Average payment (USD) 1.69 1.72 1.68 1.67
TABLE 4.6: General statistics of participants for Study 3.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatments NF3 – Feedback NF3 – FM3 NF3 – FE FM3 – FE
Average mediation
effect (95 % CI)
-1.219** -.203+ -1.270* -1.321
[-2.382, -.237] [-2.428, .087] [-2.798, -.106] [-1.874, 1.245]
Average direct ef-
fect (95 % CI)
-1.541* -1.757* -1.331 .426
[-2.954, -.153] [-3.399, -.177] [-2.985, .349] [-1.314, 2.139]
Total effect (95 %
CI)
-2.761*** -1.960** -2.602** -.896
[-4.617, -1.029] [-5.028, -.818] [-4.926, -.595] [-2.247, 2.449]
Proportion medi-
ated (95 % CI)
.442* .104+ .488* 1.475
[.126, .881] [-.048, .850] [.061, 1.290] [-7.574, 6.444]
N 394 394 394 394
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .1
TABLE 4.8: Mediation analysis results for Study 3.
facing a mediocre competitor there is a significant negative effect on performance, when
facing an equally good competitor there is not (regression model 5 in Table 4.7). Hence,
I conclude that the negative effect from feedback on performance is partially mediated by
task completion when facing a mediocre competitor and completely mediated when facing
an equally good competitor.
Result 7: The existence of an equally good competitor is negatively correlated
with performance in rank-order-tournaments. When feedback is given, crowd
workers facing an equally good competitor perform worse than without feedback.
This relation is completely mediated by task completion.
Turning to the results of the bootstrap analysis presented in Table 4.8, the NF3 control
treatment is first compared with the two feedback treatments (FM3, FE; model 1 in Table
4.8). Feedback has a significant negative total effect on performance. This negative effect
is partially mediated by task completion. This confirms the results that giving feedback is
negatively correlated with crowd workers’ performance, in some cases through the medi-
ation effect that crowd workers quit the task and in other cases because crowd workers do
not quit but still do less compared to when not getting feedback.
The effects of a mediocre competitor on performance are replicated (model 2 in Ta-
ble 4.8): A mediocre competitor leads to a total negative effect on crowd workers’ per-
formance with a comparatively low but significant mediation through task completion.
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The new aspect of Study 3 is evaluating equally good – group matched – competitors in
treatment FE. Compared to no feedback, FE leads to a significant negative total effect on
performance which is, completely mediated by task completion, as there is no significant
direct effect (model 3 in Table 4.8). Even though crowd workers have a reasonable chance
to win at all times, since their competitor has about equal strength, they still quit the task
resulting in lower performance. The correlation seems to be stronger (more negative)
than the correlation induced by a mediocre competitor, but there is not a significant dif-
ference between FM3 and FE (model 4 in Table 4.8). Contrary to the expectations, group
matching shows no positive or less negative correlation with performance, but rather a
comparable negative correlation. Regarding the implementation overhead, it is therefore
not recommended to implement such a matching, since it does not boost crowd workers’
performance in a short term dyadic ROT. Reasons for this could be that feedback may just
be a distraction or excels arousal and performance decreases in an aroused state.
4.8 Summary
Financial incentive schemes and their relationship with feedback and crowd workers’ per-
formance, have gained new relevance with the omnipresence of digital work places and
crowdsourcing human work. In this chapter, dyadic rank-order tournaments (ROTs) and
piece rates (PRs) as incentive schemes for short crowdsourcing tasks are investigated. Fur-
thermore, their relationship to task performance in an anonymous digital workplace for
activities that can be divided into small pieces that can be done (mostly) independently of
each other is in focus of this chapter. A model on the correlates of crowd workers’ perfor-
mance in ROTs is introduced and tested with a series of empirical studies on MTurk – the
most popular crowdsourcing workplace.
The best dyadic ROT in this study does not outperform a simple PR in terms of perfor-
mance elicited from participants (RQ 1). Not all dyadic ROTs are equal, however: A rela-
tion to performance from giving feedback about the competitor’s strength is found (RQ 2).
Feedback that a crowd worker is performing comparatively well does not show a relation
to his tendency to complete the task but tends to reduce his performance. Potentially, as
feedback signals that the crowd worker does not have to excel to win the competition, or
it signals that low performance is the norm, or both. Feedback that shows that a crowd
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worker trails behind increases his likelihood to quit the task. Underlying reasons could be
that the crowd worker knows that he is about to lose (and hence the financial reward) and
he cuts his losses in terms of time invested or he aims to work on tasks where he has a
structural advantage over other crowd workers. Mediocre competitors lead to correlations
in between. When competitors are group matched and hence compete against an equally
strong competitor, performance is reduced as well. Reasons could be that crowd workers
perform worse under pressure or are distracted by constantly checking the feedback on
whether they are winning or not. However, this is to be evaluated in future work. Per-
formance of crowd workers who obtain the feedback that they are comparatively weak
but who nevertheless continue to work on a task, do not change their effort compared to
receiving no feedback.
In summary, this results in a clear guidance how to set up the two studied incentives in
an anonymous crowd labor market for distributable work: A simple piece rate payment is
better than a short dyadic tournament as incentive for simple short crowdsourcing tasks, as
it is easiest to implement and unbeaten in terms of crowd workers’ performance. Holding
a short dyadic tournament does not offer performance benefits – if one does it anyways,
during the tournament one should not provide a leaderboard or feedback on crowd work-
ers’ relative performance. Selectively matching crowd workers to homogeneous groups
seems not to be worth the effort, as it decreases their performance in such a tournament
setting.
The main contribution of this chapter is threefold: First, it implements existing evi-
dence of incentives and feedback in tournaments via a theoretical model. Second, it stud-
ies the model and compares two common incentive schemes used in crowdsourcing in a
series of three studies. Third, it provides guidance for crowdsourcing practitioners on how
to structure payment schemes for their crowd workers. It thereby partially answers the
practitioner question on how to design crowd labor tasks and contributes to theoretical
discussion of designing and developing digital workplaces in general.
The limitations of this chapter are straightforward and include the following: First,
three discrete levels of the strength of a competitor (Study 2) and equally strong com-
petitors (Study 3) are evaluated but a continuous competitor strength is not observed.
Expanding the analysis in this direction might show that moderation of the effect between
strength of competitors and performance by feedback is non-linear. Second, even though
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the experiment was applied on a crowdsourcing platform (MTurk), the slider task (chosen
to provide experimental control on incentives to perform the task) is a rather unnatural
task and the short 3-min dyadic tournaments are rather small tournaments. Results might
not extend to longitudinal and more complex ROT settings with many participants. In
order to increase external validity even further, a next step might be to explore tasks more
common to crowdsourcing, to scale up the tournaments (length and participants), and to
camouflage the experimental context. Results might differ when tournaments are played
over a longer timeframe with more participants. Third, the feedback system was rather
simple. More complex leaderboard and feedback designs might induce different results.
Fourth, crowd workers’ characteristics like, e.g., personality traits are not in focus of this
work. However, they might show, that for some parts of the population, ROTs indeed spur
performance. Last, the scope of this chapter are tasks that aim at the collection and sub-
sequent aggregation of crowd input; settings in which the employer is interested in only a
single best solution are not studied and the results might not extend to such settings.
Future research might investigate causality among the constructs studied in this pa-
per. In the three empirical studies, several constructs depicted in Figure 4.1 are either
controlled by the researchers (strength of competitors, feedback), or they are given exoge-
nously by the nature of participants and vary at most marginally during the short duration
of studies (age, gender, education). Pooled with random assignment of participants to
treatments, it appears reasonable to hypothesize causation where these constructs corre-
late with capability, task completion, and performance. Testing for such causation and
further investigating the underlying mechanisms is up to future research. In addition, the
analysis could be extended to more complex tasks with a longer duration (see Chapter
5, which focuses on long lasting ROTs). Other crowdsourcing settings, specifically tasks
where the employer is only interested in the single best solution and tasks that require
collaboration among crowd workers should be evaluated (see Chapter 5). Furthermore,
it might be fruitful to design tournaments which invoke intrinsic motivation to increase
performance (see Chapter 6, which focuses on non-monetary incentives). In addition, fu-
ture work should disentangle the effects of social norms and financial incentives on crowd
workers’ performance.
To sum up, this section focused in particular on systematically investigating the effect
of different payment schemes and feedback on a crowd worker’s effort. Especially in ROTs
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crowd workers’ effort is influenced by the feedback scheme the platform designer uses. In
contrast to this chapter, the following chapter focuses on the effect of ROTs on a crowd
worker’s risk attitude in a long lasting tournament (see Chapter 5). Thereby the overall
understanding of a crowd worker’s behavior is improved and the insights can be used
by platform designers. Not at least, risk-taking is believed to be an underlying reason of
different crowd workers’ efforts in ROTs (Eriksson et al., 2009a).
73

Chapter 5
Risk-Taking and Crowdsourcing:
Tournament Modes and Rankings
“ Competition is not only the basis of protection to the
consumer, but is the incentive to progress.”
HERBERT HOOVER, 1930
IN contrast to the last Chapter, which focused on crowd worker effort, this chapter fo-cuses on the risk-taking of crowd workers in different ROT setups. It thereby evaluates
a subsidiary behavioral aspect of crowd worker behavior. Risk-attitude could be an ex-
planation for high effort variances in crowd tournaments (Eriksson, Teyssier, and Villeval,
2009). In addition platform designers can benefit from these new insights as a crowd
worker’s risk attitude can improve outcomes in certain settings. This chapter thereby eval-
uates Research Question 3 and its Sub-Questions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 (see Section 1.2 of
Chapter 1).
Research Question 3: How is risk-taking behavior affected in long lasting rank-
order-tournaments?
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Research Question 3.1: Does the tournament mode (teams or individuals)
affect risk-taking behavior?
Research Question 3.2: Does the tournament progress affect risk-taking be-
havior?
Research Question 3.3: Does the ranking position affect risk-taking behav-
ior?
This chapter builds on and extends the collective work: Straub, Teubner, and Weinhardt
(2016). It starts with introducing and motivating the context and importance of risk-
taking in crowdsourcing scenarios (Section 5.1). Section 5.2 presents related work and
posits this chapters’ experiment in the literature on ROTs and risk-taking. In Section 5.3
the experimental design is described. Results are presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5
provides concluding remarks and shows pathways for future research.
5.1 Introduction
Electronic markets are developing rapidly. New and IT-enabled business models, features,
and standards arise, for instance recommender systems and crowdsourcing platforms.
Such platforms use the input of workers all over the globe to co-create value. There are
several types of such platforms with different aims: Prediction markets aim to forecast
uncertain events (Kranz et al., 2014), innovation contests generate creative solutions for
a given problem (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008), design contests are used to create aesthetic
and meaningful graphical designs (Araujo, 2013), and crowdsourcing platforms such as
MTurk1 try to outsource “manual” tasks or are being used for experimentation (Paolacci
et al., 2010) (see Chapter 2 for more details).
One dimension of crowdsourcing is given by the incentive schemes (Kittur et al., 2013).
The most common types here are PRs and ROTs (see Chapter 4 and Subsection 2.1.1 of
Chapter 2). In ROTs, companies usually only pay for satisfying solutions (see Subsections
2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of Chapter 2 for more details). Therefore they face essentially no risk of
failure.
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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ROTs often use rankings as feedback mechanism to inform participants about their cur-
rent evaluation (see see Subsection 2.1.1 of Chapter 2). Such feedback schemes are often
thought of as a supporting element to motivate (continued) participation, whereas there
is also evidence that introducing competition – or even any rewards at all – can also have
detrimental effects, especially for creativity-centered tasks (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey,
2012).
Crowdsourcing tournaments may be differentiated with respect to whether and how
the crowd workers are grouped. In order to harness potentially beneficial group effects
(positive feedback, motivation, cohesion, belongingness, social presence, etc.), the issuer
may group the crowd workers into teams. In contrast, to stronger emphasize individualistic
aspects, participants may compete individually.
Although crowdsourcing is very attractive for companies, there is only little research
on online crowdsourcing ROTs design itself. A key challenge here is to find an adequate
operational mode, incentives, and feedback mechanisms for such ROTs (Archak and Sun-
dararajan, 2009; Shaw et al., 2011). ROTs, independent from online and crowd-based sce-
narios, have previously been analyzed in economic laboratory experiments (van Dijk et al.,
2001; Eriksson et al., 2009a; Eriksson et al., 2009b; Bracha and Fershtman, 2013). Much
of the existing literature focuses on factors directly effective with respect to effort (van Dijk
et al., 2001; Eriksson et al., 2009a; Eriksson et al., 2009b; Bracha and Fershtman, 2013)
(see Chapter 4). The role of risk-taking behavior in tournaments and its interplay with
feedback (i.e., ranking) and grouping (teams or individuals) has experienced much less
attention (Nieken and Sliwka, 2010) (see Chapter 4). Risk-taking, however, may deter-
mine a crowd worker’s contribution quite significantly. On the one hand, high risk-taking
may be reflected in crowd workers handing in low-cost-low-quality work, which does not
require much timely or cognitive effort. Such work of course has a higher probability of
being rejected (and hence not paid) by the issuer – but this is the risk the crowd worker is
willing to take. On the other hand, especially for tasks involving creativity, high risk-taking
may be desirable as it may result in a variety of more diverse, offbeat, and extraordinary
contributions.
Thus, risk-taking in tournaments is a factor worth considering. Issuers of crowdsourcing
tasks may well benefit from better understanding how different incentive schemes and
feedback mechanisms interact with human risk-taking behavior. High risk propensity may,
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in this sense, help to unleash the crowd’s creative potential and to avoid trodden paths and
conformist solutions. For more straightforward tasks, risk aversion may be the stimulus
of choice to ensure and increase output quality. Thus, this chapter introduces a factor
potentially influencing a crowd worker’s behavior in crowdsourcing ROTs – risk-taking.
Thereby this chapter extends the findings of Chapter 4.
In this work, it is thus considered how (i) tournament mode (teams or individuals), (ii)
tournament progress, and (iii) the position in the ranking affect an individual’s risk-taking
behavior. Overall, this is reflected in the three main research questions of this chapter
presented in Section 1.2:
Research Question 3.1: Does the tournament mode (teams or individuals) affect
risk-taking behavior?
Research Question 3.2: Does the tournament progress affect risk-taking behav-
ior?
Research Question 3.3: Does the ranking position affect risk-taking behavior?
These questions are addressed by means of an online experiment along with the FIFA
World Cup 2014. Participants bet on the outcomes of all 64 matches in order to earn
credit. The likelihood of the outcome of the matches is reflected by odds which account
for the possible credit participants can earn. Thereby these odds reflect the risk-taking of
participants. Hence, contrary to Chapter 4, this chapter abstracts from the factor effort
and concentrates on risk-taking behavior specifically.
5.2 Background
Crowdsourcing tournaments (e.g., 99designs2, threadless3) offer a mechanism to distribute
work to an open workforce for comparatively low cost (Leimeister, 2010; Paolacci et al.,
2010). Two of the main challenges of crowdsourcing in general and its subgroup of crowd-
sourcing tournaments are to incentivize crowd workers adequately and thus secure quality
and cost effectiveness (Shaw et al., 2011; Krause et al., 2016). Theories to assess behavior
2http://en.99designs.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
3https://www.threadless.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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in these environments must be seen in front of the background of more fundamental as-
pects such as motivation and competition, as well as their interplay in online settings (see
Chapters 2 and 3).
The intuition to this chapter’s research can be located in the streams on cognitive dis-
sonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Cooper, 2011), responsibility diffusion theory (Wallach
et al., 1964), and mechanisms of group conformity (Stallen et al., 2012). Cognitive disso-
nance theory posits that participants experience conflicting cognitive states as unpleasant
and take actions in order to resolve or reduce such mental conflicts (Cooper, 2011). For the
case of rankings, a (positive) self-image is certainly in conflict with being ranked low, while
this conflict is less likely to occur when being ranked at or near the top of the list. Behavior
with effect on a participant’s score can hence be expected to be different for different posi-
tions in the ranking. In particular, cognitive dissonance suggests that falling behind others
alters behavior compared to its “natural” form, and it does particularly more so than for
being on top, by stressing the importance of catching up. While the general presence of a
tournament mode was found to result in higher effort levels, rankings often prove to have
a detrimental effect (Straub et al., 2015; Barankay, 2011) (see Chapter 4). With respect
to risk-taking (chances on high rewards), rankings may be pointing to a possible path for
conflict resolution, if ranked at an unsatisfying position. Hence, it may be hypothesized
that positions at the bottom of the ranking entice higher levels of risk-taking.
With regard to actions relevant to the entire group, responsibility diffusion theory states
that individuals feel less responsible for their actions (and their consequences) in groups
compared to acting individually (Fraser et al., 1971; Stoner, 1968; Zajonc et al., 1968).
Effort in groups was shown to often suffer due to this diffusion effect (Petty et al., 1977),
also referred to as “social loafing” (Latane et al., 1979). Different levels of perceived re-
sponsibility may also lead to a shift of risk-taking behavior. This can be due to a lack of
motivation to determine the group-optimal risk strategy, as this may require a lot of effort
itself. Subjects may thus take larger risks as they would shine in the light of success but
presumably rely on the others in case of failure. In contrast, in groups (compared to indi-
vidual decisions) there are – after all – others for which participants may feel responsible
and accountable and thus prefer a more moderate, i.e., less risky, behavior.
Moreover, mechanisms of group conformity may entice some team members to adapt
the strategies of other members within the group (Stallen et al., 2012), e.g., of those with
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particular good performance. To the contrary, preferences for individualism may result in
choice differentiation (Ariely and Levav, 2000). This may result in a plethora of different
constellations, depending on which strategies were successful early on. In this chapter,
this effect is ruled out by making the group members’ decisions unavailable to others.
In the following subsections, some light will be shed on the factors risk-taking in ROTs
and the relationship between risk-taking and creativity by illustrating experimental and
empirical evidence on these matters.
5.2.1 Risk in Rank-Order-Tournaments
In crowd tournaments (e.g., design contests, open innovation contests, etc.) a crowd
worker’s effort may be affected by the crowd workers’ risk-taking behavior. Many studies
in this regard observed high variance in effort (Bull et al., 1987; Harbring and Irlenbusch,
2003; van Dijk et al., 2001). Risk-taking may be one explanation for high effort variance
in tournaments (Eriksson et al., 2009a) (see Chapter 4). In order to investigate partici-
pants’ risk taking behavior, it is therefore crucial to better understand the relation between
tournaments and rankings. Hvide (2002) find that individual risk-taking depends on the
modification of the tournament: High rewards for the highest performance led to high
risks, but not explicitly to hard work.
In the domain of sport psychology and motor racing, Bothner et al. (2007) consider the
impact of positions during races on risk-taking. Using data from the NASCAR professional
sports car racing series, they find that “pressure from below” induces risk-taking. “Pressure
from above”, in particular when the participant sees the opportunity to advance in rank,
in contrast, has a smaller impact on risk-taking.
As Taylor (2003) shows, the gap from sports to corporate decision making is not too
large. He examined risk-taking behavior in a mutual funding competition, in which two
fund managers with unequal midyear performances compete against each other for new
cash inflows. In short, leading managers avoid risks whereas those behind take risks. The
rationale is that losing managers try to catch up. Qiu (2003) examined the behavior of
mutual fund managers as well. The results show similar findings. Managers of funds who
are close to top managers have greater incentives to increase their portfolios, i.e., taking a
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greater risk, than top managers who are more likely to lock in their positions, i.e., reduce
their risk.
Nieken and Sliwka (2010) find that risk-taking depends on the correlation of the out-
comes of risky strategies. In their study, two agents with different scores simultaneously
decide between a risky and a safe strategy. The safe strategy guarantees an outcome, while
the risky strategies’ outcome varies with a certain probability, but might lead to a higher
payout. The experiment involves different correlations of the outcome of the risky strategy,
if it is chosen by both players, i.e., the outcome is the same for both players if both choose
the risky strategy (correlation = 1), it is the same half of the time both choose the risky
strategy (correlation = 1/2), or they always get a different outcome when both choose the
risky strategy (correlation = 0). The authors find that the leading player chooses the safe
strategy more often whereas the trailing player nearly always plays risky when there is no
correlation. However, when the outcome of the risky strategy is perfectly correlated, the
leading player chooses the risky strategy more often than the competitor. This means that
as long as risk-taking might lead to a competitive advantage, leading players will decrease
their risk-taking, while trailing players increase their risk-taking. When there is no com-
petitive advantage, i.e., when the risky strategy leads to same outcome for both players,
leading players take risk as well.
Bracha and Fershtman (2013) find that people rather tend to make riskier decisions
under tournament conditions than under performance-pay conditions. Participants make
the decision whether to play a lottery (50:50 chance to win USD 35 or USD 10) or to
get a guaranteed fixed amount (USD 22) two times. The first time the decision simply
pays the payoffs. The second time the decision is set up as a head-to-head tournament.
Only the player with the higher points receives USD 40. Contrary to the expectation that
participants would choose the safe option more often under tournament conditions, the
opposite occurred: Participants choose the riskier option more often.
Kräkel (2008) investigates how risk influences effort and the probability of winning
a tournament. While contestants try to minimize their effort, they are willing to take
risks when the chance of winning is increased. In uneven tournaments (one or several
contestants are more capable to win) the underdogs always prefer risky choices to in-
crease the likelihood of winning. This finding is supported by the results of Becker and
Huselid (1992), who examined the risk effect of the contestants’ “spread” in a tournament.
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Panel data from different auto racing tournaments (i.e., NASCAR and International Mo-
tor Sports Association) showed that drivers take more risks when the spread to the first
driver increased. In addition with the results from (Bothner et al., 2007) it seems, that
“pressure from below” and “pressure from above” are not only influenced by the rank in a
tournament, but the distance, and hence the likelihood, to the next rank as well.
In addition, Grund and Gürtler (2005) analyze the risk-taking behavior of professional
soccer coaches. Their key finding is that during a match, risk-taking of the leading coach
decreases with the goal difference. Pull et al. (2013) found that in tournaments with high
contestant heterogeneity, an increase of the individuals risk will first lead to an enhance-
ment of incentives. After reaching a critical risk level, it will then weaken incentives.
5.2.2 Risk-Taking and Creativity
Crowdsourcing works well for simple and repetitive tasks. Extending crowdsourcing to cre-
ative tasks on a large scale is more difficult to achieve (Kittur, 2010). However, creativity
is an important factor in several crowdsourcing tasks (e.g., design contests, open innova-
tion contests, etc.). While several crowdsourcing markets exist focusing on creative tasks
(e.g., InnoCentive4, threadless3, 99designs2), it is not clear if they are optimally designed
for tapping the crowd workers’ creative potential. Crowdsourcing literature so far focuses
on the collaboration of crowd workers to facilitate structures for collaborative creativity
processes (Kittur, 2010; Yu and Nickerson, 2011; Nickerson et al., 2011). Though, it may
be beneficial for creative crowdsourcing tasks to incentivize creativity, on an individual as
well as on a collaborative level.
Literature on creativity suggests that risk-taking and intrinsic motivation are the main
drivers for creativity (Hossain, 2012; Dewett, 2007; Amabile et al., 1986). Amabile et al.
(1986) show in their model that intrinsic motivation is benefiting creative tasks. Compared
to offering no reward (i.e., intrinsic motivation) offering a reward (i.e., extrinsic motiva-
tion) decreases creativity. Dewett (2007) analyzed the link from intrinsic motivation to
creativity in more detail and found that risk-taking mediates this relation. Their survey
data shows that risk-taking affects one’s creativity positively. It is therefore vital to induce
or reduce participants’ risk-taking behavior based on the desired outcome on creativity.
4https://www.innocentive.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Based on the theory and the empirical insights illustrated in the last section (5.2), the
design for an online experiment is presented, which systematically investigates the im-
pact of tournament mode (individuals or teams competing), position in the ranking, and
tournament progress in this section.
The experiment was conducted as an online experiment using a ROT payout scheme
as incentive. The experiment consisted of two treatments, which varied the way the ROT
was executed, i.e., the team (TEAM) and the individual (IND) treatment. In the TEAM
treatment participants were ranked as a team competing against other teams. In the IND
treatment, participants competed individually against other participants.
The experiment was conducted along with the FIFA World Cup 2014 in June and July
2014, using an online interface. Participants placed bets on the 64 matches of the tourna-
ment, could receive points if bets were placed correctly, and competed for payoffs, based
on their total team’s or individual points. A total of 72 participants took part in the study.
Participants were recruited from a voluntary student pool using the Online Recruitment
System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE, Greiner, 2004) at the Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology (KIT). Participants were assigned either to the TEAM or the IND treatment,
using a between-subject design, i.e., in each treatment there were 36 participants.
After an initial online registration on the experiment website, participants received in-
structions and user credentials via email (the instructions are provided in the Appendix’s
Chapter B). The participants’ task then was to place bets on the 64 matches over the course
of the World Cup using the website interface. The bets reflected the possible outcomes for
each match – home win, draw, or away win in regular time (3-way-bets)5. Participants
could discontinue participation at any time during the experiment, like in other online or
crowdsourcing tournaments where the open call characteristic usually does not enforce
participation due to anonymity and the lack of contracts.
Odds were retrieved from the sports bookmaker bwin.com6 72 hours prior to match
53-way-bets standardly close after regular game time. In tournaments where a winner needs to be
decided, such as final rounds of the FIFA Wolrd Cup, the only assessable way to implement 3-way-bets is
to bet on the outcome after regular game time. Otherwise, the draw outcome could not be realized, since
overtime or a shootout always decides a winner of the game.
6https://www.bwin.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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start. The odds reflected the inverse probability of an outcome. Bookmakers try to secure
that they earn money. Hence, they calculate, based on their insights, how likely the out-
come of an event in their eyes is. To secure their outcome, more likely outcomes result
in lower odds. Thereby, they try to minimize the possible profit a participant can earn by
placing his bet. More unlikely outcomes are reflected by higher odds. Odds are the multi-
plier with which a participant’s investment is multiplied if the outcome occurs. Following
this, outcomes are more likely when odds are small, thereby less risky and a good proxy
for risk-taking. Note that to the best of our knowledge the “true” probabilities of how the
matches may end, (e.g., based on a model incorporating all relevant factors) are simply
not available – the bookmakers odds are society’s best guess.
Figure 5.1 shows a screenshot of the betting environment. Participants earned points
according to the selected odd if their bet turned out to be correct. Wrong bets resulted in
zero points. Forgetting to bet on a specific match resulted in zero points for that match.
Placing bets was free of charge. Therefore, unlikely events yielded higher potential payoffs
(points) than ex ante rather likely events. For example, the participant who placed bets in
the betting environment, depicted in Figure 5.1, decided to bet on Brazil in the first match
and therefore got the respective selected odd as points (1.30 points), since Brazil actually
won against Croatia (match result – 3:1). However, this participant received zero points
for the wrong bet on Spain against Netherlands.
Participants were able to bet on the outcome of a match between 72 hours and 5 minutes
before the match started. Betting on all 64 matches was incentivized with an additional
payoff of 5€, to prevent dropouts from the experiment.
FIGURE 5.1: Betting environment.
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FIGURE 5.2: Individual ranking.
FIGURE 5.3: Team ranking.
Half of the participants, 36 students, were randomly divided into 6 groups of 6 par-
ticipants each. These participants competed against each other individually within their
group (IND). Each participant received points according to the respective selected odd for
each correct bet. After each match, the online ranking was updated (Figure 5.2). The own
position was highlighted (position 1 in Figure 5.2). After the experiment participants were
paid according to their final individual rank – 1st rank 50€; 2nd rank 25€; 3rd rank 15€.
Additionally, participants were able to see an alphabetic list containing their own group
and the other groups. Please note that this information was not relevant for payoff.
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The other half was also randomly divided into 6 groups of 6 participants each. How-
ever, these groups competed as a team against the other teams (TEAM). The individual
points of each participant in a team were added up to a team score. After each match
the team ranking was updated showing payoff, the total amount of points, average points
per participant, and positions of all six teams (Figure 5.3). The own team position was
highlighted (here position 6). Participants were paid according to their team’s final rank –
1st rank 50€for each team member, 2nd rank 25€for each team member; 3rd rank 15€for
each team member. In addition, participants were able to see an alphabetic list showing
their own team’s individual performance. Again, please note that this information was not
relevant for payoff. Hence, both treatments were identical – except with respect to the
payoff rules. In both treatments, participants could only see the (assigned) username of
the other participants7, whereas communication among participants was not enabled. The
same 6 names were used within all teams.
Before the actual experiment started, participants were asked to answer comprehen-
sion questions by e-mail in order to ensure proper understanding of the payoff rules and
the entire procedure. Four participants were replaced in response to not answering the
questionnaire. After the experiment, participants filled out questionnaires assessing indi-
vidual risk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002), competitiveness (Griffin-Pierson, 1990), and
the “Big Five” personality traits (Rammstedt and John, 2007). Moreover, they were asked
to assess their experience during the experiment with regard to perceived social presence
(Gefen and Straub, 2004), perceived competition (Byun and Mann, 2011; Vandercruysse
et al., 2013), group belonging (Bollen and Hoyle, 1990; Greene, 2004), arousal (Liu et al.,
2013), and enjoyment (Hassanein and Head, 2005) (see Appendix B). Afterwards they
received their payment. This experimental process is depicted in Figure 5.4.
Registration 
Instructions 
& Quiz 
Questionnaire Payment 
Treatments 
Individual Ranking 
(IND) 
Team Ranking 
(TEAM) 
FIGURE 5.4: Experimental process of Chapter’s 5 study.
7Nicknames of famous soccer players were used as usernames. Each group consisted of the same 6
usernames.
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Risk-taking is assessed by the odds that were selected by the participants as described in
Section 5.3. Assuming that the provided odds incorporate all relevant available informa-
tion, each choice (home, draw, away) has the same expected outcome, but higher odds are
more risky than lower odds as they represent a lottery with a higher variance. Moreover,
odds represent the inverse likelihood of an event. Events more likely are represented by
small odds of bookmakers, while high odds reflect unlikely events. Hence, odds represent
a good proxy for how risky it is to bet on an outcome of an event. The higher the odd
is, the more unlikely is the outcome of the event and in conclusion it is more risky to bet
on this event since chances to win are more unlikely. Following this, the selected odd by
the participant proxies a participant’s risk-taking. In statistical tests, I employ a 0.1 level
to decide on the rejection of null hypotheses. More detailed information on p-values is
provided below.
Table 5.1 shows general statistics about participants. Overall 72 participants (56 male,
16 female) participated in the study. Average age was 21 years. All participants were
enrolled in university and the majority of participants had a background in economics
(62.5 %). All participants completed the experiment, but not all participants placed their
bets on all games. Participants placed a total of 4,401 (out of a possible 72x64 = 4, 608)
conclusive bets, representing a betting rate of 96 % of all possible bets. Moreover, some
participants placed several bets on the same game, thereby changing their opinion over
time. Overall 6,380 bets were placed – 4,401 conclusive and 1,979 non-conclusive bets.
Overall IND TEAM
#Participants 72 36 36
Female 16 7 9
Economics 45 24 21
Average Age 21.44 21.81 21.08
#Bets 6,380 3,439 2,941
Conclusive Bets 4,401 2,193 2,208
Non-Conclusive Bets 1,979 1,246 733
TABLE 5.1: General statistics of participants.
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FIGURE 5.5: Mean risk-taking (selected odd) by treatment, standard error bars for 95 % con-
fidence interval.
The main focus of this research lies on betting behavior, i.e., which degree of risk par-
ticipants are willing to take in their respective treatment condition, with their respective
position in the ranking, and tournament progress. As a proxy for risk, the selected odd
(out of 3) for a given participant and match is used.
Overall, taking both treatments into account (IND and TEAM), the mean risk-taking
(selected odd) is 2.42 (SD = 1.310). Moreover, we can observe higher mean risk-taking
(selected odd) in the IND treatment (mean = 2.476; SD = 1.423) compared to the TEAM
treatment (mean = 2.364; SD = 1.185), as depicted in Figure 5.5 (two-sided t-test, t =
-2.838, p-value < .01). However, this analysis does not control for the timely sequence,
which is addressed in later analyses.
Result 1: Participants in the individual treatment take higher risks compared to
participants in the team treatment.
Table 5.2 shows descriptive statistics of risk-taking (selected odd) per treatment and
rank. Overall, taking both treatments into account (IND and TEAM), the payout-relevant
ranks (rank 1-3) we can observe lesser risk-taking (selected odd) (mean= 2.32; SD= 1.13)
than in non payout-relevant ranks (rank 4-6: mean = 2.56; SD = 1.51). While this effect
is the same in both treatments, we can observe, independent of (non) payout-relevant
ranks (Figure 5.5), higher risk-taking (selected odd) in the IND treatment (rank 1-3:
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Overall IND TEAM
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All 2.42 1.31 2.48 1.42 2.36 1.18
Rank 1 2.33 1.26 2.28 1.04 2.31 1.11
Rank 2 2.34 1.26 2.44 1.49 2.22 .91
Rank 3 2.44 1.13 2.40 1.16 2.35 1.15
Rank 4 2.47 1.33 2.60 1.52 2.44 1.12
Rank 5 2.49 1.23 2.66 1.32 2.32 1.08
Rank 6 2.53 1.66 2.75 2.13 2.64 1.67
Rank 1-3 2.32 1.13 2.35 1.19 2.29 1.07
Rank 4-6 2.56 1.51 2.67 1.69 2.46 1.32
TABLE 5.2: Mean and standard deviation of risk-taking (selected odd) by treatment and rank.
mean= 2.35; SD= 1.19 – rank 4-6: mean= 2.67; SD= 1.69) than in the TEAM treatment
(rank 1-3: mean = 2.29; SD = 1.07 – rank 4-6: mean = 2.46; SD = 1.32).
However, the data was collected as a time sequence over the course of the tournament.
Thus, the data has a panel structure as it faces a timely sequence of 64 decisions (corre-
sponding to the 64 matches) for 72 participants. Hence, to evaluate this descriptive finding
and to address the Research Questions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, a generalized least squares (GLS)
regression analysis with subject random effects is implemented. The dependent variable
is the selected odd.
As independent variables, a dummy for the IND treatment is used, i.e., whether a partici-
pant was allocated in the IND or in the TEAM condition. Moreover, to capture tournament
progress, the number of remaining matches in the tournament (#remaining matches) is
used as temporal panel variable. It states how many open matches were left at the time of
placing the bet. This measure is more accurate than using the respective match number
since placing bets was allowed within a time frame of 72 hours to 5 minutes before match
start, which mostly included several other matches. By using the number of remaining
open matches, this variable refers to a fixed state of information at the time of placing the
bet. Furthermore, the product term IND x #remaining matches is used to capture possible
interaction effects between treatment and tournament progress. Indicators are used for
the position (1 to 6) in both the main ranking (actual relevant for payoff) and the position
in the respective other ranking which was irrelevant for the experiment payoffs.
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DV (method) Risk-Taking – Selected Odd (GLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 2.641*** 2.629*** 2.727***
Treatment (IND) .243+ .244* .241+
#Remaining Matches -.007*** -.007*** -.007***
IND x #Remaining Matches -.004* -.004* -.004*
Rank (Relevant) .003 .010
Rank (Irrelevant) -.031*
N 4401 4401 4401
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .1
TABLE 5.3: Mixed effects regression results.
In order to provide some sense for the data and robustness, three specifications of re-
gression models, building up on each other, are presented in Table 5.38. Moreover, the
relation between tournament progress, treatment, and risk-taking (selected odd) is illus-
trated in Figure 5.6.
As can be seen in Figure 5.6, Research Question 3.1 and 3.2 must be approached in
a joint manner, as tournament mode and progress interact. Whereas overall risk-taking
increases in the TEAM condition (by .007 units per match, p-value < .001), this increase is
even higher in the IND condition (.007 + .004 = .011 per match, p-value < .05). Starting
from a negligible difference at the beginning of the tournament, this treatment difference
amounts to (marginally significant) .2432 units towards the end. In conclusion, partic-
ipants increase their risk-taking behavior over the course of the tournament, where this
increase is significantly more pronounced in the IND condition.
Result 2: Participants increase their risk-taking behavior over the course of the
tournament.
Result 3: Tournament mode and -progress interact. Participants in the indi-
vidual treatment increase their risk-taking behavior more over the course of the
tournament than participants in the team treatment.
8Note that R2’s are not reported. Random effects models try to reduce variance of the data by de-
fault. Hence, there is no unified way of reporting the goodness of fit, researchers agreed on (Nakagawa
and Schielzeth, 2013; Snijders and Bosker, 1994). Based on the possible goodness of fit models, the overall
explained variance might be over- or underrepresented. Hence, R2 or pseudo-R2 are not reported.
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FIGURE 5.6: Comparison of risk-taking (selected odd) by individual and team ranking over
the course of the tournament (GLS regression estimates).
With regard to the position in the ranking, the results are a little less obvious. While
the actual relevant payoff in model (2) does not show to have any effect, including the
irrelevant ranking position in model (3) changes the picture: Positions at the bottom of
the ranking are associated with less risk-taking (by -.031 units per payoff irrelevant rank,
p-value < .05). This observation is persistent in direction and magnitude with regard to
removing the relevant rank variable and also to adding other control variables for ranking
position (e.g., position in the IND or TEAM ranking). Controlling for gender and risk
aversion did not reveal any significant effect or model improvement.
Result 4: Payoff-relevent ranks have no effect, while the payoff-non-relevant
ranks have an effect on participants’ risk taking behavior. Participants who are
placed on positions at the bottom of the payoff-non-relevant ranking take less
risks.
Results from the questionnaire show that participants in the TEAM condition felt higher
group belonging (Bollen and Hoyle, 1990; Greene, 2004) – mean scores from group be-
longing: IND = 29.47, TEAM = 33.41 (two-sided t-test, t = 23.380, p-value < .001) – and
social presence (Gefen and Straub, 2004) – mean scores from perceived social presence:
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IND = 15.81, TEAM = 16.31 (two-sided t-test, t = 3.780, p-value < .001). This might
evidence that participants felt less responsible for their actions like the responsible diffu-
sion theory states as introduced in Section 5.2 of this chapter (Fraser et al., 1971; Stoner,
1968; Zajonc et al., 1968). This is in line with the results of the questionnaire regarding
the sensed competition. Participants experienced the TEAM condition as less competitive
– mean scores from competitiveness (Griffin-Pierson, 1990): IND = 74.04, TEAM = 70.82
(two-sided t-test, t = 14.340, p-value < .001); mean scores from perceived competition
(Byun and Mann, 2011; Vandercruysse et al., 2013): IND = 27.54, TEAM = 24.31 (two-
sided t-test, t = -28.642, p-value < .001). One explanation for this could be, that the
overall result is shared with the other team members and thus participants feel less re-
sponsible for their individual decisions. Hence, this might reduce perceived competition
and consequently result in less risk-taking behavior.
Result 5: Participants in the team treatment felt higher group belonging and
social presence, while participants reported that the treatment is less competitive
than the individual treatment.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter results of an experiment, evaluating the interplay of individual and team
rankings with risk-taking behavior are presented. Results indicate that risk-taking in-
creases over the course of a tournament (RQ 3.2) and that this increase is stronger for
individual (compared to team) rankings (RQ 3.1). The ranking position itself exhibits an
unexpected effect: Whereas the payoff relevant position does not appear to impact risk-
taking, the complementary ranking does, decrease risk-taking for worse positions (RQ 3.3).
It might be that participants compare their own strategy with their peers within their team
(TEAM treatment) or with other teams (IND treatment) and adjust to perform better.
This chapter contributes to the discussion on how to design online crowdsourcing tour-
naments. Results indicate that implementing crowdsourcing tournaments should be as-
sessed carefully with regard to risk-taking. Fundamental design variables like payoff rules
and feedback information were found to impact risk-taking behavior. Besides higher levels
of effort and variance (Bull et al., 1987; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003; van Dijk et al.,
92
5.5 Summary
2001), an issuer of a crowd task may hence also deliberately control risk-taking behavior.
This might be especially helpful for tasks requiring high levels of creativity such as de-
sign and innovation contests. Adequate payoff and feedback schemes then help to tap the
crowd workers’ creative potential by inducing, encouraging, and emphasizing risk-taking
behavior.
With regard to the shift in risk-taking behavior over time, Effron et al. (2015), for
instance, found that participants in a self-reported coin-flip experiment tended to cheat on
their last (expected) trials, represented by statistically unnatural high fractions of paying
coin flips, which the authors related to the participants’ anticipated regret over missing
the (last) chance to enrich themselves. For the case of betting, cheating can be ruled out
as an issue as there is simply no way to cheat. Hence, the increase in risk-taking towards
the end rather stems from the increasing awareness that only so many matches remain.
With less matches left, the chances (matches to bet on) to have a substantial lucky hit and
advance in the ranking by earning points decrease. To some extent this is comparable to
long-shot bets at the end of the day in horse races (Camerer, 2004). This finding is in
line with the result that this increase in risk-taking is more pronounced for individuals
than for teams, as the impact of such a bet is potentially mitigated by the other four group
members’ behaviors in the team treatment.
For platform operators, this means that creating long lasting tournament situations may
be a suitable way to induce risk-taking behaviors and – implicitly linked to this – unleash
silent creative potentials, since risk-taking is one of the drivers of creativity (Hossain, 2012;
Dewett, 2007; Amabile et al., 1986), as already discussed in Subsection 5.2.2 of this chap-
ter. Note that I do not claim that individually increasing participants’ creativity is possible,
as creativity was often found to be inhibited by extrinsic motivators (Amabile et al., 1986).
Rather one should create a platform environment which encourages creative participants
to actually pursue their “wild” ideas and not to hand in main stream – and hence presum-
ably more “secure” – draftings.
Several limitations of this study exist. Since the World Cup is associated with a lot
of emotion to many viewers, it might be that the participants’ betting and hence risk-
taking behavior is biased. Preferences for certain teams might have distorted behavior.
Controlling for the participants’ favorite team did not reveal interference with risk-taking.
Preferring a second over a third team might have still had an influence, which cannot
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be accounted for. Another issue stems from the fact that odds from bwin.com 72 hours
before the match started were used. Of course, odds may have changed between 72 hours
to 5 minutes before the start of the match – the time-frame participants could place bets.
Differences here could have been used for arbitrage betting.
Future work might further disentangle the effect of a participant’s current position in
the ranking and risk-taking. Hence, the study should potentially be transferred to a setup
where the position in rankings can be investigated in a more isolated manner such as a
laboratory experiment. This might give more insights for potentially unobserved correla-
tions in the current setup. In addition, future work should concentrate on the effect of
non-monetary incentives on crowd workers, which platforms like Wikipedia9 already put
into practice (see Chapter 6). Thereby a broader picture of incentives for crowdsourcing
would be given, as already outlined in Chapter 2. Furthermore, to increase external va-
lidity even more, further studies might focus on natural field experiments in this domain.
Similar approaches without taking risk into account are provided by (Mason and Suri,
2012; Sorokin and Forsyth, 2008) and could be used as orientation of the task setup. To
conclude, crowdsourcing has experienced rapid growth and can be expected to do so in
the future, not only as a means of outsourcing, but also as complementary base of intelli-
gence for machine learning systems. The underlying level of risk-taking may be valuable
information and even a set screw for task quality. Hence, future studies should transfer the
current insights to a setup where quality is the outcome, to further strengthen the insights
for practitioners in the field of crowdsourcing.
To conclude, this chapter particularly focused on evaluating crowd workers’ risk-taking
over the course of different ROTs. In long lasting crowd tournaments risk-taking can be
influenced by the ROT setup. Platform designers thereby have a strong tool at hand to
influence a crowd workers behavior. With the complementary results of Chapter 4, plat-
form designers thereby can influence a crowd workers behavior in monetary incentivized
crowdsourcing settings based on the desirable outcome. However, not all crowdsourc-
ing cases allow monetary incentives. Conclusively, the focus of the next chapter will be
non-monetary incentives (see Chapter 6).
9https://www.wikipedia.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Chapter 6
Non-Monetary Incentives for
Crowdsourcing: Framing and Monetary
Compensation
“ Don’t think money does everything or you are going
to end up doing everything for money.”
VOLTAIRE
CONTRARY, to Chapters’ 4 and 5 focus – monetary incentives – this chapter focuseson non-monetary incentives. As outlined in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1, crowdsourcing
platforms use both monetary- and non-monetary incentives. Hence, to give the full picture
of crowdsourcing incentives as outlined in Subsection 2.1.1 of Chapter 2, this chapter
addresses Research Questions 4 and 5 (see Section 1.2 of Chapter 1), focusing on non-
monetary incentives.
Research Question 4: Is framing capable of influencing behavior in non-monetary
settings towards a certain goal?
Research Question 5: Can a customized framing for a non-monetary setting
lead to similar behavior as in monetarily incentivized settings?
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This chapter builds on and extends the collective work completed during the course of
the German government financed project, the so-called “Planspiel Flächenhandel”1. The
remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 focuses on introducing and
motivating non-monetary incentivized crowdsourcing scenarios. Section 6.2 gives insight
in related work (see Subsection 6.2.1) and explains the context of the project (see Subsec-
tion 6.2.2), this study is embedded in. Section 6.3 describes the study design. Section 6.4
then discusses the results. Section 6.5 provides concluding remarks and outlines possibil-
ities for future work.
6.1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing does not always need monetary incentives (Horton and Chilton, 2010;
Hammon and Hippner, 2012) (see Subsection 2.1.1 of Chapter 2). Many prominent crowd-
sourcing examples, such as Wikipedia2, Google ReCAPTCHA3, Stack Overflow4, OpenIDEO5,
and many more, show that collaborative online work can be incentivized without mone-
tary compensation. People working on such platforms are, for example, driven by intrinsic
motivations, social status, enforcement to get access to a certain web page, and meaningful
tasks (Huberman et al., 2009; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Pilz and Gewald, 2013). Therefore,
to broaden the picture of crowdsourcing incentives, it is necessary to better understand
these non-monetary incentives, as a platform designer might benefit from incorporating
such.
Besides the already discussed different monetary incentive schemes (see Chapters 4
and 5), this chapter focuses on the motivational factor of non-monetary incentives. As
classical motivation theory tells us (see Chapter 3), besides extrinsic motivational factors
like money, intrinsic motivational factors are an important part of participants’ motivation
to participate (Ryan and Deci, 2000). However, it is difficult for crowdsourcing platform
designers to specifically target intrinsic motivational factors, since a person is moved to
take part out of his personal interest, fun, or curiosity (see Subsection 3.2.3 of Chapter 3).
1http://www.flaechenhandel.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
2https://www.wikipedia.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
3https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html last accessed: September 6, 2016.
4http://stackoverflow.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
5https://openideo.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Reminding people of their initial motivation to take part might reinforce their participation
again. Explaining to them the scenario in which they take part and encouraging their al-
truistic behavior might spur their motivation to take part initially. Some platforms already
do this by publicly sharing the overall goals they want to achieve, for example, OpenIDEO5
deals with meaningful societal and ecological questions and Wikipedia2 transports the idea
of distributing knowledge. Both platforms make that clear on their websites and hence
frame participants. Therefore this raises the question whether framing participants can
be a motivational factor for participation and desirable behavior. Moreover it raises the
question if a framing incentivizes comparable behavior to monetary based incentives. To
be specific this chapter considers if similar behavior to monetary incentivized scenarios
can be induced by a framing, even when monetary compensation lacks. Overall, this is
reflected in the two main research questions of this chapter presented in Section 1.2 of
Chapter 1:
Research Question 4: Is framing capable to influence behavior in non-monetary
settings towards a certain goal?
Research Question 5: Can a customized framing for a non-monetary setting
lead to similar behavior as in monetarily incentivized settings?
Research Question 4 is addressed by means of four online experiments – with and with-
out a framing. Research Question 5 is addressed by means of four experiments (two online
experiments and two controlled lab experiments) – with and without a monetary compen-
sation (see Figure 6.1 for more details). All experiments were implemented in the context
of a German government financed project, which tests a cap and trade system6 with trade-
able development rights (TDRs) to reduce land consumption in Germany, similar to the
CO2 emission trading used in the European Union
7 (United Nations, 1998) – the so-called
“Planspiel Flächenhandel”.
6A cap and trade systems is a scenario where the maximum use of a certain good is defined by a “cap”
and allowances for using these goods are “traded”. The total amount of allowances account for the overall
“cap”.
7http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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6.2 Background
6.2.1 Incentives and Motives for Non-Monetary Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing platforms offer a variety of incentives to a potential crowd (Horton and
Chilton, 2010). Incentives are monetary and non-monetary (Horton and Chilton, 2010;
Hammon and Hippner, 2012) (See Subsection 2.1.1 of Chapter 2). Non-monetary incen-
tives vary from information (Adamic et al., 2008; Jain et al., 2009), fun and entertainment
(Von Ahn, 2006), to altruism, social status, and attention (Huberman et al., 2009). Non-
monetary incentives are a main driver of motivation in certain crowdsourcing settings and
sometimes even more important than classical monetary incentives as applied in standard
labor markets (Kaufmann et al., 2011; Rogstadius et al., 2011; Chandler and Kapelner,
2013; Pilz and Gewald, 2013).
Brabham (2008) analyzes motives for participation in iStockphoto, a crowdsourcing
applications where non-professional photographers upload and sell images on the plat-
form. In this online survey it is shown that motives for participation range from money
to developing skills. Brabham (2010) transfers this study to threadless, a t-shirt manu-
facturer who crowdsources his designs using ROTs. Using expert interviews he identified,
that besides monetary incentives, community based motivations and skill improvement
are strong motives for participation as well. Overall, monetary incentives are not the only
motivation for participating in crowdsourcing.
Kaufmann et al. (2011) find that for many crowd workers, who work on paid crowd-
sourcing tasks intrinsic motivation aspects are important. They conducted a survey on
MTurk and asked crowd workers for their motives to work on crowdsourcing tasks. Over-
all, motives of crowd workers range from extrinsic to intrinsic motivations. However,
besides the most important incentive of immediate payoffs, intrinsic motivations are the
main drivers for participation in crowdsourcing settings. Pilz and Gewald (2013) transfers
the study from Kaufmann et al. (2011) to the software development field, in this case Mo-
bileWorks a software application development platform using a crowdsourcing approach.
The findings show that in this setting extrinsic motivations dominates intrinsic ones. The
most important factor is payment. However, extrinsic but non-monetary incentives, like
learning and skill improvement are as well strong drivers of crowdsourcing participation.
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Chandler and Kapelner (2013) use an experiment to compare intrinsic and extrinsic
motivational factors in a crowdsourcing setting. They apply an experiment on MTurk with
a labeling task of medical images. They applied three treatments with three different
framings before the experiment. Participants were either not told the purpose of the task,
additionally told that their results would be discarded, or told that they are labeling tumor
cells. Results indicate that participation increases when the task has a meaning. However,
quality is not affected.
Contrary to Chandler and Kapelner (2013), Rogstadius et al. (2011) find different re-
sults. They analyze intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors in crowdsourcing settings
as well. Using an experiment on MTurk they compared an unpaid scenario with two paid
scenarios. Each of these scenarios included two framings varying in the identity of the
requester, resulting in a 2x3 design. During the experiments, participants were instructed
to count blood cells with a malaria infection. The first framing manipulation was framed
as a non-profit health organization, helping malaria patients, while the second was framed
as a private profit oriented pharmaceutical company. Results indicate that indeed intrinsic
motivation (non-profit scenario) affects the result quality, while no differences between
the unpaid and the two paid scenarios were observed in regard of crowd worker effort
(amount of finished tasks). However, both Chandler and Kapelner (2013) and Rogstadius
et al. (2011) show that framing in crowdsourcing settings influences participants. Some-
how, participation and quality is effected by the scenario. Hence, a framing can induce
positive effects on participation, besides extrinsic motivation factors like money.
6.2.2 The “Planspiel Flächenhandel”
The “Planspiel Flächenhandel” is a German government financed project. It evaluates a cap
and trade system for land consumption with TDRs for land construction. The basic idea is
that each new land construction in Germany needs to be confirmed by a TDR, which gives
the right to use and construct buildings on this land. Each day 70 hectare of new land are
planned to be used in Germany leading to urban sprawl and potential negative economic
and ecologic consequences8. The German government plans to reduce this to 30 ha/d
8Numbers are based on the “Statistisches Bundesamt” and the “Umweltbundesamt” from Germany. For
a detailed overview see the project’s homepage http://www.flaechenhandel.de/flaechenhandel/pro
blem-flaechenausweisung last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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by 2020 (Federal Government, 2002; Coalition Treaty, 2013). One possible approach is
the use of TDRs where the overall amount is capped, consequently restricting new land
consumption. Thereby administrative cost are kept low as only the capped TDRs need to
be distributed to the local authorities (Thorsnes and Simons, 1999).
To incentivize local authorities to further reduce their new planned land consumption,
a market is implemented where local authorities can trade TDRs between each other.
Thereby not used TDRs can be monetized and this money can be used for other purposes.
Moreover such a market-oriented instrument can improve the distribution of TDRs as mar-
kets allow to transfer these warrants between the local authorities. Hence, economically
more valuable building projects lead to a higher demand for TDRs in the market and would
continue to be more likely realized, despite an overall TDR cap. Following this, a market-
oriented instrument thereby has the potential to still achieve a high welfare in a situation
where land use is capped, since such markets allow the shift of TDRs based on the demand,
which is influenced by the evaluation of the building projects.
The European Union already uses a cap and trade systems to restrict CO2 emissions
7
(United Nations, 1998). In the context of the “Planspiel Flächenhandel”, a transfer of
such a systems to land consumption is evaluated. The project committee of the “Planspiel
Flächenhandel” implemented different steps to evaluate this cap and trade system for TDRs
and to derive guidance for a potentially real world implementation of such a system (see
the project’s homepage for further details1). First, the projects’ committee consist of ex-
perts and consultants in the area of land consumption, local authorities, and economists.
Together, main aspects of such a system can be discussed from a theoretical and practical
level. Second, through different workshops with employees of planning departments from
local authorities, insights and important factors are collected about the process of planning
and execution of new land consumption. Third, economists work together to design and
conduct laboratory experiments with a high abstraction level to secure internal validity
(Bizer et al., 2014; Meub et al., 2015; Proeger et al., 2015; Meub et al., 2016; Proeger
et al., 2016). Fourth, contrary to the laboratory experiments, economists plan field ex-
periments as well. In these field experiments real data from local authorities is used and
planners from local authorities take part. As extension, additional information is shown,
which is important for planning actual new land constructions but not necessarily impor-
tant for the decisions throughout the experiment. Thereby internal validity is not in focus,
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but a high external validity is achieved. Fifth, these field experiments are replicated in a
laboratory setting to compare the behavior of students and planners from local authorities.
Sixth, results are discussed with the local authorities and their feedback is incorporated in
a final manuscript.
Overall, these steps give an extensive insight in how a cap and trade system for land
consumption would work. The main goals of the project are to test whether planners from
local authorities can handle a trading system, how different auction mechanisms affect the
distribution of TDRs, if local authorities would pay realistic prices for TDRs and, hence,
do not overdraw their accounts. Furthermore it is tested if a cap on TDRs lead to a new
evaluation of building projects and in addition, if building projects with higher fiscally
evaluation are more likely to be realized.
This chapter reports about the field experiment and its replication with student par-
ticipants in a laboratory. It focuses if a framing induces similar behavior as monetary in-
centives. Overall project results, and the implications for a cap and trade system for land
consumption can be read in an information paper series on the projects’ homepage1.
6.3 Study Design
The study consists of six experiments as depicted in Figure 6.1. Four field experiments
consisting of 38 land construction planners representing overall 97 German local author-
ities and two laboratory experiments consisting of 76 students – 38 students each – were
conducted. The six experiments were conducted in four sessions. Overall, the experiment
design is divided in settings (NoFr, Fr, NoMo, Mo), treatments (NA, A), and experiments
(1-6) as depicted in Figure 6.1.
Settings vary in whether participation is voluntary, and no monetary compensation is
implemented (NoMo setting – NoMo for not monetary), or if participants receive a mone-
tary compensation (Mo setting – Mo for monetary). Furthermore, settings vary in whether
participants receive a framing before the experiment (NoFr setting – NoFr for no framing;
Fr setting – Fr for framing). The framing includes instructions to behave realistically, as if
the decision throughout the experiment would be real and highlighting the importance of
the project. In addition the Fr setting includes a budget restriction per year, while the NoFr
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FIGURE 6.1: Overview of the six experiments conducted in the context of the “Planspiel
Flächenhandel”.
setting allows to overdraw accounts without restrictions (see Subsection 6.3.2 for further
details).
Treatments vary in whether a continuous double auction (CDA; the NA treatment – NA
for no auction) or a combination of a CDA and an uniformed sealed bid auction (USBA; the
A treatment – A for auction) is used as market mechanism for trading TDRs (see Subsection
6.3.3 for further details on these mechanisms).
6.3.1 Participants
All 38 land construction planners were employees of the local authorities working in the
public sector. They were recruited by the partners of the project “Planspiel Flächenhandel”
through personal contact and promotion events during the course of the project. Their
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participation was voluntary. Hence, no monetary compensation was given (NoMo). They
participated from their office in their local authority’s townhall. Access to the experimental
platform was given through a web interface with a personal account. The platform was
hosted on an online server at the FZI Research Center for Information Technology (FZI)
in Karlsruhe (see Subsection 6.3.4 for further details about the experimental platform).
Participants of the NoMo setting (land construction planners) were assigned to represent
their own local authority and play four field experiment settings (Experiments 1, 2, 3, and
4 in Figure 6.1). The field experiments were designed as a within subject study at two
separate days – Sessions 1 and 2 each with two experiments per day (see Subsection 6.3.2
for further details about the session structure). These four field experiments consisted of
the two treatments (NA, A) once conducted with the conditions of the no framing setting
(NoFr; Session 1 in Figure 6.1) and once with the conditions of the framing setting (Fr;
Session 2 in Figure 6.1), resulting in four experiments at two separate session. Due to no
shows of four land construction planners during the Fr setting the respective treatments
(Session 2 – Experiments 3 and 4 – in Figure 6.1 ) consisted of only 34 participants.
For Sessions 3 and 4, all 76 students were recruited from a voluntary student pool from
the KIT using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In contrast to the land use planners (NoMo), stu-
dents received a monetary compensation (Mo). Students participated at the Karlsruhe
Decision & Design Lab (KD2Lab)9. Access was given to the same online platform through
browsers in isolated cabins to assure comparability between treatments. Participants of
the Mo setting (students) were each assigned to represent one of the local authorities,
who participated in the NoMo settings, and play one of two lab experiments (Experiments
5 and 6 in Figure 6.1). The lab experiments were designed as between subject designs
at two separate days, i.e., in each treatment there were 38 student participants (see Sub-
section 6.3.2 for further details about the session structure). Hence, the 76 students were
assigned to either the NA (Experiment 5 in Figure Figure 6.1) or the A treatment (Ex-
periment 6 in Figure 6.1), both with a restricted budget and a framing (Fr). However,
students did not play the setting without restrictions (NoFr). Students were incentivized
by a 5€fixed payment for participation and a ranking-based bonus. The ranking was based
on their last play money account balance, which depended on their decisions throughout
the experiments. Bonus payment ranged from 10€to 21€with an average of 15.57€plus
9For a detailed description of the KD2Lab see http://www.kd2lab.kit.edu/ last accessed: September
6, 2016.
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FIGURE 6.2: Experimental processes of Chapter’s 6 study.
5€fixed payment. Hence, payments were above an hourly wage of 10€(see Table C.1 in
the Appendix for a detailed overview of bonus payments).
6.3.2 Experimental Process
The six experiments were conducted in four sessions as depicted in Figure 6.1. Overall,
the experiment design is divided in settings (NoFr, Fr, NoMo, Mo), treatments (NA, A), and
experiments (1-6). Session 1 consisted of two field experiments with 38 land construction
planners. Both experiments were conducted on one day – NA in the morning, A in the
afternoon. No monetary compensation was given; both were part of the NoMo setting.
Play money was not restricted or limited. Participants started with zero play money and
could overdraw their account without restrictions. Participants were not framed (NoFr)
before the experiments to behave in any certain way. The experiment was conducted
remotely. Participants accessed the online experimental platform through a web interface
from their own office. After an initial log in, participants were instructed to read the
instructions and view a tutorial video of the NA treatment (Experiment 1). Afterwards, all
participants played a 15 minute trial round to get familiar with the experimental software.
Subsequently Experiment 1 (treatment NA) was conducted. After 75 minutes, participants
took an one hour break. Before the second experiment started, participants had to view
another tutorial video, explaining differences to the first experiment – the USBA extension
(A). Experiment 2 (treatment A) took 90 minutes due to the extension of the USBA. After
the second experiment, participants filled out a questionnaire asking for their motives and
feedback. The overall experimental processes are depicted in Figure 6.2.
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FIGURE 6.3: Information message that was shown if a participant’s action would spend more
than 10 % of his yearly budget.10
Overall, Session 2 was conducted in the same sequence as Session 1: instructions part
1, trial round, Experiment 3 (treatment NA), break, instructions part 2, Experiment 4
(treatment A), and a questionnaire (see Figure 6.2). The same 38 land construction plan-
ners as in Session 1 were invited to take part. However, due to four no shows only 34
land construction planners took part. Session 2 differs from Session 1 by a framing and
a budget restriction (Fr). Two weeks before the experiment, all participants were called
by phone and instructed to behave realistically, as they would do if the decisions they face
during the experiments were real. Instructions followed a script to assure similar fram-
ings. Furthermore, the importance of the experiment within the overall project context
was highlighted. The instructions were slightly changed, now including the importance
of the project and the instructions to behave realistically. A participant’s budget was re-
stricted on a yearly basis. Each year a participant could spend 20 % of the local authority’s
yearly budget. Information messages were shown, once a participant spend more than
10 % of the local authority’s budget as depicted in Figure 6.3. The message stated that
the participant would overdraw the budget which the local authority provides for land
10Translation of Figure 6.3:
Attention:
The finance department warns: “With this decision you severely stress your local authority’s account and
have to raise credits or withdraw the money from different budget items!”
Price per certificate: 10,000€, which corresponds to 10€per square meter
Amount: 100
Buy/Sell: BUY
Total price: 1,000,000€.
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FIGURE 6.4: Information message that was shown if a participant’s action would spend more
than 20 % of his yearly budget.11
consumption and if the participant still wanted to proceed, money from other sectors of
the local authority had to be used. Thereby the participants were reminded, that spending
money has consequences for their local authority’s community. If a participant’s action
would lead to a yearly spending over the 20 % budget limit, another information message
was shown (Figure 6.4) informing the participant that it is forbidden to spend this amount
in the current year.
Session 3 and Session 4 each consisted of one experiment (Experiments 5 and 6 in
Figure 6.1). 76 students of the KIT took part, 38 students in each experiment. Both
sessions included a framing and a restricted budget (Fr) (see Figure 6.2). The framing
was similar to Session 2, but not done by phone. Instead participants were briefed directly
before the experiment started. Participants were invited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The
experiment took place in the KD2Lab. Participants were incentivized by a monetary rank-
based bonus payment (Mo) as depicted in Table C.1 and a fixed payment of 5€. During
the experiments participants could earn play money. Participants were ranked according
to their last play money account in the respective experiment. The experiments (5 and 6)
started with the briefing including the framing and the payout structure. After the initial
11Translation of Figure 6.4:
Attention:
The municipal regulation reviewed your decision and does not allow it, since disproportionate high credits
would be needed!
Price per certificate: 10,000€, which corresponds to 10€per square meter
Amount: 1000
Buy/Sell: BUY
Total price: 10,000,000€.
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FIGURE 6.5: Overview of the experimental phases per simulated year.
briefing, participants were assigned to isolated cabins. Participants then had time to read
the instructions, followed by a trial round of the experiment. Afterwards, they played the
respective experiment – treatment NA or A depending on the session. After the experiment,
participants got their payment and the respective session was finished (3 or 4).
6.3.3 Phases of the Experiments
The experimental processes vary in whether an USBA auction (A) takes place or not (NA),
as shown in Figure 6.5. During the experiment 15 years (2014-2028) are simulated. The
NA treatment consisted of three phases per year: distribution phase, CDA trading phase,
and activation phase. The A treatment consists of an additional USBA auction phase, which
is introduced in the year 2020. All phases in the respective experiments are repeated once
per year, i.e., 15 times throughout one experiment.
The distribution phase is the first phase of each year. During the distribution phase
each participant gets TDRs in the form of certificates for free. The distribution happens
instantaneously during the change of the year. The amount of TDRs each participant gets
for free depends on the represented local authority’s population. Larger local authorities
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FIGURE 6.6: Stepwise reduction of land consumption in hectare per day (ha/d).
get more TDRs than smaller ones12. In total 8,467 TDRs are freely distributed throughout
the experiment (average = 223; max = 885; min = 5). Overall, the project tests a reduc-
tion of land consumption from roughly 75 ha/d to 30 ha/d in the year 2020. Since this
is a big gap, the reduction is introduced in five steps over time. In the years 2014-2016
TDRs which account for a new land consumption of 55 ha/d are distributed. Followed by
42.5 ha/d in 2017-2019, 30 ha/d in 2020-2022, 25 ha/d in 2023-2025, and 20 ha/d in
2026-2028, as depicted in Figure 6.6. In the NA treatment the TDRs are completely dis-
tributed. In the A treatment, beginning with the year 2020 certificates are partly retained
to distribute them via an USBA.
FIGURE 6.7: Orderbook of the experimental platform.13
12Details can be found in Henger and Schier (2014) and on the project homepage: http://www.flaech
enhandel.de/flaechenhandel/zertifikate-rechner last accessed: September 6, 2016.
13Translation of Figure 6.7: Markt = market; Aktuelle Gebote = current orders; Preis = price; Menge =
amount.
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The second phase is the CDA trading phase. Participants can trade their TDRs with each
other via a CDA. A CDA is a widely used market mechanism, e.g., in stock exchanges and
prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Participants make buy or sell orders
consisting of the amount of TDRs they want to buy or sell and a limit-price (per single
TDR). Orders are collected in an orderbook, as depicted in Figure 6.7. In contrast to
stock exchanges, no transaction costs for putting orders are present. Thereby the CDA
is a zero sum game. Orders can be canceled by participants as long as the order is not
executed. Orders will be executed automatically once prices from a sell order and a buy
order match. TDRs and money are then exchanged between the respective participants’
accounts – the buyer and the seller. The basic idea is that participants who do not need
TDRs which they get for free in the distribution phase can sell TDRs to participants who
need additional TDRs. For example if one participant relinquishes to realize a building
project the participant can sell the TDR contingent needed for the realization. This phase
lasts three minutes.
The third phase is the activation phase. During this phase a participant can activate
building projects of the represented local authority. Each local authority has a list of
projects it plans to hypothetically build until 2028 as depicted in Figure 6.8. Each lo-
cal authority’s projects were collected before the experiment via a project partner’s survey
census platform as depicted in Figure 6.9. Afterwards, projects were fiscally evaluated,
taking, e.g., into account how many workplaces and living quarters they would create,
how much taxes they would generate, and how much the land costs.
Dependent on the size of the project, more or less TDRs are needed for realization.
Projects firstly can be realized starting at a certain year – their theoretical building year as
depicted in the first column of Figure 6.8. Their realization can be shifted to later years
as well. Hence, a participant can realize projects depending on the year and his available
TDRs. If a participant realizes a project, the fiscally evaluated amount of the project is
booked on the respective account.
Besides the realization of new projects, a different set of already existing projects can be
depleted. These depletion projects cost money but generate new TDRs – so called “white
TDRs”. To not flood the market with TDRs and thereby prevent the goal of an overall
reduction of new land consumption, the yearly maximal amount of claimable white TDRs
is capped. The cap is depending on the size of the local authority. If a depletion project
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FIGURE 6.8: Example project list of a local authority.14
would claim more white TDRs than the yearly cap, the TDR payout is stretched over several
years. The implementation of depletion projects and the possibility to claim white TDRs
is used as an incentive to over-think the use of fallow building cites. Participants can use
generated white TDRs for realizing other projects or sell them in the trading phases. An
example list of depletion projects is shown in Figure 6.10. Both, building and depletion
projects, can be executed during the activation phase. It runs two minutes per year.
The fourth phase is the USBA auction phase, which only exists in the A treatments.
Beginning with the year 2020, TDRs, which were freely distributed in the distribution
14Translation of Figure 6.8: Beginn = start; Name = name; Typ = type; WE = living quarters; AP =
workplaces; Dauer [a] = duration [years]; BBL [ha] = gross development area [ha]; Fiskalwert [€] = fis-
cally evaluation [€]; Fiskalwert [€/Zert.] = fiscally evaluation [€/TDR]; Zertifikate = TDRs; Entwicklung
Ja/Nein = realization yes/no; Gesamtbedarf bis 2014 / abzüglich der noch ausstehenden kostenfreien Er-
stzuteilungen = total demand 2014 / deducting the outstanding free of charge TDRs of the distribution
phases; Gesamtkosten = total costs; Gesamterlös = total income; Entwicklung bestätigen = confirm realiza-
tion.
110
6.3 Study Design
FIGURE 6.9: User interface of the project census platform by Gertz Gutsche Rümenapp GbR.
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FIGURE 6.10: Example depletion project list of a local authority.15
phase of the NA treatments, are partly retained to auction them via an USBA in the A
treatments. The rest of the TDRs are still distributed freely during the distribution phase.
To get used to this new mechanism the amount of auctioned TDRs is increased stepwise
over years. In the years 2020-2022, 20 % of the overall TDRs are auctioned, followed
by 40 % in 2023-2025 and 60 % in 2026-2028. The phase is active for one and a half
minutes directly after the distribution phase. Participants can bid on the auctioned TDRs
by handing in the amount of TDRs they want to auction and a limit-price they want to
pay per TDR. Handing in several bids is allowed. Participants see their own bids, but bids
from other participants are hidden. Own bids can be canceled during the phase and the
the overall amount of auctioned certificates is available as an information message in the
header. At the end of the phase bids are collected and are served from the highest to the
lowest price. This means that a participant who is willing to pay the highest price for TDRs
is served first. Afterwards the participant with the second highest price is served, and so
on. Participants are served as long as TDRs are available. All participant pay a unified
price for the auctioned TDRs. The unified price is the limit-price of the last served bid,
i.e., the lowest limit-price of all fully or partly executed bids. Hence, all participants who
are being served pay this same price multiplied with the amount of TDRs they auctioned
during this phase. All other bids do not get served. The money which is spend during
this phase is not re-distributed to the participants. It is kept as hypothetical governmental
tax.
15Translation of Figure 6.10: Beginn = start; Name = name; BBL [ha] = gross development area [ha];
Kosten [€] = costs [€]; Kosten [€/Zert.] = costs [€/TDR]; (Weiße) Zertifikate = (white) TDRs; Rückpla-
nung Ja/Nein = depletion yes/no; Gesamterlös = total income; Gesamtkosten = total costs; Rückplanung
bestätigen = confirm depletion.
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6.3.4 Experimental Platform
A customized experimental platform was programmed to implement the described study
design. It was implemented using the grails framework16, following a model view con-
troller approach. An overview of the platform is given in Figures 6.11 and 6.12. The
platform consists of features, supporting participants’ decisions by potentially making land
construction planning easier. The platform is divided into several parts. On the left hand
side, bids for the trading and auction phase can be made if the respective phase is active
(Figure 6.11: number 3). Before handing in an order a message is shown, reminding
participants about how much they would spend in total. Only by accepting this billing
orders are confirmed and executed. The list of all building projects (Figure 6.11: num-
ber 4; Figure 6.12: number 4) and depletion projects (Figure 6.11: number 5; Figure 6.12:
number 5) is always shown, to give an overview of how many TDRs are needed. Build-
ing projects are standardly shown, if the activation phase is active and building projects
are currently realizable (Figure 6.12: number 4). Building projects are displayed slightly
grayed out if other phases are currently active (Figure 6.11: number 4). This feature was
implemented to highlight parts of the platform, which are important in each phase, while
still having all the information displayed at any given time throughout the experiment.
On the right side of the platform overall goals are shown (Figure 6.11: number 6; Fig-
ure 6.12: number 7). In reality, the realization of building projects would create working
or living places. The goals show how many of these are currently created through realized
projects and how many overall could be created, if all potential building projects would be
realized. Below, the participant’s deposit is shown (Figure 6.11: number 6; Figure 6.12:
number 7). Besides a participant’s current money and TDR deposit, potential changes
through actions are shown. An additional column shows how orders or planned building
projects would affect the deposit. The market information on the right side shows the
orderbook (best five buy and sell orders), own orders (not yet allocated orders, which can
be deleted), and a price chart (price per TDR and volume) (Figure 6.11: number 7; Fig-
ure 6.12: number 8). As for the case of building and depletion projects, this information
is displayed slightly grayed out if the CDA trading phase is inactive (Figure 6.12: num-
ber 8). For the USBA auction phase the own auction bids are shown as well (Figure 6.11:
number 8; Figure 6.12: number 9).
16https://grails.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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FIGURE 6.11: User Interface of the experimental platform: Active CDA trading phase.
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FIGURE 6.12: User Interface of the experimental platform: Active activation phase.
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On top of the platform messages are shown, which inform participants about changes
and events during the experiment, e.g., how many TDRs they auctioned during the last
USBA auction phase, how many TDRs they will get over the course of the experiment
during the several distribution phases, or that an auction will take place in the next year
and how many TDRs will be auctioned (Figure 6.11: number 1; Figure 6.12: number 1).
Besides these short informations, participants can see the messages in more detail at the
bottom of the page (Figure 6.12: number 6). Furthermore, an overview about the progress
of the experiment is shown. A time progress bar shows how much time has already pro-
gressed and how much time of the experiment is left (Figure 6.11: number 2; Figure 6.12:
number 2). Additionally, the top of the platform informs participants about the currently
active phase, which will be the next phase, which year is currently simulated, and how
much time is left in the current phase (Figure 6.11: number 1; Figure 6.12: number 1).
Phases are color-coded. Pink for the CDA trading phase, white for the activation phase,
and blue for the USBA auction phase. Instructions can be accessed at any given time during
the experiment by a navigation on top of the page, if participants still had open questions
(see Appendix C for further details on the instructions).
6.4 Evaluation
Overall, 114 participants took part in the study – land construction planners (12 female, 26
male)17 and 76 student participants (19 female, 57 male). The evaluation starts with the
differences from the NoFr to the Fr setting, followed by the differences between NoMo and
the Mo setting. The differences are evaluated by comparing prices of TDRs, spending of
participants, and the conversion rate of projects. In statistical tests, a 0.1 level is employed
to decide on the rejection of null hypotheses. More detailed information on p-values is
provided in the result Subsections (6.4.1 and 6.4.2) of this chapter.
17Note that due to no shows only 34 land construction planners took part in Experiments 3 and 4. 38
took part in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Figure 6.1)
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6.4.1 No Framing vs. Framing
To asses Research Question 4 and hence the comparison between the NoFr and the Fr
settings, the results of Sessions 1 and 2 are compared (Figure 6.1). In both sessions the
behavior of land construction planners is examined. In each session they took part in the
NA and A treatments, once without a framing and restrictions (NoFr) and once with a
framing and a yearly restricted budget (Fr).
The relation of the two treatments is evaluated in three ways: First, it is evaluated
if the prices of the CDA trading phase and the USBA auction phase move in a realistic
scope given the German land prices. Second, it is evaluated if the spending of participants
behaves similarly. Third, it is evaluated if the conversion rate of projects is different in the
two respective settings.
Calculating an exact theoretical average price for a TDR is difficult. It depends on many
factors, like which local authority sells a TDR at which point to whom, how many TDRs a
local authority banks in his depot to sell later on, and most importantly, how differently
local authorities evaluate land prices. However, several land consumption experts and
consultant institutions were involved in the project’s context. Together they evaluated
land prices of the local authorities taking part in the experiments. While it is hard to give
an exact average price per TDR, they concluded for the experimental setup that a TDR
should not cost more than 200,000€. This price is a bit higher than the average square
meter price in Germany. As a reduction in land consumption would lead to a shortage, it
is expected to raise prices. Thereby, the first part of the evaluation observes if this goal is
achieved.
Session 1 tested the NoFr setting, including two treatments (NA, A) and Session 2 tested
the Fr setting18, including the same two treatments (NA, A). Price statistics are shown in
Table 6.1.
The experimental economics literature (Smith, 1976) suggests that, experiments with-
out incentives may not lead to realistic behavior and hence unrealistic results. This is
reflected by the high prices in both treatments of the NoFr setting. Especially in the A
treatment of the NoFr setting it becomes clear, that prices are far off the 200,000€upper
18Note that due to unrealistically high prices, the A treatment of Session 2 (Experiment 2) was aborted
at the year 2020.
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TDR price boundary (see Table 6.1). Without incentives, which were linked to their ac-
tions and decisions throughout the experiment, participants tested the boundaries of the
experiments. They spend unrealistically high prices per TDR, since they had an unlimited
budget and were not incentivized to take the money in their depot into account for their
decisions. Overall this led to the result that Experiment 2 (NoFr - A) was aborted at the
year 2020, once the first USBA auction phase showed, that prices would not relax from
this unrealistic level.
These unrealistic price level, however, did not occur in the Fr settings. In both cases
prices were under 200,000€. This leads to the conclusion, that this customized framing,
reminding participants to behave realistically, had an effect on the participants’ behavior
towards more realistic decisions.
Besides this framing, a yearly budget was as well implemented in the Fr settings. How-
ever, this did not affect the price results, as only one participant in one year in the NA
treatment (participant 24 in the top image of Figure 6.13) and one participants in four
years in the A treatment (participant 33 in the bottom image of Figure 6.13) came close
to their yearly budget limit. The rest of the participants earned money in each year or did
not spend more than 75 % of their yearly budget (relates to 20 % of the local authorities
yearly budget) as depicted in Figure 6.13.
Overall this shows, that after participants are framed to behave realistically, they do pay
prices for TDRs experts and consultants would expect. Hence, the following result can be
concluded:
Result 1: In the no framing setting unrealistically high prices were paid. The
assessment of a framing lead to prices which experts and consultants in this area
expected.
Setting Treatment Experiment Participants Minimum Median Mean Maximum
NoFr NA 1 Planners 25,000 15,000,000 12,890,000 28,000,000
NoFr A 2 Planners 1,000,000 500,000,000 497,449,000 999,999,99019
Fr NA 3 Planners 40,000 138,000 133,500 200,000
Fr A 4 Planners 25,000 100,000 92,870 122,000
TABLE 6.1: Prices in €per TDR of Experiments 1-4.
19Note that the technical maximum was set to 999,999,990.
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FIGURE 6.13: Participants’ spending of the local authorities’ budget for land consumption dur-
ing the experiments (Fr): NA treatment (top image), A treatment (bottom im-
age). Only spendings are shown on the graph. Local authorities who made
money are depicted as 0 % spendings of their yearly budget. The graph is sorted
by participants, from lowest to highest average spendings. One x-Axis index
consists of 15 yearly spendings (2014-2018) of one participant.
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After looking at the TDR prices the evaluation of the money local authorities spend or
made throughout the experiment is now assessed. This gives insight if they managed their
resources somehow realistically. The mean last deposit values by experiments are shown
in Table 6.2.
Due to the abortion of Experiment 2 (NoFr - A), a comparison of the local authorities’
spending is only possible between Experiment 1 (NoFr - NA) and Experiment 3 (Fr - NA).
Furthermore, the experimental design lacks of repeated observations of each experiment
due to the field experiment character with 38 land construction planners. To not stress
their voluntary participation, project partners appointed four experiments at two different
days (two experiments per day; see Figure 6.1). This made repeated observations of the
same experiment setup (setting and treatment) with same or different participants impos-
sible. Thereby no inference based statistics can be applied on an experiment setup level
(setting and treatment). As an approximation an assessment of analyses on a participant
level is possible. Hence, a pairwise comparison of the local authorities’ behavior between
experiments is assessed. However, four participants did not take part in Experiments 3
and 4, thereby this pairwise comparison is only possible with 34 observations.
In the case of the local authorities’ last depot values, tests comparing the means and
the variance (e.g., t-test) are not suitable. The experimental design of the NA treatments
allowed changes in the depot values by building or deploying projects and by trading
TDRs during the CDA trading phase. From design the CDA trading phase is a zero sum
game. Money one local authority earns by selling TDRs is spent by another who buys the
TDRs. Hence, means equal zero and all statistical tests conclude in no differences between
treatments, even if variance and overall spending tend to differ. For the A treatments this
is different, since spending during the USBA auction phase are kept as a hypothetical
governmental tax. As already explained, Experiment 2 was aborted and comparison is
only possible for the NA treatments (NoFr – Fr). Hence, the correct way to use inference
statistics on a participant level is thereby a test which does not compare means. Following
Setting Treatment Experiment Participants Minimum Median Mean Maximum
NoFr NA 1 Planners -9,992,375,000 57,728,750 28,486,710 6,259,660,000
NoFr A 2 Planners -691,546,403,260 3,290,281,990 -9,580,158,760 182,616,536,800
Fr NA 3 Planners -11,883,995 2,449,498 34,889,768 440,641,000
Fr A 4 Planners -13,194,045 1,058,951 32,627,956 446,016,050
TABLE 6.2: Last mean depot values in €of Experiments 1-4.
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this a kolmogorov-smirnov test is assessed to test whether the two experiments follow the
same distribution.
Results from the kolmogorov-smirnov test show that the two distributions are different.
This leads to the conclusion that participants in fact behave differently in the two treat-
ments (NoFr NA – Fr NA) (two-sided kolmogorov-smirnov test: p-value = .013). Descrip-
tive statistics, depicted in Table 6.2 show, that overall in the framing setting participants
spend less money.
Result 2: In the framing setting participants spend less compared to the no fram-
ing setting.
The last part of the evaluation compares the realization of building projects on a partic-
ipant level. Table 6.3 shows summary statistics about the conversion of building projects,
divided by positive and negative fiscally evaluation.
As already explained, only the NA treatments (NoFr – Fr) are being compared. A paired
wilcoxon signed-rank test is assessed, since the same participants competed in both exper-
iments (NoFr, NA – Fr, NA; within subject design). Results show that the total amount of
realized projects differs in the two experiments (matched-pairs wilcoxon signed-rank test:
p-value = .041). Table 6.3 shows that overall more projects were realized in the Fr setting
(Total: NoFr= 73.35 %, Fr= 77.45 %). Comparing positive and negative fiscally evaluated
building projects results show that only more positive fiscally evaluated building projects
were realized in the Fr setting (matched-pairs wilcoxon signed-rank test: p-value = .027;
Positive: NoFr = 82.85 %, Fr = 89.41 %). Negative fiscally evaluated building projects do
not differ between experiments (matched-pairs wilcoxon signed-rank test: p-value = .86;
Negative: NoFr = 56.57 %, Fr = 56.11 %). This leads to the conclusion that the framing
Setting Treatment Experiment Participants Building Projects Depletion Projects
Total Positive Negative Total
NoFr NA 1 Planners 73.35 % 82.85 % 56.57 % 95.00 %
Fr NA 3 Planners 77.45 % 89.41 % 56.11 % 95.12 %
N 501 321 180 41
TABLE 6.3: Conversion rate of building and depletion projects in Experiments 1 and 3.
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led to a different appreciation of the fiscally evaluation leading to a higher share of positive
fiscally evaluated projects.
Result 3: In the framing setting participants realized more positive fiscally eval-
uated projects.
In conclusion, with the results of the three evaluations, a framing did work in this
setting. Results show that in all three evaluations participants behaved in the directions as
they were framed. Hence, regarding Research Question 4 (see Section 1.2 of Chapter 1), it
can be concluded that a framing is capable of influencing participants’ behavior towards a
certain goal. How far this behavior is off from actual monetarily incentivized experiments
will be part of the next section.
6.4.2 No Monetary Compensation vs. Monetary Compensation
To assess Research Question 5 (see Section 1.2 of Chapter 1) and hence the comparison
of not incentivized planners from local authorities and monetarily incentivized students
(NoMo – Mo), comparisons between Experiments 3 and 5 and Experiments 4 and 5 are
conducted (see Figure 6.1). In Session 2 an observation of the behavior of land construc-
tion planners is conducted, while in Sessions 3 and 4 students took part. All Sessions
included a framing but Sessions 3 and 4 were monetarily incentivized. In Session 3, 8
female and 30 male participants took part, in Session 4, 11 female and 27 male partici-
pants took part. Overall 29 of 76 student participants studied in fields with an economic
background (25 in Session 3, 14 in Session 4). The evaluation is assessed in the same
three ways as for the comparison between Sessions 1 and 2.
First, it is evaluated if average prices of TDRs during the experiments cost less than
200,000€– the scope set by experts. Averages prices of the different experiments are
depicted in Table 6.4.
By comparing the results of the NoMo and Mo Settings it is shown that all prices move
in a scope under 200,000€, besides some outliers in Experiment 6. Hence, the conducted
framing for two experiments in the NoMo setting achieved the goal of realistic prices as
well as the standardly incentivized monetary lab experiments in the Mo setting.
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Setting Treatment Experiment Participants Minimum Median Mean Maximum
NoMo NA 3 Planners 40,000 138,000 133,500 200,000
NoMo A 4 Planners 25,000 100,000 92,870 122,000
Mo NA 5 Students 1,000 49,000 65,400 130,000
Mo A 6 Students 10,000 69,000 65,730 300,000
TABLE 6.4: Prices in €per TDR of Experiments 3-6.
Result 4: In both settings, with and without monetary incentives and a framing,
prices for TDRs were realized which experts and consultants in this area expected.
The second part of the evaluation compares how much money is spend by participants
throughout the experiments. Table 6.5 shows summary statistics of participants’ last mean
deposit values.
Like for the comparison of the NoFr and Fr settings the evaluation is assessed on a
participant level20. Statistical tests based on the mean and distribution are not suitable
for the same reasons. Hence, a kolmogorov-smirnov test is assessed. To compare the be-
havioral differences between the NoMo and Mo settings, Experiments 3 and 5 (NoMo,
NA – Mo, NA) and Experiments 4 and 6 (NoMo, A – Mo, A) are each compared pair-
wise. Otherwise effects of the USBA auction phase would interfere with the differences
of the monetary incentive. Results indicate no significant differences for neither the NA
(two-sided kolmogorov-smirnov test: p-value = .307) nor the A treatments (two-sided
kolmogorov-smirnov test: p-value = .673). This leads to the conclusion that the framing
worked regarding the spendings of participants. Planners from local authorities, who did
not have a monetary compensation but were framed to behave realistically, behaved simi-
larly to student participants who were incentivized with money in a laboratory experiment
setting.
Setting Treatment Experiment Participants Minimum Median Mean Maximum
NoMo NA 3 Planners -11,883,995 2,449,498 34,889,768 440,641,000
NoMo A 4 Planners -13,194,045 1,058,951 32,627,956 446,016,050
Mo NA 5 Students -19,570,084 7,899,883 23,712,897 240,824,923
Mo A 6 Students -15,629,668 6,712,975 30,087,269 449,288,985
TABLE 6.5: Last mean depot values €of Experiments 3-6.
20Note that 34 observations in each experiment are compared. Since four land construction planners did
not show up for the Experiments 3 and 4.
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Result 5: No differences can be observed for the spending of participants in the
no money and money settings.
The last part of the evaluation of the NoMo and Mo comparison again looks at the
realization of building projects. Table 6.6 shows summary statistics about the conversion
of building projects.
Similar to the evaluation of the participants’ spendings Experiments 3 and 5 (NoMo,
NA – Mo, NA) and Experiments 4 and 6 (NoMo, A – Mo, A) are compared to assess the
evaluation of differences in the behavior between the NoMo and Mo settings. Since dif-
ferent participants are compared (planners – students) an unpaired wilcoxon signed-rank
test is used. Results show again no differences in the behavior of the NoMo and Mo set-
tings. The total conversion rate shows no differences for Experiments 3 and 5 (wilcoxon
signed-rank test: p-value = .985) and Experiments 4 and 6 (wilcoxon signed-rank test: p-
value = .862). Splitting the evaluation by the fiscal evaluation does not show differences
as well for Experiments 3 and 5 (wilcoxon signed-rank test: positive – p-value = .932;
negative – p-value = .796) and Experiments 4 and 6 (wilcoxon signed-rank test: positive
– p-value = .895; negative – p-value = .963). This leads to the conclusion that the framing
worked regarding the conversion rate of projects. Framed participants in the NoMo setting
behaved similarly to monetarily incentivized student participants.
Result 6: No differences can be observed for the conversion rate of building
projects in the no money and money settings.
The three evaluations comparing the NoMo and Mo settings overall show, that in this
study framing in fact achieved similar behavior of non-monetarily incentivized participants
(NoMo) and monetarily incentivized participants (Mo).
Setting Treatment Experiment Participants Building Projects Depletion Projects
Total Positive Negative Total
NoMo NA 3 Planners 77.45 % 89.41 % 56.11 % 95.12 %
NoMo A 4 Planners 76.85 % 90.03 % 53.33 % 92.68 %
Mo NA 5 Students 75.05 % 84.42 % 58.33 % 95.12 %
Mo A 6 Students 72.85 % 86.29 % 48.89 % 78.05 %
N 501 321 180 41
TABLE 6.6: Conversion rate of building and depletion projects in Experiments 3-6.
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6.4.3 Summary of Evaluation
In this evaluation two comparisons were assessed. Overall results are depicted in Table
6.7. The first comparison of a non-framed (NoFr) and a framed (Fr) setting showed that
for this experiment setup participants’ behavior is affected by the assessed framing.
The second part of the evaluation compared the results of the framing and no mone-
tary incentive setting (Fr, NoMo) with the behavior of a classically incentivized student
laboratory setup (Fr, Mo). Results indicate that non incentivized field participants who
have been framed to behave realistically (NoMo) acted similar during the experiment as
the student participants with a monetary compensation (Mo).
In conclusion, for the given scenario of land construction planning with a cap and trade
system using TDRs, the introduction of a customized framing achieved comparable be-
havior to a controlled laboratory environment with monetary compensation in a crowd
scenario without monetary compensation.
6.5 Summary
Non-monetary incentives are an important part of the motivation to participate on crowd-
sourcing platforms. This chapter investigated if a framing, reminding participants of the
importance of the context and stating that participants should behave realistically (Fr,
NoMo), actually incentivizes participants similar to a monetary incentive (FrMo). For the
case of a cap and trade system for TDRs to reduce the overall land consumption, a cus-
tomized framing affects participants’ behavior (RQ 4). Moreover, this behavior is similar
to the behavior of monetarily incentivized participants (RQ 5). These results show that a
framing aligned with the project context can change the behavior of participants. Thereby
Level of Analysis
TDR Price < 200,000€ Local Authority’s Spending Building Projects
NoFr vs. Fr 6= 6= 6=
NoMo vs. Mo = = =
TABLE 6.7: Differences in settings of the experiments.
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platform designers of crowdsourcing platforms who are not able to pay their crowd work-
ers, have a strong tool to incentivize and motivate their crowd workers.
The main contribution of this chapter is to give insight in the practitioners question
of how to incentivize crowd workers on crowdsourcing platforms. This chapter shows,
that a framing aligned to the context of the platform is a valuable addition to monetary
incentives. The limitations of this study include the following: First, this study evaluates
a specific case – a cap and trade system for TDRs to reduce the overall land consumption.
In different settings the findings might not be transferable. Second, this study evaluates
the behavior of land construction planners, which participated in this study voluntarily. It
might be that the framing in such a setup works better, since the initial motivation of par-
ticipants was intrinsically driven. In setups were external motivation is standard, findings
could be different. Third, due to the project context and the field experiment character,
the study lacks of repeated observations of the experiments. Thereby, the evaluation of the
price levels is not assessable with inference statistics. Fourth, due to the field experiment
character the experiment lacks of internal validity.
Future research should replicate the findings in a laboratory study with a higher focus
on internal validity and repeated observations to strengthen the findings. The study should
be transfered to a setup where extrinsic motivation is key and evaluate if a framing still
affects a crowd workers behavior. Furthermore, it would be fruitful to evaluate different
levels of framing, to see how the sentiment of the framing affects participants behavior
differently.
To conclude, non-monetary crowdsourcing plays an important role in the context of
online work. As this study shows, future work should not only focus on paid crowdsourc-
ing but as well on intrinsic motivational factors. Platform designers can profit from these
insights in better understanding how to setup their non-paid and paid crowdsourcing plat-
forms.
To sum up, this chapter enhanced the picture of incentives for crowdsourcing platforms
by taking non-monetary incentives into account. It shows, that framing crowd workers can
improve the outcome of crowdsourcing platforms. Overall, this thesis thereby evaluated a
broad picture of both monetary (see Chapter 4 and 5) and non-monetary incentives (see
Chapter 6).
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Finale

Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
“ Each problem that I solved became a rule, which
served afterwards to solve other problems.”
RENÉ DESCARTES, 1637
INCENTIVE engineering for online work has shown to be an important factor for crowd-sourcing platform designers as the behavior of crowd workers can be influenced, conse-
quently affecting the desired outcome. The work at hand documents the implementation
of different studies evaluating different incentives and their effect on crowd workers’ be-
havior. This lead to numerous improvements and insights for crowdsourcing platform
designers. The full picture of these contributions are presented in the previous Chapters
(4, 5, and 6). This chapter summarizes the main contributions in a briefly manner and
outlines pathways for potential future research.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 summarizes the main
contributions of this work. Section 7.2 gives an outlook for future research. Section 7.3
closes this thesis.
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7.1 Summary and Contributions
The main goal of this work is to address the following five Research Questions:
RQ1 Which incentive scheme – piece rates or rank-order-tournaments – incentivizes crowd
workers’ effort best?
RQ2 Does feedback in rank-order-tournaments affect crowd workers’ effort in crowd-
sourcing settings?
RQ3 How is risk-taking behavior affected in long lasting rank-order-tournaments?
RQ4 Is framing capable of influencing behavior in non-monetary settings towards a cer-
tain goal?
RQ5 Can a customized framing for a non-monetary setting lead to similar behavior as in
monetarily incentivized settings?
Contribution 1: Which incentive scheme – piece rates or rank-order-tournaments – in-
centivizes crowd workers’ effort best?
It is known that incentives are needed to spur participation and a desirable outcome.
Crowdsourcing uses mainly two different payment schemes to incentivize participation,
quality of work, and effort – PRs and ROTs (see Subsection 2.1.1 of Chapter 2). However,
it is not clear which payment structure incentivizes crowd workers’ effort best. Hence, the
work at hand specifically evaluated these two payment schemes and their effect on crowd
workers’ effort, an important outcome of work in general and particularly crowdsourcing
platforms. By implementing a field experiment on the most prominent micro-task crowd-
sourcing platform – MTurk1 – valuable insights could be gathered. Given balanced average
payouts, both payment structures show similar effects on crowd workers’ effort. None of
the two incentivizes crowd workers’ effort better than the other incentive structure. In
summary, without further tweaks of the setup, straightforward PRs and ROTs without a
feedback scheme incentivize crowd workers’ effort equally. For designers of crowdsourcing
platforms this means, that they cannot improve a crowd worker’s effort by simply changing
the payment scheme. Hence, they should stick with their currently implemented payment
scheme, if they do not implement further tweaks.
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Contribution 2: Does feedback in rank-order-tournaments affect crowd workers’ effort in
crowdsourcing settings?
Most crowdsourcing tournaments use a feedback mechanism to inform crowd workers
about their relative performance – a ranking (see Chapter 4 for further details). Such
feedback mechanisms are evaluated. First, a theoretical moderation mediation model of
the interplay of different feedback schemes on crowd workers’ effort was implemented by
summarizing existing evidence. This gives practitioners an overview of existing findings
and guidance of how feedback influences crowd workers’ effort in ROTs. Second, this in-
terplay was evaluated with the implementation of two field experiments on MTurk1. With
the first experiment, it was shown that giving feedback in a ROT, specifically showing a
ranking about the current position in a dyadic ROT, decreases crowd workers’ effort. To
be more specific, giving feedback about a strong competitor increases the likelihood that a
crowd worker quits the task. Feedback about a weak competitor lets crowd workers exert
less effort, since they win even if they relax, but do not lead to higher rates of quitting
the task. Competitors showing mediocre performance lead to results in between. With
the second experiment, the findings regarding the mediocre feedback could be replicated.
Furthermore, it was shown that crowd workers competing with equally good competitors
reduce their effort as well. Overall, giving feedback, i.e., showing a ranking, about dif-
ferent strong competitors leads to decreased crowd workers’ effort. However, underlying
reasons are different. Good performing crowd workers, continue to work on the task but
do not give their best, while bad performing crowd workers tend to quit the task, leading to
less exerted effort as well. Wrapping up, all feedback schemes which were evaluated lead
to worse crowd workers’ effort than dyadic ROTs without feedback. Furthermore, the best
dyadic ROT did not enhance crowd workers’ effort compared to PRs (see Contribution 1).
This gives a clear guidance for crowdsourcing platform designers. The best incentive for
short tasks is a simple PR, as it leads to performance on par with the best ROT design and
is easiest to implement (standardly provided by micro-task platforms such as MTurk1). If
a platform designer wants to implement a short lasting ROT, he is best of by not showing
feedback (i.e., a ranking) throughout the task.
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Contribution 3: How is risk-taking behavior affected in long lasting rank-order-
tournaments?
After demonstrating the interplay of payment schemes, feedback within ROTs, and crowd
workers’ effort another behavioral aspect of crowd workers within ROTs is evaluated – risk-
taking. Moreover, the analysis focuses on long lasting ROTs, in contrast to short lasting
ROTs (see Contributions 1 and 2). Overall three sub-questions are evaluated. The evalu-
ation was implemented as a field experiment accompanying the FIFA World Cup 2014.
Contribution 3.1: Does the tournament mode (teams or individuals) affect risk-taking
behavior?
First, it could be shown that in long lasting ROTs the tournament mode affects a crowd
worker’s risk-taking behavior. Comparing individuals competing against each other (IND)
and teams competing against other teams (TEAM) it was shown that individuals competing
on their own take higher risks.
Contribution 3.2: Does the tournament progress affect risk-taking behavior?
Second, the effect that individuals (IND) take higher risks (see Contribution 3.1) interacts
with the tournament progress. Overall, all participants took higher risks over the course
of the tournament. However, this effect was stronger in the case that individuals compete
against each other (IND).
Contribution 3.3: Does the ranking position affect risk-taking behavior?
Third, turning to the ranking within the ROT, results are somewhat surprising. An effect
of the payout relevant position could not be observed. It seems, that the effects from the
treatment (IND or TEAM) and the progress of the tournament overcompensates a possi-
ble effect of the payout relevant rank on a participants risk-taking behavior. Moreover,
the complementary non-relevant rank, i.e., a comparison with the peers within the own
team or with the group score of other individually ranked groups, affects risk-taking be-
havior. It decreases risk-taking behavior of participants who are ranked worse. It seems
like participants compare their own strategy with their peers when they are performing
badly.
Overall, this means that for crowdsourcing platform designers, creating long lasting
tournaments is a suitable design option to induce risk-taking behavior of crowd workers.
Especially, the design of individuals competing against each other induces high risk-taking
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behavior. Crowd workers take higher risks over the course of the ROT. If a platform de-
signer wants to avoid this, he is better of implementing a ROT where teams compete
against other teams, as this effect is less pronounced (TEAM). The effects might be ex-
plained with the results of the associated questionnaire, which showed that participants
sense higher competition in the individual ranking (IND), while higher group belonging
and social presence in the team competition (TEAM). Hence, participants felt less respon-
sible for their individual decision, since risk is shared with the other team members. This
might have led to the lower sensed competition and resulted in less risk-taking.
Contribution 4: Is framing capable of influencing behavior in non-monetary settings to-
wards a certain goal?
Besides monetary incentives (see Contributions 1, 2, and 3) crowdsourcing often uses non-
monetary incentives (Wikipedia2, StackOverflow3, ReCAPTCHA4, etc.). In Chapter 6 the
focus was on such non-monetary incentives. In particular it was evaluated if a framing
can alter a crowd workers’ behavior, as it is reminding him of his initial motivation to
participate in the crowdsourcing task. The evaluation was implemented as set of two field
experiments in the context of the German government financed project “Planspiel Flächen-
handel”. Results indicate on three levels that a customized framing positively affected the
behavior of participants, regarding the outcome. First, average prices in a market im-
plementing a cap and trade system for TDRs are reduced after participants have been
framed. Second, average spendings, thereby the indebtedness of participants represent-
ing local authorities, are reduced. Third, new land consumption is differently evaluated
after the framing. Participants take the value of new land consumption into account and
hence, have a higher focus on positively fiscally evaluated land. Overall, it was shown,
that a framing, customized to the platforms context and reminding participants of their
initial motivation to take part and the importance of the context they work on, affects the
outcome positively. For crowdsourcing platform designers this means, that framing peo-
ple is a beneficial option to induce a certain behavior and improve the outcome of crowd
workers.
2https://www.wikipedia.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
3http://stackoverflow.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
4https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/index.html last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Contribution 5: Can a customized framing for a non-monetary setting lead to similar
behavior as in monetarily incentivized settings?
After showing that framing can positively affect a crowd worker’s behavior (see Contribu-
tion 4), it was evaluated how far this behavior is off of standardly incentivized laboratory
settings. Therefore the field experiment (see Contribution 4) was replicated with students
in a laboratory experiment. Results show no differences between the field- and laboratory
experiments on all three levels, i.e., prices per TDR, spendings of participants, and evalua-
tion of new land consumption. Hence, the behavior of framed participants is similar to the
behavior of monetarily incentivized students. Overall, this means that in the given case of
the German government financed project “Planspiel Flächenhandel” a customized framing
could incentivize participants to behave as in a laboratory setting, even without monetary
compensation. For crowdsourcing platform designers this not only means, that framing
people improves the outcome. In a scenario similar to the project “Planspiel Flächen-
handel” where crowd workers’ participation is based on intrinsic motivation, a framing
highlighting this can potentially compensate a monetary incentive.
All contributions were derived from custom made web-applications, that use or mimic
crowdsourcing platforms. These web-based platform approaches have the advantage to
mimic remote work as it is standard for crowdsourcing. Hence, a higher external valid-
ity can be observed, compared to the mainly used laboratory experimental setups. Fur-
thermore, the conducted studies focus on monetary and non-monetary incentive settings.
Other design options of crowdsourcing platforms, e.g., appeal of design, user profiles,
quality measures, etc., are not focus of this thesis. Hence, generalizability of the results to
any crowdsourcing or similar platform might not be given. However, the presented con-
tributions are a step in the direction to answer the practitioners question of how to design
crowdsourcing platforms. Thus, the work at hand contributes to better understand the
interplay of incentives and crowdsourcing and thereby, outlines a potential pathway for
the future of work.
Furthermore, all studies are exploratory studies using experimental procedures. Ex-
perimentation serves different roles in different research traditions. In the information
systems literature, Boudreau et al. (2001), for example, posit that experiments take place
in settings created by the researcher for the investigation of a phenomenon: The researcher
controls independent variables (e.g., feedback, tournament mode, framing, etc.), creates
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different treatment conditions by varying these independent variables, randomly assigns
research participants to these treatment conditions, and measures the impact on one or
more dependent variables (e.g., crowd workers’ effort, risk-taking, etc.). These experi-
mental techniques are used in the work at hand’s studies. In economics, experimental
research has a long tradition. It is accepted that experiments can serve multiple purposes.
Roth (1986, 1987), for example, distinguishes three classes of experiments under the la-
bels “speaking to theorists”, “searching for facts”, and “whispering in the ears of princess”.
Experiments speaking to theorists are designed to test well-articulated formal theories.
Experiments searching for facts explore phenomena where existing theory may have lit-
tle to say; they are “often designed without reference to a specific body of theory” (Roth,
1987, p. 2). Experiments whispering in the ears of princess are designed to resemble
natural environments and inform policy decisions. On the backdrop of this experimen-
tal economics perspective, this work’s exploratory studies are experiments searching for
facts (Roth, 1986, 1987), more precisely they are all framed field experiments (Harrison
and List, 2004). A contrary perspective common in the social sciences (Stebbins, 2001)
and applied to information systems research by, e.g., Briggs and Schwabe (2011, p. 98)
suggests that the goal of experimental research “is to test the propositions of a deductive
nomological theory. It may also be called confirmatory research.” In this perspective, only
studies “speaking to theorists” (Roth, 1986, 1987) can be considered experiments. In or-
der to be clear on the exploratory nature of this thesis, these empirical studies are referred
as “exploratory studies using experimental techniques”.
7.2 Future Work
A Guideline on How to Conduct Crowd Experiments
Lessons learned from the online crowd experiments from Chapters 4, 5, and 6 show, that
conducting crowd experiments comes with a vast amount of challenges compared to classi-
cal laboratory or field experiments. By conducting several online experiments with differ-
ent crowds many challenges occurred, which in classical laboratory setups are unknown,
since classical experimental economics literature was developed before the rise of crowd-
sourcing platforms (see Friedman and Sunder, 1994). The validity of such experiments
in comparison to economic laboratory experiments was comprehensively discussed in the
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literature (Paolacci et al., 2010; Chilton et al., 2010). However, compared to classical
lab experiments, researchers are facing several challenges while conducting online exper-
iments with crowds as well, e.g., synchronization and control. To overcome such issues
on crowdsourcing platforms, guidelines leading through the process of conducting exper-
iments are needed.
A set of comprehensive guidelines for behavioral research on crowdsourcing platforms
have already been published (Mason and Suri, 2012; Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci et al.,
2010). However, these guidelines often do not focus on economic experiments but on
behavioral research in general. Furthermore, against the background of the fast growing
number of experiments, especially on MTurk1, crowd workers start to get used to certain
experiment types (Chandler et al., 2014). As a consequence, guideline-based experimental
design approaches become outdated rapidly. Approaches to overcome this issue need to be
developed steadily since researchers have to address the new insights of crowd workers.
Searching for approaches is exhausting. Researchers do not report their own approaches
extensively, since it is mostly not the researcher’s focus. Guidelines who do report ap-
proaches are often outdated and might not work to the expected extend. This stresses
the need for a continuously updating guideline with a specific focus on economic experi-
ments.
Future work should hence develop a state-of-the-art guideline for crowd experiments
including common challenges and best practices from the experimental economics litera-
ture. A potential approach should use a well known process, which most researchers are
familiar with as a starting point, such as the work of Friedman and Sunder (1994), depicted
in Figure 7.1, and transfer it to a conceptual framework. Each of these stages should then
be extensively described and should highlight typical challenges, which researchers would
face when transferring an experiment to a crowd setup, and then highlight approaches and
examples to overcome them. Furthermore an architecture of an open platform facilitating
continuous updates of the guideline should be developed and implemented.
The process of conducting economic experiments can be divided in (i) the experimental
design stage focusing on which experimental setup suits the research question best, (ii)
the sampling or recruitment of participants, (iii) conducting the experiment, and (iv) the
analysis of the results (see Friedman and Sunder, 1994). When transferring these steps to
crowd experiments, researchers have to address certain challenges to ensure result quality.
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Design Sampling 
Instruc-
tions 
Tests Execution 
De-
briefing 
Payment Analysis 
Conducting the Experiment 
FIGURE 7.1: Process of conducting experiments based on Friedman and Sunder (1994).
A guideline should hence highlight these challenges and suggest possible approaches re-
trieved from literature. In the following, such a possible approach is exemplarily presented
for the experimental design stage, by first highlighting the challenges and then showing
approaches.
One of the first steps in experimental research is to decide which experimental design
suits the research question best. Common design decisions comprise whether an experi-
ment requires (i) asynchronous or synchronized decision-making and if it should be con-
ducted as (ii) a field or a laboratory study (Friedman and Sunder, 1994).
(i) In asynchronous as opposed to synchronous experiments participants do not com-
pete simultaneously against each other. Since in laboratory studies participants usually
are in the same room during the observation, it is easy to implement both setups. On
MTurk and other online crowd scenarios however, the implementation of synchronous ex-
periments is challenging. Usually tasks are designed as open calls (Howe, 2006b). It is
unclear if or when a crowd worker starts completing the task. This makes it difficult to re-
alize experiments where two or more participants have to compete simultaneously against
each other due to unknown arrival times of crowd workers (Mason and Suri, 2012; Mao
et al., 2012).
First, it should be checked, whether the underlying research question can be addressed
with an asynchronous experiment design as well. If possible, the experiment can be re-
designed in an asynchronous setup. Second, if participants do not have to compete live
against each other, playing against historical data from an earlier observation is possible
(Amir et al., 2012; Suri and Watts, 2011; Straub et al., 2015) (e.g., the studies of Chap-
ter 4). Third, if the live interaction and reaction between participants is indispensable a
“ virtual waiting room” can be implemented (Mao et al., 2012; Mason and Suri, 2012;
Paolacci et al., 2010). However, a shortcoming of this approach is that it is unclear how
long a participant has to wait, since arrival times vary. One possible approach to address
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this is paying a fixed fee after a certain amount of waiting time or using bots in case that
waiting times are too long (Horton et al., 2011).
(ii) In a field experiment participants usually do not know that they are being observed
and the experimental setup is camouflaged. This leads to a high external validity but
lower internal validity. In laboratory studies the actions of a participant are observed in
a controlled environment – the laboratory. Isolated cabins prevent unregulated contact
and ensure that participants are not influenced by uncontrolled stimuli. Variance in noise,
light, and technical factors like input devices, monitors, etc. can be suppressed. There-
fore external confounding factors are minimized and internal validity is higher (Friedman
and Sunder, 1994). In theory both, field and laboratory setups, can be realized on crowd-
sourcing platforms like MTurk. However, the internal validity of experiments on MTurk
compared to laboratory settings might be lower due to less possible control.
To be more specific, crowd workers might not pay attention during the observation
(Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton et al., 2011; Mason and Suri, 2012). Since participants
on MTurk work usually from their own computer it is nearly impossible to control their
environment during the observation (Chandler et al., 2014; Crump et al., 2013; Rand,
2012). Chandler et al. (2014) finds that participants are watching TV or listening to music
while working on MTurk. Another problem with crowdsourcing is that some of the crowd
workers try to maximize their payout by finishing as many tasks as possible, often just
clicking through tasks. So called “malicious” crowd workers or “spammers” are not paying
attention and jeopardize the overall data quality of results (Krause et al., 2016).
First, the overall task design can be aligned to incentivize crowd workers to take the task
seriously. Tasks that are fun, interesting, and meaningful incentivize participants to pay
attention (Kittur et al., 2013; Crump et al., 2013). Layman and Sigurdsson (2013) show
that tasks designed as a game are more satisfying for a participant and thereby motivate
to pay attention. Furthermore, researchers could state the expected result quality and
give context about the overarching goal in the instructions to give the task a meaning (Oh
and Wang, 2012; Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Stating that the task is an experiment and
participation helps research, can as well give the task a meaning, if experimenter bias is
not a problem (Orne, 1962).
Second, besides redesigning the overall experimental task, experimenters can try to
exclude participants who do not pay attention before the actual observation. Many re-
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searchers test if a participant is paying attention during the instructions and exclude those
who fail the respective test from the sample (Paolacci et al., 2010; Peer et al., 2013; Oppen-
heimer et al., 2009; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). Oppenheimer et al. (2009) introduced
the instruction manipulation check, which was recently applied by many researchers (Hall
and Caton, 2014), as well as in Chapter 4. The fundamental idea of the instruction ma-
nipulation check is to trick inattentive participants with a question or free text field which
is easy and at best straightforward to answer, e.g., “What is your age?” The instructions
state at one point that this particular question should be ignored. Consequently partici-
pants who do not read the instructions carefully, e.g., stating their age, can be excluded
from the task (Goodman et al., 2012).
A continuously updating guideline can be successfully put into practice within a collab-
orative process. Hence, researchers should work together to integrate their (new) insights
to an online platform. A possible framework for such a process could be structured as
follows: First, if researchers decide to conduct a crowd experiment they should have ac-
cess to the most recent version of the guideline from the platform as depicted in Figure
7.2. Second, challenges that apply to the experimental setup should be possible to iden-
tify by looking up approaches in the registered insights from other researchers. Third,
researchers should incorporate these approaches to their experimental setup or develop
new approaches based on the challenges and hints from the platform. Fourth, after the
researchers conducted their experiment they should update the platform based on their
findings, e.g., if and how good the applied approaches worked. Through such a process
continuous updates to the guideline are facilitated based on collaborative input from re-
searchers and the community.
However, certain requirements should be implemented. Malicious crowd workers might
try to trick such a system by accessing the platform in order to get defective insights.
Therefore access should be restricted to researchers and practitioners. Login systems only
giving access to confirmed users and other security measures must be developed.
Overall the most important factor for a continuously updating guideline is the integra-
tion of new insights and results. Therefore researchers must be incentivized or enforced
to incorporate their knowledge to the platform. Social rankings raising reputation and
chances for citations might incentivize participation. Another conceivable way would be
to enforce participation by restricting access with a fee, which a researcher gets back once
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FIGURE 7.2: Framework of an online platform for a collaborative and continuous crowd ex-
periment guideline.
he updates the platform. However, finding and developing the correct incentives is one of
the research challenges this future work proposes.
So far this future work is a conceptual proposal. Following the notion of collaborative
online work and crowdsourcing, a demonstration version should be developed to incorpo-
rate practitioners and community feedback in future iterations. Hence, first steps should
elaborate and finalize the guideline concept and integrate it in a platform to facilitate a live
deployment. Possible future extensions of such a platform include crowd worker databases
to block users who already participated in similar experiments as proposed by Chandler
et al. (2014) and experimental databases to look up which experiments other researchers
already conducted.
NeuroIS and Crowdsourcing
In Chapter 4 the results showed that effort levels of crowd workers decrease in a dyadic
ROT with an equally well performing competitor. A potential explanation could be that
crowd workers perform worse under pressure. In a scenario, where the competitor is
always on par with a crowd worker might be more stressful and hence increases pressure
and arousal. A future study should thus shed light on this assumption by transferring this
study to a laboratory setup where internal states such as the heart rate are measured as
a proxy for a subjects’ arousal level. Todays measurement tools, such as biosensors, give
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access to the physiological state of a person. Potential applications and further studies
could then involve tools for crowd workers to access live bio feedback about their current
physiological state. In combination with nowadays affordable biosensor tools, such as
webcams and fitness trackers measuring the heart rate, and instructions for self regulation
of the internal state, the overall performance of the crowd could be potentially improved.
Selective Rankings and Quality in Crowdsourcing
Results from Chapter 4 showed that feedback in ROTs decreases performance of crowd
workers compared to PRs. Hence, the best ROT design is without feedback, leaving the
crowd workers in the dark if they are winning or not, when it comes to effort. However,
it is straightforward to assume that in long lasting tournaments for creative tasks, such as
creating logos and designs (e.g., 99designs5, threadless6, etc.), feedback might increase
the quality of results.
In relations between the requester and the crowd workers, where the crowd workers
have to meet the specific expectations of the requester, communication and feedback might
help to guide the workers in the right direction. However, from Chapter 4 we know that
giving such a feedback decreases performance. Future work should hence further analyze
the relation between ROT feedback and quality. It might still be vital to give feedback in
a ROT when a high quality of results and not performance is the desired outcome of the
market. A future study could potentially analyze further design tweaks of ROT feedback,
as depicted in Figure 7.3. Especially not giving a public feedback, as this decreases crowd
workers’ effort compared to not giving feedback (see Chapter 4), but giving private feed-
Rank    Name         Score 
1. Player 3        4.5 
2. Player 2      4.0 
3. You         3.8 
4. Player 1 2.4 
5. Player 4 1.7 
 
 
 
             You               3.8 
 
 
Rank    Name         Score 
1.         ________        __ 
2.         ________        __ 
3.         ________        __ 
4.         ________        __ 
5.         ________        __ 
No Feedback Public Feedback Private Feedback 
FIGURE 7.3: Potential treatments of a future study analyzing feedback mechanisms and qual-
ity.
5http://en.99designs.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
6https://www.threadless.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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back to each crowd worker separately might increase quality, as it is proven to affect a
crowd worker’s behavior (Mazarakis and Van Dinther, 2011).
Adaptive Feedback
One limitation of Chapter’s 4 studies is that the given feedback was from (only) one com-
petitor. If you beat this competitor a participant received a bonus. However, before the
experiment and to some extend during the experiment it was unclear how many tasks this
competitor will finish (see Chapter 4). This might have lead to a demotivational factor of
some participants who, not knowing how good they have to perform, thought that they
will not be able to win. Hence, stating how many tasks a participant has to finish to receive
a bonus before the experiment might increase a participant’s effort level.
A future study could, hence, analyze if, by stating the amount of tasks a participant
has to finish given a certain time frame, the overall effort level can be increased. The
setup should analyze repeated tournaments. In each new stage (tournament round) the
amount of tasks to finish in this time frame should be adopted based on the result of the
last round. If the participant has achieved the goal, the next round’s goal should be slightly
higher. If the participant fails, the next round’s goal should be slightly lower, as depicted
in Figure 7.4. Doing so, the goal is achievable for every participant, while still getting
harder as long as the participant can do better. Once the goal reached a level higher than
his maximum effort level and he cannot beat it, the challenge will become easier. Such
an adaptive setup should lead to a higher motivation in long lasting tasks, while still the
highest effort of each individual can be potentially achieved. A control scenario could be a
tournament where you always have to beat a median score from pre-tests, which will not
adopt over the rounds. The analysis could then answer on the one hand, if an adaptive
feedback leads to higher effort levels. On the other hand, it could evaluate if such an
adaptive feedback leads to continued participation in long lasting tournaments, i.e., lower
quitting rates. Therefore, a participant should be able to exit the experiment after each
tournament round or to continue and earn more money, as depicted in Figure 7.4.
Crowdsourcing Trust
Through recent developments crowdsourcing applications now face the challenge of the
crowd participating and cooperating as a network (Prpic´, 2016). In such P2P networks, like
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
You: 5 
Target value: 50, current value: 0 
Timer: 2:37 
Stop this round and go to payment 
Your gaol: 15 
You have beaten your goal 
 
Your current earnings: USD 1 
 
 Continue to next round 
Stop and go to payment 
You have not beaten your goal 
 
Your current earnings: USD 0 
 
 Continue to next round 
Stop and go to payment 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
You: 5 
Target value: 50, current value: 0 
Timer: 2:37 
Stop this round and go to payment 
Your gaol: 20 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
You: 5 
Target value: 50, current value: 0 
Timer: 2:37 
Stop this round and go to payment 
Your gaol: 10 
FIGURE 7.4: Potential treatment process of a future study analyzing adaptive feedback, effort,
and motivation in long lasting tasks.
the sharing economy, the crowd shares goods, such as flats (Airbnb7) or cars (BlaBlaCar8)
with each others. In such situations where the crowd faces each other and wants to ex-
change goods it is important to trust the respective peer of the transaction (Hawlitschek
et al., 2016). However trust to a specific peer is a phenomena which a person develops
over time based on past transactions. Hence, such platforms have to overcome the problem
of building an initial trust before the first transaction of the respective peers.
One already used mechanism of such platforms are user profiles. However, the ques-
tion arises if such profiles can be optimized to increase this initial trust. Especially user
profile pictures seem to be a promising starting point as they give a first impression of the
respective peer and are known to increase trust (Teubner et al., 2014). A future study
might examine if crowd workers of an online labor market (e.g., MTurk1) are capable of
FIGURE 7.5: Potential process of crowdsourcing trust-scores for profile pictures of sharing
economy platforms.
7https://www.airbnb.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
8https://www.blablacar.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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evaluating how trustworthy a person appears on his profile picture. In such a setup several
crowd workers could rate user profile pictures with a likert scale implementing the trust-
worthiness of the user’s profile picture. The mean score could then serve as a proxy for
the trustworthiness of the user. Potential research questions involve if profile pictures with
a higher trust-score show higher trust in a trust game experiment and how many reviews
from crowd workers are needed to build a suitable trust-score. A future application could
then, for example, be an integrated service of sharing economy platforms where a user
can evaluate his profile picture by a crowd for a small monetary compensation, to increase
his likelihood for transactions on such a platform, as depicted in Figure 7.5. This could
potentially offer a cheap and fast mechanism given the small monetary compensations on
online labor markets, the large subject pools, and the fast execution times of such a task.
Prediction Markets and Rankings
Another prominent crowdsourcing application is a prediction market (e.g., Economic In-
dicator Exchange9, intrade10, or PredictIt11) which aim to forecast future events (Kranz
et al., 2014). On such markets crowd workers trade stocks which constitute the outcome
of future events, such as on real stock markets. The current price on a prediction market
usually accounts for the likelihood of the outcome. Thereby, these markets give predictions
for future events at any given point in the lifespan of such a market.
A potential research question could be which incentives are best suited to get the at-
tention of the crowd, which could evaluate the findings from Chapter 4 in a real world
crowdsourcing application – a prediction market. Furthermore it could be evaluated if
increasing the risk-taking behavior of crowd workers could increase the precision of pre-
dictions. Thereby the ranking design of Chapter 5 could be further extended and tested on
such a prediction market. In addition, the evaluations of Chapter 4 are missing a longitu-
dinal study if these incentives motivate crowd workers over time for a continuous partici-
pation. Rankings however, offer a variety of design tweaks, such as selective feedback and
information messages after special events, such as increasing a rank after a good trade.
Prediction markets offer a tool to analyze if such design tweaks motivate crowd workers
to participate in the long run.
9http://www.eix-market.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
10https://prev.intrade.com/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
11https://www.predictit.org/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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Rank   Suggestion Votes 
1. Name 3 3500 
2. Name 1 3000 
3. Name 4 2000 
4. Name 5 0800 
5. Name 2 0150 
Standard List Random List 
Rank   Suggestion Votes 
1. Name 4 2000 
2. Name 5 0800 
3. Name 1 3000 
4. Name 2 0150 
5. Name 3 3500 
Rank   Suggestion Votes  
feat. Name 2 0150 
1. Name 3 3500 
2. Name 1 3000 
3. Name 4 2000 
4. Name 5 0800 
Featured List 
 Suggestion Votes 
 Name 2 0150 
 Name 5 0800 
 Name 4 2000 
 Name 1 3000 
 Name 3 3500 
Reversed List 
FIGURE 7.6: Potential treatments of a future study analyzing user interface designs for crowd-
voting settings.
User Interface Design for Crowd-Voting
In crowd-voting, crowdfunding, and crowd-donating settings the crowd is used to decide
which is the best out of several options. In such settings it is important to identify the “best”
solution (e.g., name, project, etc.). In crowd-voting scenarios, usually, the crowd is used
to propose solutions and later to vote on these to identify a winning solution. Often these
crowd-voting tournaments are implemented only for a given scenario, such as naming a
boat12. However, several recent examples have proven, that crowd-voting does not always
lead to a satisfying outcome for the requester. For example, a crowd-voting tournament
of the Natural Environment Research Council led to the outcome to name their new boat
“Boaty McBoatface”12. Clearly the institute was not satisfied with this name and named
the boat after Sir David Attenborough instead. This example shows, that these scenarios
need some control mechanism. A potential future work could, hence, focus on different
user interfaces to identify a design which facilitates a different outcome.
Most crowd-voting scenarios usually show just a list of the different suggestions ranked
from most liked (most votes) to least liked (least votes). Such a visualization surely fa-
cilitates that prominent suggestions like “Boaty McBoatface”12 are seen by every voter,
since it always shows up on the front-page as most popular. The visibility of such a “joke”
contribution might spur its popularity. Evidence for this is given by studies analyzing so-
cial influences, social biases, and herding effects in such scenarios (Lorenz et al., 2011;
Muchnik et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014). Hence, a potential experiment could analyze
different visualizations and their impact on the outcome – here identified winning sugges-
tion. Possible visualizations incorporate (i) a standard list (most votes to least votes) as
a basic scenario, (ii) a random list, (iii) a standard list including features (promotion) of
12For more details see: http://www.nerc.ac.uk/press/releases/2016/18-ship/ last accessed:
September 6, 2016
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currently unpopular suggestion on top of the page, and (iv) a reversed standard list (least
votes to most votes), as depicted in Figure 7.6. Such a study could shed first light on the
question, if the outcome of crowd-voting scenarios could be influenced by only changing
the user interface of such platforms. Together with a customized framing which tells peo-
ple not to suggests “jokes” (see Chapter 6) and further tweaked visualizations this future
work could potentially lead to new crowd-voting platforms where the crowd more likely
suggests satisfying solutions.
7.3 Final Remark
In this chapter I presented the five main contributions of the work at hand. Thereby I eval-
uated several incentives for crowdsourcing applications and their interplay with crowd
workers’ behavior. First, two common payment schemes which are used in crowdsourcing
practice – PRs and ROTs – were compared focusing on effort of crowd workers (RQs 1 and
2). Second, crowd tournaments were further investigated based on their influence on risk-
taking behavior (RQ 3). Third, it was evaluated how a framing can suit as non-monetary
incentive for crowdsourcing applications (RQs 3 and 4). These contributions (see Sec-
tion 7.1 of this chapter) give practitioners insights and clear guidance of how to set up
incentives for crowdsourcing applications. To sum up, the represented contributions and
collected insights about incentives for crowdsourcing provide important details about the
effect of different incentives on the user behavior. Platform designers can now incorporate
these insights to implement the best possible crowdsourcing applications (see Section 7.1
of this chapter).
Then I shed light on future directions for this research domain, which is built up on
lessons learned from the experiments conducted in this thesis. In particular, a framework
was presented to collaboratively build an update a guideline for conducting crowd experi-
ments. In addition, six main challenges for future research were derived which build upon
and extend the present work (see Section 7.2). The outlined research directions are ap-
propriate to get insights about open questions and extend the results to newly developing
crowdsourcing domains. I would be delighted if the contributions and directions for future
work help to broaden the understanding of this research domain and potentially inspire
future researchers to work in this vastly developing field.
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Appendices

Appendix A
Texts and Platform Screens of Chapter 4
This appendix lists the instructions, platform screens, and questionnaires from the exper-
iments conducted in Chapter 4. Instructions and questionnaires from the experiments are
presented in its original English version. Instructions of Study 1 represent the treatment
where the PR round is played first. For the case that the ROT round is played first, the
order of the rounds in the instructions are changed. Instructions of Studies 2 and 3 are
represented by the instructions of Study 2. Instructions of Study 3 were changed where
appropriate.
Instructions
Study 1: Piece Rates versus Rank-Order-Tournaments
Please read these instructions carefully:
You participate in an academic experiment on performance in groups.
You will play 3 rounds of a slider task game. A round proceeds as follows:
• At the top there is a feedback of your performance.
• Beneath there is a slider.
• Your task is to position the slider to 50 (it ranges from 0 to 100) as often as possible.
• A new slightly different slider will appear every time you positioned the slider cor-
rectly.
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• It is possible to stop the round and go to the next round/payment if you click on the
button on the bottom of the page.
• If you do so this will not influence the acceptance of your HIT! You will always
get the earnings you have gathered.
Round 1 will proceed as follows:
• This is a test round.
• You play alone.
• You get used to the task.
• You do not get a payment for this round but for the next 2 rounds.
• The task will last 0:30 minutes.
Round 2 will proceed as follows:
• You play alone.
• You get $0.02 per finished slider.
• The task will last 2:00 minutes.
Round 3 will proceed as follows:
• You play against 1 other participant.
• To prevent any delays, the other participant already finished the task and you play
against his historical data.
• If you finish more sliders than your rival you will get a $1.00 bonus. Else you get
$0.00 in this round.
• We will inform you if you performed better than your rival after all 3 rounds in the
final payment screen.
• If there is a tie we will randomly assign the bonus to one of you.
• The task will last 2:00 minutes.
Your bonus is calculated as follows:
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• You get a fix payment for completing this HIT of $0.50.
• You get a bonus payment for every finished slider in round 2 of $0.02.
• You get another bonus of $1.00 if you finished round 3 better than your rival.
• The sum of these 3 will be your final payment.
Do not use a tablet, smartphone or touchpad. The task will be much easier using a
mouse.
Please note: Most modern theories of decision making recognize the fact that decisions do
not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational
variables can greatly impact the decision process. In order to facilitate our research, we
are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then
some of our research design that relies on changes in the instructions will be ineffective.
So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the input
field and the continue button below. Instead simply click on the words “please note” at
the beginning of this paragraph to proceed to the next screen. Thank you very much.
What is your age in years?
Please insert your age in years in this textfield.
Continue
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Study 2 and 3: Feedback in Rank-Order-Tournaments – Different (Equal)
Strength(s) of Competitors
Please read these instructions carefully:
You participate in an academic experiment on performance in groups.
You will play 2 rounds of a slider task game. A round proceeds as follows:
• At the top there is a feedback of your performance.
• Beneath there is a slider.
• Your task is to position the slider to 50 (it ranges from 0 to 100) as often as possible.
• A new slightly different slider will appear every time you positioned the slider cor-
rectly.
• It is possible to stop the round and go to the next round/payment if you click on the
button on the bottom of the page.
• If you do so this will not influence the acceptance of your HIT! You will always
get the earnings you have gathered.
Round 1 will proceed as follows:
• You play alone.
• You get $0.01 per finished slider.
• The task will last 1:30 minutes.
Round 2 will proceed as follows:
• You play against 1 other participant.
• To prevent any delays, the other participant already finished the task and you play
against his historical data.
• If you finish more sliders than your rival you will get a $1.00 bonus. Else you get
$0.00 in this round.
• You will see a ranking which informs you about your current performance and pay-
ment.
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• If there is a tie we will randomly assign the bonus to one of you.
• The task will last 3:00 minutes.
Your bonus is calculated as follows:
• You get a fix payment for completing this HIT of $0.30.
• You get a bonus payment for every finished slider in round 1 of $0.01.
• You get another bonus of $1.00 if you finished round 2 better than your rival.
• The sum of these 3 will be your final payment.
Do not use a tablet, smartphone or touchpad. The task will be much easier using a
mouse.
Please note: Most modern theories of decision making recognize the fact that decisions do
not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational
variables can greatly impact the decision process. In order to facilitate our research, we
are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then
some of our research design that relies on changes in the instructions will be ineffective.
So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the input
field and the continue button below. Instead simply click on the words “please note” at
the beginning of this paragraph to proceed to the next screen. Thank you very much.
What is your age in years?
Please insert your age in years in this textfield.
Continue
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Platform Screens
FIGURE A.1: Web interface of piece rate treatment of Chapter 4.
FIGURE A.2: Web interface of no feedback treatment of Chapter 4.
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FIGURE A.3: Web interface of feedback treatments (FW, FM, FS, and FE) of Chapter 4.
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Questionnaires
Instructions Test
We would like to ensure your understanding of the instructions to allow you to partici-
pate.
Please answer the 5 following quizzes carefully. If you make too many mistakes, you will
not be allowed to participate1.
In case of doubt, you can review the instructions in a new browser window any time by
clicking this link.
1. What is your task?
a) Estimate the average of a set of numbers
b) Count the occurrence of a certain number in a given dataset
c) Adjust a slider to a certain position
d) Copy a text
e) Solve a simple maze game
2. Against whom your playing in round 3 (2 for study 2 and 3)?
a) No one, I’m playing alone
b) Against historical data from another participant
c) I’m playing live against another participant
d) I’m playing live against 3 other participants
1After three mistakes a participant was kicked out of the study. They still got the fix fee as reward.
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3. To which value do you have to adjust the slider?
a) 50
b) 20
c) To a new value each round
d) 80
e) I don’t have to adjust a slider
4. If you are reading this, please answer the third option.
a) Grey
b) Dark Blue
c) Both
d) None of the above
5. How is your bonus calculated?
a) I get a fix bonus. The same as everybody.
b) The bonus is equally distributed between the participants.
c) My bonus will be calculated according to the completed sliders in round 2 (1 for
study 2 and 3) and according to my final rank in round 3 (2 for study 2 and 3).
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Questions after study 1, 2, and 3
1. What is your gender?
a) male
b) female
2. What is your age?
Please insert your age in years in this textfield.
3. What is your education?
a) Some High School completed
b) High School Diploma
c) Some college completed
d) Associate’s degree
e) Bachelor’s degree
f) Master’s degree
g) Doctorate
h) None
4. How distracted have you been during the experiment?
a) not at all
b) a little
c) very
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5. Which input device did you use?
a) Mouse
b) Touchpad
c) Tablet
d) Smartphone
e) Trackball
f) Pointing stick (Lenovo/IBM)
g) Other
6. Which hand do you use to control your input device?
a) left
b) right
How well do the following statements describe your behavior?2
• I enjoy competition because it gives me a chance to discover my abilities.
• Competition does not increase my awareness and understanding of myself and oth-
ers.
• Competition can lead to the formation of friendship with others.
• Competition is not a means of motivating me to bring out the best in myself.
• I enjoy competition because it tends to bring out the best in me rather than as a
means of feeling better than others.
• I do not find competition to be a very valuable means of learning about myself and
others.
• I like competition because it teaches me a lot about myself.
2Questions are based on Griffin-Pierson (1990) and Ryckman et al. (1996). All questions were imple-
mented with a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Questions were randomized for
the questionnaire.
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• I value competition because it helps me to be the best that I can be.
• I find competition enjoyable because it lets me express my own potentials and abili-
ties during competition.
• Competition does not help me develop my abilities more.
• Without the challenge of competition I might never discover that I had certain po-
tentials or abilities.
• I enjoy competition because it brings me and my competitors closer together as hu-
man beings.
• I enjoy competition because it helps me to develop my own potentials more fully
than if I engaged in these activities alone.
• I enjoy competition because it brings me to a higher level of motivation to bring the
best out of myself rather than as means of doing better than others.
• Through competition I feel that I am contributing to the well-being of others.
• I perform better when I am competing against someone rather than when I am the
only one striving for a goal.
• I do not feel that winning is important in both work and games.
• When I win an award or game it means that I am the best compared to everyone else
that was playing. It is only fair that the best person wins the game.
• In school, I always liked to be the first one finished with a test.
• When nominated for an award, I focus on how much better or worse the other can-
didates’ qualifications are as compared to mine.
• I would want an A because that means that I did better than other people.
• I have always wanted to be better than others.
• Because it is important that a winner is decided, I do not like to leave a game unfin-
ished.
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Texts and Platform Screens of Chapter 5
This appendix lists the instructions, platform screens, and questionnaires from the exper-
iment conducted in Chapter 5. Instructions and questionnaires from this experiment are
translated to English from the original German version. The presented instruction is from
the IND treatment of the experiment of Chapter 5. The instruction of the TEAM treatment
was changed where appropriate.
Instruction
Hello “first name”,
thank you for your participation in this experiment. Here are some relevant informa-
tions.
General
This experiment is a betting game. You bet on tendencies (win home, draw, win away) of
all 64 games of the FIFA World Cup. You bet on the outcome of the games after regular
time. This means that overtime or shootouts are not included (important: This applies as
well for the final rounds!).
Each of these events has a quota, similar to commercial sport betting platforms. The quota
corresponds to the points you can win.
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Placing your bets
Please note that you are only allowed to bet on games 72 hours until 5 minutes before
the game starts. You can place your bet by clicking on the respective box (left box = win
home, middle box = draw, right box = win away).
If your bet is correct, you will receive points accordingly to the quota. If your bet is wrong
or you did not place a bet, you will receive no points.
Group & payment
You are in a group with 5 other participants. Overall there are 6 similar groups. Decisive
for the ranking and hence your payment is the overall sum of your points and how you
rank compared to the peers in your group. Therefore you are not in competition with the
other groups, but with the participants in your group.
The ranking is updated after each game. Your own position is highlighted with yellow.
The payment at the end of the experiment is structured as follows:
• The participant on the first place receives 50€, the second place receives 25€, and
the third place receives 15€.
• Each participant who bets on all 64 games receives in addition 5€.
• After the experiment you have to fill out a questionnaire. You can earn additional
money dong so.
Besides the ranking of your own group, you can access an alphabetical list of all groups
taking part in this experiment. This group comparison is irrelevant for your payment, since
you only compete against the participants in your group.
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Login
To place bets and to view your ranking, please visit www.golero.de and log in with the
following user account:
Username: “username”
Password: “password”
Please confirm that you are able to successfully log in with a short e-mail. Thank You.
If you have additional questions, you can contact us via e-mail (Tim Straub “email” or
Dr. Timm Teubner “email”).
Best regards and good luck during the experiment!
Your IISM-Team
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Platform Screens
FIGURE B.1: Log in of the web interface for the experiment of Chapter 5.
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FIGURE B.2: Inactive betting phase (active 72 hours until 5 minutes before the start of a game)
of the web interface for the experiment of Chapter 5.
FIGURE B.3: Active betting phase (active 72 hours until 5 minutes before the start of a game)
of the web interface for the experiment of Chapter 5.
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FIGURE B.4: Ranking of the IND treatment of the web interface for the experiment of Chap-
ter 5.
FIGURE B.5: Ranking of the TEAM treatment of the web interface for the experiment of Chap-
ter 5.
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Questionnaires
Questions after the experiment
First name
Please insert your first name.
Last name
Please insert your last name.
Age in years
Please insert your age.
Citizenship
Please insert your citizenship.
Which is your favorite team of the FIFA World Cup?
Please insert your favorite team.
Did you follow a specific strategy throughout the experiment? If so, what strategy?
Please insert your strategy.
To what extent do the following statements apply to you?1
• There is a sense of human contact in this experiment.
• There is a sense of personalness in this experiment.
• There is a sense of sociability in this experiment.
• There is a sense of human warmth in this experiment.
1Questions are based on Bollen and Hoyle (1990), Griffin-Pierson (1990), Gefen and Straub (2004),
Greene (2004), Hassanein and Head (2005), Rammstedt and John (2007), Byun and Mann (2011), Liu
et al. (2013), and Vandercruysse et al. (2013). All questions were implemented with a Likert scale from 1
(not correct at all) to 7 (fully correct). Questions were randomized for the questionnaire.
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• There is a sense of human sensitivity in this experiment.
• I see myself as someone who is reserved.
• I see myself as someone who is generally trusting.
• I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy.
• I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handles stress well.
• I see myself as someone who has few artistic interests.
• I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable.
• I see myself as someone who tends to find fault with others.
• I see myself as someone who does a thorough job.
• I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily.
• I see myself as someone who has an active imagination.
• I would want to get an A because that is the best grade a person can get.
• I perform better when I am competing against someone rather than when I am the
only one striving for a goal.
• I do not care to be the best that I can be.
• When applying for an award I focus on my qualifications for the award and why I
deserve it, not on how the other applicants compare to me.
• I do not feel that winning is important in both work and games.
• When I win an award or game it means that I am the best compared to everyone else
that was playing. It is only fair that the best person wins the game.
• In school, I always liked to be the first one finished with a test.
• I am not disappointed if I do not reach a goal that I have set for myself.
• I have always wanted to be better than others.
• Achieving excellence is not important to me.
168
• When nominated for an award, I focus on how much better or worse the other can-
didates’ qualifications are as compared to mine.
• I would want an A because that means that I did better than other people.
• I wish to excel in all that I do.
• Because it is important that a winner is decided, I do not like to leave a game unfin-
ished.
• I would rather work in an area in which I can excel, even if there are other areas
that would be easier or would pay more money.
• The experiment makes you feel active.
• The experiment makes you feel excited.
• The experiment makes you feel stimulated.
• The experiment makes you feel lively.
• The experiment makes you feel activated.
• During the experiment I felt competition with other participants.
• During the experiment I was conscious about other participants’ behavior.
• During the experiment I felt like I am competing with other participants for points.
• During the experiment I felt like running a race.
• During the experiment, I experienced a high level of competition in general.
• I feel a sense of belonging to the group.
• I feel that I am a member of the group.
• I see myself as part of the group.
• I am enthusiastic about the group
• When I talk about this group, I usually say “we” rather than “they”.
• This group’s successes are my successes.
• I act like a person of this group to a great extent.
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• I found my participation in this experiment interesting.
• I found my participation in this experiment entertaining.
• I found my participation in this experiment enjoyable.
• I found my participation in this experiment pleasant.
Your decision sheet shows ten decisions listed on the left2. Each decision is a paired choice
between “Option A” and “Option B”. You will make ten choices and record these in the final
column, but only one of them will be used in the end to determine your earnings. Before
you start making your ten choices, please let me explain how these choices will affect your
earnings for this part of the experiment.
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered
from 1 to 10 (the “0” face of the die will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your
choices, we will throw this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and
a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the
particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these
will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will
be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end.
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays 2.00€if the throw of the ten
sided die is 1, and it pays 1.60€if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields 3.85€if the throw
of the die is 1, and it pays 0.10€if the throw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar,
except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option
increases. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each
option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 2.00€or 3.85€.
To summarize, you will make ten choices: For each decision row you will have to choose
between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other
rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. When you are
finished, we will come to your desk and throw the ten-sided die to select which of the
ten Decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to determine your money
earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. Earnings (in €) for this choice will
2This short introduction and the following questionnaire are based on the risk-aversion test of Holt and
Laury (2002).
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be added to your previous earnings, and you will be paid all earnings in cash when we
finish.
So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will
have to mark a decision, A or B in each of these boxes, and then the die throw will de-
termine which one is going to count. We will look at the decision that you made for the
choice that counts, and circle it, before throwing the die again to determine your earnings
for this part.
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not talk
with anyone while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question.
Option A Option B Choice
1/10 of 2.00€, 9/10 of 1.60€ 1/10 of 3.85€, 9/10 of 0.10€
2/10 of 2.00€, 8/10 of 1.60€ 2/10 of 3.85€, 8/10 of 0.10€
3/10 of 2.00€, 7/10 of 1.60€ 3/10 of 3.85€, 7/10 of 0.10€
4/10 of 2.00€, 6/10 of 1.60€ 4/10 of 3.85€, 6/10 of 0.10€
5/10 of 2.00€, 5/10 of 1.60€ 5/10 of 3.85€, 5/10 of 0.10€
6/10 of 2.00€, 4/10 of 1.60€ 6/10 of 3.85€, 4/10 of 0.10€
7/10 of 2.00€, 3/10 of 1.60€ 7/10 of 3.85€, 3/10 of 0.10€
8/10 of 2.00€, 2/10 of 1.60€ 8/10 of 3.85€, 2/10 of 0.10€
9/10 of 2.00€, 1/10 of 1.60€ 9/10 of 3.85€, 1/10 of 0.10€
10/10 of 2.00€, 0/10 of 1.60€ 10/10 of 3.85€, 0/10 of 0.10€
TABLE B.1: The Ten Paired Lottery-Choice Decisions risk-aversion test based on Holt and Laury
(2002).
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Appendix C
Texts and Platform Screens of Chapter 6
This appendix lists the instructions, platform screens, and questionnaires from the exper-
iments conducted in Chapter 6. Instructions and questionnaires from the experiments are
translated to English from the original German version. The presented texts are from Ses-
sion 2 (Experiments 3 and 4) of Chapter 6. All other texts were changed where appropriate.
Online Platform’s Landing Page Text
Welcome to the online platform of the “Planspiel Flächenhandel”.
Several changes were made to this platform in comparison to the first session. The most
important is the following:
• Your actions are from now on under the supervision of several institutions, which
will question your actions and when appropriate restrict your actions. In focus of this
is your behavior when submitting orders as well as your possibility to loan money
(credits). Information regarding this will be available via the header of the plat-
form. When corresponding actions occur you will always be informed with pop-up
windows.
We would like to highlight, that you participate in this experiment as representative of
a German local authority and you should act realistically. Take all displayed building
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land as given and ask yourself before taking an action, how the real local authority would
decide, given the circumstances you face during the experiment.
Schedule, September 29, 2015:
• 10:00 am: start / log in / instructions part 1
• 10:30 am: playing a test-round
• 10:50 am: experiment 1
• 12:15 am: lunch break
• 01:15 pm: log in / instructions part 2
• 01:30 pm: experiment 2
• 03:00 pm: questionnaire / feedback
• 03:10 pm: end
At this session we will conduct 2 experiments. One in the morning and one in the after-
noon. Please view the tutorial videos and instructions located in the help section of this
platform until 10:30 am, to be prepared for the experiments.
At 10:30 am we will start a test round. In this round you will have 15 minutes time to
get used to the experimental platform. Doing so you will be able to realize (hypotheti-
cal) “Monopoly-building-projects”. You can test all functions of the platform during the
test-round. This test-round will not be used in the analysis of the results, however we
want to strongly encourage you to use this test-round to be more secure during the actual
experiments.
At 10:50 am we will start the first experiment. There you will find all your (real) building
projects which you entered in the survey census platform several weeks ago.
The experiments last until 12:15 am. Eventually we wil finish a bit early. After the first
experiment a lunch break will take place.
Please come back to your desk until 01:15 pm, so that you have enough time to read the
instructions for the second experiment. Here you can view again a short tutorial video or
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read the text form of the instructions. These instructions will explain you the differences
to the first experiment.
At 01:30 pm we will start the second experiment.
At 03:00 pm the second experiment is finished. Then you will have time to fill out a short
questionnaire to give us feedback. After finishing this questionnaire you are done for today.
The team of the “Planspiel Flächenhandel” wants to thank you for your participation!
If you have additional questions feel free to contact us:
Tim Straub
“e-mail”
“phone”
Dr. Ralph Henger
“e-mail”
“phone”
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Instruction
Dear participant of the “Planspiel Flächenhandel”,
this document describes the online platform of this planning game.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Please consider the following central points:
• You are taking the role of a planning department of a German local authority.
• Your actions during the simulation are supervised by different institutions. These
institutions will question your actions and when the circumstances require it restrict
your actions. This regards your bids as your possibility to take out credit loans.
Information regarding this will be presented via the header of the platform as well
as through pop-up windows.
We would like to highlight, that you participate in this experiment as representative of
a German local authority and you should act realistically. Take all displayed building
land as given and ask yourself before taking an action, how the real local authority would
decide, given the circumstances you face during the experiment.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Overview of the platform:
We would like to give you a short overview of the structure of the platform. This should
make it easier for you to find the several elements of the platform. You will find detailed
explanations of these elements below.
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1. In the header of the page you find an overview of the course of the experiment –
which phase is currently active, which will be the next phase, which year it is, and
how much time is left in the current phase. Additionally you will get short update
messages about the experiment.
2. In the trading module you can submit buy and sell orders for certificates. Therefore,
you type in the price (in €) per certificate, the amount of certificates, as well as if
you want to buy or sell.
3. The building projects module shows you all your potential building projects. Only
during the “activation phase” you can realize them. You need enough certificates
doing so. In all other phases the building projects are slightly grayed out.
4. The depletion projects module shows you all your depletion projects (white certifi-
cates projects). Only during the “activation phase” you can deplete them. You will
gain white certificates doing so.
5. The message module will give detailed messages about the experiment. These are
mostly similar to the messages of the header, but supplemented with more details.
6. The planning goals module informs you about your currently created working and
living places and how many of them your local authority planned to realize until the
end of the experiment (end of 2028).
7. The depot module informs you about your current certificates and money.
8. The orderbook module shows you the currently open orders at the certificate mar-
ket. This shows you at any given point at which price you can buy or sell certificates.
9. The own orders module shows you your own orders, which you created during the
“CDA trading phases”. You can cancel orders which are not yet matched, which will
remove them from the market.
10. The price chart module informs you about the course of certificate prices.
11. The own auction orders module shows you your orders from the “USBA auction
phases”. You can cancel orders which are not yet matched during an active “USBA
auction phase”, which will remove them from the market.
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1. Experiment:
Video Tutorial:
The video tutorial is accessible here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VM6B4TG9u
9c1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General (video 00:00 min):
After you logged in into the platform, you will first see the landing page. You can always
come back to the landing page by clicking in the left upper corner on “Planspiel Flächen-
handel”. During the experiment, you can come back to this instruction page by clicking
on “help”.
At first the experiment will not be active. You will be automatically redirected to the
experiment, once it starts.
The experiment simulates the period of the years 2014 to 2028.
A year consists at first of 2 phases: The first phase comprises the trading of certificates;
the second phase the realization and depletion of building projects. The phases repeat
yearly until the end of the experiment. The phases last 3 minutes (“CDA treading phase”)
1Last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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and 2 minutes (“activation phase”). A certificate accounts for 0.1 ha (1000 square meters)
building land. To realize building projects during the “activation phase” you need enough
certificates. You get certificates at the beginning of each year for free and you can buy
them during the “CDA trading phase” from other participants.
Throughout the experiment you are informed in the upper part of the platform (header),
which year and phase is currently active. Moreover, it shows how much time is left in the
current phase and which will be the next phase.
The next line shows you, how many certificates you got for free in the current year. Each
year you will get certificates for free dependent on the size of the local authority you
represent. This yearly freely distributed amount will be shortened every 3 years. To give
you an overview of this process we inform you about the outlook of your own certificate
distribution in the first year as information message in the header. Moreover we inform
you if any complications occur and we have to pause the experiment. The different phases
are color coded to make it easier for you to identify which phase is currently active – “CDA
trading phase” pink, “activation phase” white, and “USBA auction phase” blue.
180
CDA trading phase (video 05:55 min):
The experiment starts with the “CDA trading phase”, which lasts 3 minutes. Here you
can buy and sell certificates from or to other participants. The auction mechanism is a
continuous double auction (CDA).
If you point your mouse over the small green question mark symbols you can access short
explanations of the different modules, which should clarify most questions throughout the
experiment.
During the “CDA trading phase” you see the “trading module” in the upper part of the
screen. During the other phases this module is hidden. If you want to trade you have
to submit buy or sell orders with this module. Once you have confirmed and submitted
your order it will be available anonymized within the “orderbook module” for all other
participants.
During the phase you can submit as many orders as you want to. Submitting orders is
free of charge. However, you have to pay the price for the certificates if you buy them or
have to provide the certificates if you sell them, once your order is matched. A order gets
matched if respective other order exists.
You should take into account that the price of your order is in relation to your building
project’s fiscally evaluation, so that you not lose money. The fiscally evaluation per certifi-
cate of your building projects’ list helps you in this case. You find these evaluations in the
“building projects module”. We will later explain this module in more detail.
High spendings during the “CDA trading phase” can lead to the point, that your local
authority has to loan to much money (credits). If your order is unrealistic, given your
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local authorities budget and overall market caps, your actions can be questioned by several
institutions or even be prohibited. If you act to often against the intuitions of your local
authority, you may even lose your right to take part in the experiment. As orientation you
can see your yearly maximal budget in the header of the platform as short information
message.
The “orderbook module” is structured as follows:
• On the left side you see the best 5 buy orders, sorted from the highest to the lowest
price.
• On the right side you see the best 5 sell orders, sorted from the lowest to the highest
price.
Orders are matched following the continuous double auction (CDA) mechanism. The ex-
ecution price is based on the older order in the market.
Not yet matched orders can be canceled in the “own orders module”.
An overview of your current financial values and your current certificates is given in the
“depot module”. At the beginning of each year you get certificates for free on your depot.
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If you have active orders, which are currently not yet matched, then the amount of money
or certificates which you need for your order is blocked and not accessible for you. Your
money depot starts with 0€.
You can overdraw your money depot yearly to a certain extend. The municipal supervisory
will take action and might even forbid an action, if it would overdraw your money depot
over your yearly limit or if you would need to borrow the money from other departments
within your local authority. Please note, that your income during a year will counteract to
this, so that your financial scope will get bigger again. As orientation we will tell you your
yearly budget as short information message in the header.
Please note, that you can already select building projects during the “CDA trading phase”.
Doing so, you can see a preview of the impact on your depot in the “depot module”. This
can help you with the decision if you should buy or sell certificates.
Activation phase (video 15:30 min):
After the “CDA trading phase” the “activation phase” is active. During this phase you can
realize or deplete building projects. This phase lasts 2 minutes.
For the “activation phase” the modules “building projects module” and “depletion projects
module” are important. During the phase all other modules are slightly grayed out. In
these modules you will find a list of your building projects or your depletion projects (white
certificates). Depletion projects cost money to deplete but create certificates (white cer-
tificates) over the following years.
The “building project module” shows the following informations in a aggregated manner:
the name of the project, the type (commercial or living), the amount of created working
and living places, as well as the expected duration until the projects is fully used, the
space of the project in ha, the fiscally evaluation of the project, the fiscally evaluation per
certificate needed to realize the project, and the amount of certificates needed to realize
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the project. You can only realize a project if you have enough certificates in your depot.
By doing so you will get the fiscally evaluation booked on your depot.
The building projects are sorted following their potential first realization year. Below the
list of all projects of one year, you can see a summary row, showing the total certificates
needed to realize all projects. The projects from the current year are included in this
summary calculation. Projects first realizable in later years are not included in this calcu-
lation. The second number of this summary row subtracts all freely distributed certificates
you would get until the respective year. E.g., we currently have the year 2020. The build-
ing projects we want to realize cannot be realized before 2022. Then the second number
shows the amount of certificates you need additionally for the realization, given your cur-
rent certificates depot and the freely distributed certificates from the years 2021 and 2022.
Hence, you can easily identify how many additional certificates you need to buy to realize
all building projects.
To realize a building project you have to check mark the respective box in the row of the
project. In each “activation phase” you can realize as many projects as you want to. You
can see the impact on your depot and your overall goals in the “depot module” and the
“planning goals module”. For the realization you need to confirm your selection by clicking
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on the “confirm” button below the table. If you have enough certificates the action will be
accepted. These certificates will be subtracted from your depot. The fiscally evaluation of
the realized building projects will be booked on your money depot as well. Note that not
all building projects have a positive fiscally evaluation.
After clicking on the confirm button the selected building projects will appear at the end
of the list with the comment “realized”. Furthermore, your “planning goals module” and
your “depot module” will be updated.
Besides the realization of building projects you can as well deplete projects (“renatura-
tion”) during an “activation phase”. Thereby you generate so called white certificates. You
will find the respective module below the “building projects module”.
If you decide to deplete projects, you will get the displayed certificates distributed over
several years on your “depot module”. Depletion projects do have costs, which will be
subtracted from your “depot module”. Like for the case of the realization of building
projects you have to confirm your action by clicking on the confirm button below the list.
The maximal amount of white certificates you will get each year is aligned to the size of
the local authority you represent, similar to the free distribution of certificates each year.
You can see the maximal yearly amount of white certificates by moving your mouse over
the small green question mark of the “depletion projects module”. Hence, you will not get
all certificates instantly, but stretched over several years.
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2. Experiment:
Dear participant of the “Planspiel Flächenhandel”,
this document describes the extensions and changes from the second experiment compared
to the first experiment you played this morning.
Video Tutorial:
The video tutorial is accessible here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X39TZae25Wc2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USBA Auction Phase (video 00:00 min):
The second experiment is overall very similar to the first experiment. Like this morning we
will again simulate the period from 2014 to 2028. The big difference is, that beginning with
the year 2020 we will introduce the “USBA auction phase”. During this phase the yearly
freely distributed certificates will be partially auctioned by the public administrations.
For you that means, that besides the “activation phase” and the “CDA trading phase” there
will be a third phase, the so called “USBA auction phase”. Each year this will be the first
phase, taking place before the other two phases. To understand this new phase we will
first look at the changes to your freely distributed certificates each year. Different than
before, beginning with the year 2020, you will get stepwise less certificates for free. In a
2Last accessed: April 6, 2016.
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first period from 2020 to 2022 you will receive 20 % less certificates for free than in the
first experiment. During the period from 2023-2025 you will get 40 % less and during the
period from 2026-2028 you will get 60 % less. Now you will probably ask yourself what
we will do with these not distributed certificates.
Thats where the USBA auction comes into play. You will get the chance to auction those
not-distributed certificates (certificates from all participants). In reality such an auction
would be conducted by the public administration, similar to the emission trading. The
“USBA auction phase” lasts 1:30 minutes and all participants take part. To make the pro-
cess more clear, we will guide you exemplarily through it.
We will tell you that an auction will happen through a short information message in the
header. The phase is color coded with blue, so that you can easily distinguish it from the
other phases.
During the “USBA auction phase” the “auction module” will be active, which looks similar
to the “trading module”.
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Similar to the “CDA trading phase” you will submit price per certificate and amount of
certificates as an order. In our example the participant is willing to pay 15,000€per cer-
tificate. He wants to buy 5 certificates for this price. Hence, this results in a buying volume
of 75,000€. You can submit as many orders during this phase as you want to.
To not lose money, you should take into account that the price of your order is in relation
to your building project’s fiscally evaluation. If you would lose money several institutions
could prevent your actions as well. The fiscally evaluation per certificate of your building
projects lists helps you in this case. You find these evaluations in the “building projects
module”. The spendings during this phase will as well affect your “depot module” and
hence your credit limit. As orientation we will tell you your maximal budget as short
information message in the header.
Your order will be submitted by clicking on the confirmation button. The auction will be
sealed, hence you will not see the orders from the other participants.
During the “USBA auction phase” you can cancel your orders in the blue highlighted “own
auction orders module”.
Explanation of a Uniform-Price Auction (video 05:35 min):
Different than the “CDA trading phase” the auction follows a uniform-price scheme. E.g.
overall 100 certificates will be auctioned. During the “USBA auction phase” all participants
submit their orders. After the phase, when all orders are submitted, they are sorted from
the highest to the lowest price. Then the certificates will be distributed from top to bottom
(order with highest price to order with lowest price). This happens as long as the orders
can be executed, meaning as long as certificates are available for distribution. It is possible
that the last executed order does not get all certificates he initially wanted to auction. In
that case he gets the rest of the still available certificates. The last executed order (the
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order who got certificates with the lowest price), defines the price for all participants – the
so called uniform-price.
In our example, where 100 certificates are auctioned, the participant who wants to auction
20 certificates and at a price of 35,000€only gets 10 certificates, since all other certifi-
cates are already distributed to the other participants with orders including higher prices.
However, since his order is the last one executed, it defines the uniform-price. Hence, all
participants pay per certificate 35,000€, even when they were willing to pay more per
certificate initially.
At the end of the “USBA auction phase” you can see a short information message in the
header, how many certificates you auctioned and at which price.
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All other yearly following phases will proceed analogous to experiment 1.
If you have any questions during the experiments, you can always come back to the in-
structions by clicking on help at the top of the platform.
We wish you good luck during the two experiments!
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Information Papers from “Planspiel Flächenhandel
All papers are in German language. They are accessible from the project’s homepage3 as
well.
• Information paper 1, Information:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Fl
%C3%A4chenhandel-InfoPapier-Nr01_Fl%C3%A4chenhandel_Informationspapi
er_Nutzen_und_Anforderungen_f%C3%BCr_Kommunen.pdf
• Information paper 2, certificate distribution:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Fl
%C3%A4chenhandel-InfoPapier-Nr02_NEU.pdf
• Information paper 3, inner city development:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Fl
%C3%A4chenhandel-InfoPapier-Nr03-NEU.pdf
• Information paper 4, survey census platform:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Pl
anspiel_Fl%C3%A4chenhandel_Erhebungsplattform_Anleitung.pdf
• Information paper 5, white certificates:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Fl
%C3%A4chenhandel-InfoPapier-Nr05.pdf
• Information paper 6, field experiment:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Fl
%C3%A4chenhandel-InfoPapier-Nr06.pdf
• Information paper 7, fiscally evaluation:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Fl
%C3%A4chenhandel_Infopapier_Nr._07_-_Fiskalische_Wirkungsanalyse.pdf
3http://www.flaechenhandel.de/ last accessed: September 6, 2016.
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• Information paper 8, results of case studies:
http://www.flaechenhandel.de/fileadmin/std_site/content/Downloads/Fl
%C3%A4chenhandel-Info-Papier-Nr.08.pdf
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Platform Screens
FIGURE C.1: Homepage of the project “Planspiel Flächenhandel” of Chapter 6.
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FIGURE C.2: Participating local authorities of the project “Planspiel Flächenhandel” of Chap-
ter 6.
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FIGURE C.3: Certificate calculator (1) of the project “Planspiel Flächenhandel” of Chapter 6 –
searching for a local authority (here Berlin, city).
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FIGURE C.4: Certificate calculator (2) of the project “Planspiel Flächenhandel” of Chapter 6 –
certificates distributed to a local authority (here Berlin, city).
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FIGURE C.5: Experiment platform of the project “Planspiel Flächenhandel” of Chapter 6 –
active CDA trading phase.
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FIGURE C.6: Experiment platform of the project “Planspiel Flächenhandel” of Chapter 6 –
active activation phase.
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Questionnaire
1. How strongly did the following factors impact your buy orders?4
• Price on the market
• Political importance
• Fiscally evaluation
• Demand (long-term)
• Demand (mid-term)
• Demand (short-term)
2. How strongly did the following factors impact your sell orders?
• Price on the market
• Political importance
• Fiscally evaluation
• Demand (long-term)
• Demand (mid-term)
• Demand (short-term)
3. To which extend do you think your actions correspond to real decisions from your local
authority?
4. Here you can give us feedback:
Please insert your feedback in this textfield.
4Questions are constructed mainly by Dr. Ralph Henger and Michael Schier from the “Institut der
deutschen Wirtschaft Köln”. All questions were only answered from planners from local authorities (session
1 and 2). Students did not answer questions (session 3 and 4). The following questions were implemented
with a scale ranging from 0 % to a 100 %.
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Bonus Payment Structure
Rank Bonus-Payment
1 21.00€
2 21.00€
3 21.00€
4 20.00€
5 20.00€
6 20.00€
7 19.00€
8 19.00€
9 19.00€
10 18.00€
11 18.00€
12 18.00€
13 17.00€
14 17.00€
15 17.00€
16 16.50€
17 16.50€
18 16.50€
19 15.50€
20 15.50€
21 15.50€
22 14.50€
23 14.50€
24 14.50€
25 13.50€
26 13.50€
27 13.50€
28 12.50€
29 12.50€
30 12.50€
31 12.00€
32 12.00€
33 12.00€
34 11.00€
35 11.00€
36 11.00€
37 10.00€
38 10.00€
TABLE C.1: Bonus payment of student participants in the Mo setting.
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